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The turbulent years of anticolonialist struggle had come to an end, 
but for several decades, and particularly from the time that full 
political Independence was gained from France In 1954, Laos has been a 
country without peace. It was, of course, deeply Involved In the 
complex struggle between the nationalist. Western, and Communist nations. 
The movement from traditionalism to modernity, however, has been quite 
minimal. The country still holds the rank of the least urbanized as 
well as the least literate In Southeast Asia. Based on self-contained 
farm villages, the Laotian economy Is the least developed In Indochina.^ 
One of the basic problems In Laos has been— and still Is— the fact 
that It has little precedent for being a "nation." Unlike neighboring 
Thailand, for example, which has long had a central government, the 
territory of present-day Laos has traditionally been divided Into 
several competing principalities. Although Laos was governed as a unit 
by the French for many years, the unifying effect of this was minimal
In 1972, the United Nations described Laos as one of the twenty- 
five least developed countries on earth. The twenty-five least developed 
countries. In alphabetical order, are: Afghanistan, Botswana, Bhutan,
Burundi, Chad, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Guinea, Haiti, Laos, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Republic of Maldives, ^ 1 1 ,  Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Sikkim, Somalia, Sudan, 
Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Western Zamoa, and 
Yemen. See, "DAC's New Target for Aid," War on Hunger (December, 1972), 
1-3.
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because the French mainly exercised control through the existing regio­
nal structures. Some degree of unity of purpose was achieved during 
the Laotian independence movement, but independence itself was followed 
almost immediately by civil war, and the end of that war was so recent 
that the Laotian leadership has still had little experience in 
governing the territory as a true nation.
In Laos, the most distinctive characteristic of the political 
system was the lack of agreement among the political elites and between 
these elites and the average citizen as to what constitutes the legiti­
mate and appropriate ends and means of political action. The clashes
2between old and new, between foreign and indigenous, between democracy 
and socialism, and between universal and parochial orientations 
inevitably create tremendous gulfs in understanding among different
3segments of the society.
It has been speculated that the majority of the Lao population 
still clings to traditional ways, but among the Laotian elites there 
are likely to be variances in position and view. Some people may be 
more entrenched in traditional practice and may thus see politics 
largely as a means for expressing status differences and reinforcing
2For example. Prince Boun Oum, a Rightist of the South, once 
said that "the war in Laos is between a Frenchman and a Vietnamese.
I alone am Lao." The "Frenchman" was, of course. Prince Souvanna Phouma, 
Prime Minister; the "Vietnamese" meant Prince Souphanouvong, the leader 
of the Laotian Patriotic Front. See Arthur J. Dommen, "Lao Political 
Under Prince Souvanna Phouma," in Indochina in Conflict; A Political 
Assessment, ed. by Joseph J. Zasloff and Allen E. Goodman (Lexington; 
Lexington Books, 1972), pp. 86-96.
3
Lucian W. Pye, "The Developing Area: Problems for Research,"
in Studying Politics Abroad: Field Research in Developing Areas, ed. by
Robert E. Ward (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1964), p. 12.
3
hierarchical relationships. Others may have been Influenced by Western 
experiences and think of government largely as Involving problems of 
administration and maintenance of law and order. Many others may be 
Imbued with the spirit of nationalist movements and think of the 
political realm as primarily providing opportunities for self-expression 
and national assertion. Others, fascinated by socialist doctrine, think 
of discarding Western-style democracy for an authoritarian regime for 
the purpose of survival. Still others may come to view the government 
as giving guidance In mobilizing the entire people for social advance-
4ment and economic development.
Unlike other countries, where several different types of elites 
may govern,^ only political-bureaucratic elites govern In Laos. They 
are, to use the words of Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, "the key 
political, economic, and social decision-makers."^ The country Is In 
their hands, and political events have little relevance to the sentiment 
of the masses,^ who are mostly aliens to the world of public affairs.
The key to understanding the Laotian situation, therefore, lies In
See, J. H. Halpem, The Lao Elite; A Study of Tradition and 
Innovation (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1960); Phouml Vongvl-
chlt, Laos and the Victorious Struggle of the Lao People Against U.S. 
Neo-Colonlallsm (Paris: Neo Lao Hak Xat Editions, 1969); and, Joseph
J. Zasloff, The Pathet Lao (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973).
^For example, see, Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic 
Elitism (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967).
^Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 219.
^Thls also Is largely true even In advanced countries, see, N. 
Glazer and Seymour Martin Llpset, "The Polls on Communism and Conformity," 
In The New American Right, ed. by Daniel Bell (New York: Criterion
Books, 1967), p. 161.
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understanding the political-bureaucratic elites themselves. What are 
their characteristics, their attitudes, their values, and their perspec­
tives on human beings, Laotian society, and the political institutions 
to which they devote their lives? These points, concerning the 
personality and culture of the elites themselves, are likely to give us 
a better picture of Laos in the present and on the road ahead.
Statement of the Problem 
As human beings the elites interact, influence each other, and 
bring influence to bear upon their environmental systems. Through these 
processes ideas are formed which, in turn, constitute the basis of inter­
relationships between the,elites and their environments. But, what are 
the deep-seated preoccupations of the elites? What ideas are shared by 
them? In other words, what are the characteristics of those elites?
This study is intended to investigate the role perceptions of 
the Laotian political-bureaucratic elites, placing the perceptions within 
the context of various behavioral and institutional phenomena. We assume 
that the elite's opportunities and limitations for political actions 
are structured by the political situation, the polity, and the political 
culture-and-personality.
The investigation has entailed two separate but related efforts. 
First: the literatures of psychology, sociology, anthropology, social
psychology, and political science have been drawn together eclectically 
to develop a conceptual framework within which the Laotian elites might 
be studied. Second: an extended visit was made to Laos for the purpose
of making observations and conducting interviews with the elite 
population.
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At this point key terms— such as "elite," "culture," "personality," 
and "political culture-and-personality"— which will be used throughout 
this study should be considered at greater length.
The Conceptualization
The term "elite" in this study refers to the small stratum of
individuals who are most active and most influential in a society's 
8political affairs. For purposes of simplification, we assume that all 
political systems can be stratified into the elites and the non-elites.
The elites— or the rulers or leaders— who possess the most power and 
make important decisions in a society play the key political roles : 
they shape and reflect the values, attitudes, and beliefs of a society, 
carve out the public institutions, and mold the framework for the lives 
of those who are ruled. They also formulate and articulate demands 
within the political system and enact, interpret, and enforce the rules 
which govern the non-elites.
Because the elites' roles are key to a society, the word "elite" 
has been extended to involve other definitions and connotations, ^ o n g  
them are "bureaucrat" and "establishment." But the sense of "bureaucrat" 
is often pejorative, even evil— very nearly synonymous with ruling class, 
dictatorship, or aristocracy. Elites have occupied the attention of a
8 •Harold D. Lasswell defines "elite" in a broader sense: "The
few who get the most of any value are the elite; the rest are the rank 
and file." See Harold D. Lasswell, World Policies and National Security, 
1st paperback ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 3. For theore­
tical foundations of the political elite approach, see: Gaetano Mosca,
The Ruling Class, trans. by Hannah D. Kahn (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939); 
Vifredo Pareto, The Mind and Society, trans. by Andrew Bongorno and 
Authur Livingston (New York: Hartcourt, Brace, 1935); and Robert
Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical
Tendencies of Modern Democracy, trans. by Eden and Cedar Paul (Glencoe:
The Free Press, 1949).
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great many political and social philosophers from the time of Plato to 
Aristotle to Pareto, Mosca, Salnt-Slmon, Mannheim, Lasswell and C.
Wright Mills— to mention only a few. The central Idea of the "elite" 
concept Is that a small group In a given society Is differentiated from 
the rest (sometimes referred to as the masses) by one or more of these 
characteristics; 1) the elite exerts, or possesses, crucial power 
with respect to the decisions In his society; 2) the elite Is the bene­
ficiary of special privilege In terms of wealth. Income, or other per­
quisites; and 3) the elite has high prestige In the society as a whole.
There are two principal categories of elite studies. According 
to the first, the existence of a political elite Is held to be common 
to all political systems regardless of location, time, or culture; and 
a common basis Is assumed to exist for the undertaking of cross-national 
comparisons. Studies falling Into the second category are Involved 
with stratifying a particular political system Into the rulers and the 
ruled. This provides the opportunity for study at either level. The 
present study falls within the second category of elite studies. It 
Investigates the Laotian political elite In considerable depth, and—  
for reasons given below— relatively Ignores non-elites.
According to James Bill and Robert Hardgrave, Jr., the study of 
elites "can yield the most fruitful results with regard to precisely 
those societies about which we know least and within which the processes
9
of modernization are most dramatically evident." They further 
comment that
9James A. Bill and Robert Hardgrave, Jr., Comparative Politics: 
The Quest for Theory (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1973), p. 171.
African, Asian, Middle Eastern, and Latin American societies 
lend themselves to the elite approach for two basic reasons:
(1) they tend to be those societies which are most obviously 
elitist; and (2) personal and informal politics are relatively 
more significant here.10
Regardless of the categories or methods used, the studies of the 
elites of developing countries have yielded quite similar results.
Elite analyses in Africa and the Middle East by Manfred Halpem and 
Daniel Lerner, in Turkey by Frederic Frey, in Iran by Marvin Zonis, in 
India by Myron Weiner, in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) by Marshall Singer, in 
Malaysia by James Scott, in Burma by Lucian Pye, and in Latin America 
by Seymour Martin Lipset, Aldo Solari, and John Johnson— to cite but 
a few— have presented a remarkably consistent composite picture of the 
political elite. According to these studies, a typical member of the 
elite would be an urbanized man having at least some secondary school 
education, knowing a world language, belonging to the salaried middle 
classes, strongly influenced by nationalism and the desire to modern­
ize his country, and often inclined toward state capitalism or 
socialism.
^°Cbid.
^^John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin America (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1958); Daniel Lemer, The Passing of Tra­
ditional Society (Glencoe: Free Press, 1958); Myron Weiner, The
Politics of Scarcity: Public Pressures and Political Response in India
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1962); Lucian W. Pye, Politics,
Personality, and Nation-Building: Burma's Search for Identity (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1962); Manfred Halpem, The Politics
of Social Change in the Middle East and Africa. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1963; Marshall Singer, The Emerging Elite: The
Politics of Leadership in Ceylon (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1964);
Frederic Frey, The Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965);
Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Solari, Elites in Latin America (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1967); James C. Scott,Political Ideology in 
Malaysia: Reality and Beliefs of an Elite (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1968); and, Marvin Zonis, The Political Elite (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1971).
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In one of these studies, Lucian Pye comments that
The elite who dominate the politics of most non-Westorn 
countries generally represent a remarkably homogenous 
group in terms of educational experience and social 
background— it is those who have become urbanized, have 
received the appropriate forms of education, and have 
demonstrated skill in establishing the necessary personal 
relations who are admitted to the rank of the elite.
Similarly, Edward Shils observes that the members of these elites by
and large are rational-minded and that they believe in dynamic change,
in science, in rational administration, in written law and order, and
13in the planning of large-scale improvement schemes. And Manfred
Halpern states that in the Middle East leadership is being increasingly
seized by a class of men inspired by non-traditional knowledge. They
form a core of salaried civilian and military politicians, organizers
and administrators, and other technical "expert," and they have to a
large extent taken power from the former elite— which consisted of land-
14owners and the commercial and professional middle class. Furthermore, 
John Johnson describes the groups which are most influential in Latin 
America as urban, above average in education, pro-industry, nationalistic, 
and by and large favoring state participation in social and economic 
a r e a s . I n  like fashion, Myron Weiner remarks that India is governed 
by m o d e m  or Westernized elites who favor a unified national state and 
large-scale economic development and who are concerned with making
12Pye, op. cit., p. 16.
13Edward Shils, "The Concentration and Dispersion of Charisma," 
World Politics, 11 (October, 1958), 1-19.
14Halpem, op. cit.
Johnson, op. cit.
substantial modifications in the social s t r u c t u r e . F i n a l l y ,  Fred
Von der Mehden states that elites in most underdeveloped countries are
motivated by a desire for national unity, social welfare, and indus-
17trialization under government auspices.
Perhaps the most important similarities which emerge from
this comparison of elites in underdeveloped countries, as Halpern
has pointed out, is that in their great majority they are "modern"
elites, similar in function and to some degree in outlook to the modern
Western elites defined by Raymond Aron— they are the "managers of
18modern mass society."
Many of the earlier studies of developing nation elites tended
to treat them as simply local copies of Western political elites, and
gave little attention to the ways in which their socio-cultural
backgrounds might make them behave differently than Westerners. Later
studies, while having the merit of bringing in a behavioral perspective,
have tended to emphasize conflict and the vertical stratifications of 
19their societies. But according to Larry Hill, "a mere study of the 
distribution of various political attitudes over the society might 
obscure important configurations of them within individual
^^Weiner, op. cit., chapter 1.
^^Fred R. Von der Mehden, Politics of the Developing Nations 
(Englewood-Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964).
18Raymond Aron, "Social Structure and the Ruling Class," 
British Journal of Sociology, 1 (March, 1950), 1-16.
19 See comprehensive bibliographies of elite study in: Carl
Beck and J. Thomas McKennie, Political Elite: A Select Computerized
Bibliography (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1968); and, William B. Quandt,
The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Beverly Hills: Sage
Publications, 1970).
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20personalities." Failure to search for the "political attitude con-
21figurations within the Individual," to use Hill's phrase. Is a
22limitation of many studies. He suggests a "political culture-and- 
personallty" approach as an alternative. This approach will be con­
sidered further below.
A Political Culture-and-Personallty Focus 
Political culture-and-personallty Is one particular area of 
research where anthropology, sociology, psychology, and political 
science come together. In order to explain this approach let us begin 
with Edward Tyler's statement that culture Is "the complex whole 
which Includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any
23other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society." 
But this may be called an omnibus definition. In that It lumps together 
a number of different categories. In trying to analyze the theoretical 
diffusion of culture, Clyde Kluckhohn's Mirror for Man devoted twenty- 
seven pages to defining "culture." To cite only ten of his definitions,
20Larry B. Hill, "Political Culture-and-Personallty; Theoreti­
cal Perspectives on Democratic Stability from the New Zealand Pattern," 
In Social Psychology of Political Life, ed. by Samuel A. Kirkpatrick and 
Lawrence K. Pettit (Belmont, Calif.: Duxbury Press, 1972), p. 141.
^ Îbld.
22For detailed discussions of the difficulties of doing research 
on those personality characteristics that contribute to elite behavior, 
see: Fred I. Greensteln, "Impact of Personality on Politics: An
attempt to Clear Away Underbrush," American Political Science Review,
61 (September, 1967), 629-41; Fred I. Greensteln, Personality and 
Politics (Chicago: l^rkham Publishing, 1969); and, Richard L. Merritt,
Systematic Approaches to Comparative Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally,
1970), pp. 129-134.
23Edward B. Tyler, Primitive Culture Researches Into the 
Development of Mythology, Religious. Language, Art, and Customs (New 
York: Henry Holt & Co., 1877), p. 1.
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Kluckhohn said that culture could be defined as; 1) "the total way 
of life of a people"; 2) "the social legacy the individual acquires from
his group"; 3) "a way of thinking, feeling, and believing"; 4) "an
abstraction from behavior"; 5) "the way in which a group of people in 
fact behave"; 6) a "storehouse of pooled learning"; 7) "a set of 
standardized orientations to recurrent problems"; 8) "learned behavior"; 
9) "a set of techniques for adjusting both to external environment and 
to other men"; 10) "a precipitual of history," and turning (perhaps in 
desperation) to similes, as "a map," as "a sieve," and as "a matrix.
Later, over 150 definitions of culture were reviewed by A. 
Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn. These reviewers found considerable 
commonality among these definitions, they described the pattern as 
follows :
Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and 
for behavior acquired and transmitted by symbols, constitu­
ting the distinctive achievement of human groups, including
their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture
consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived and 
selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture 
systems may on the one hand, be considered as products of 
action, on the other as conditioning elements of further 
action.25
They also speculated as to how this definition might change: "the main
respects in which, we suspect, the formula will be modified and
enlarged in the future are as regards (1) the interrelations of
26cultural forms; and (2) variability and the individual." Thus they
^^Clyde Kluckhohn, Mirror for Man (New York: Whittlesey House,
1949), chapter 1.
25A. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, Culture: A Critical Review
of Concepts and Definitions (Cambridge : Harvard University Peabody
Museum of American Archeology and Ethnology Papers, 1952), Vol. 27,
No. 1, p. 181.
^̂ Ibid.
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speculated that psychology would make major contributions to cultural
studies, because of that discipline's central concern with the
individual as a unit of analysis.
In congruence with the above conceptions, Anthony Wallace has
suggested an operational definition that culture is "those ways of
behavior or techniques of solving problems which, being more frequently
and more closely approximated than other ways, can be said to have
27probability of use by individual members of society." He further
points out that, in operational terms, personality is "those ways of
behavior or techniques of solving problems which have a high probability
28of use by one individual." The culture is, in reality, a result of 
the congregation of many diverse personalities.
Perhaps the most profitable procedure is to combine the words 
"culture" and "personality" to form a term— "culture-and-personality"—  
which can represent an indefinitely large number of different empirical 
operations. All of the operations under the rubric of "culture" have 
in common certain broad and general features; and, similarly, so do 
those operations which we refer to as "personality." The core of 
culture-and-personality in this sense has been described by Francis Hsu, 
who says that "culture-and-personality deals with human behavior pri­
marily in terms of ideas which form the basis of interrelationship
29between the individual and his society. Culture-and-personality thus
27Anthony Wallace, "Individual Differences and Cultural Uni­
formities," Ameri^an_Socl£logi^al^JRevl^^ 17 (December, 1952), 747.
^̂ Ibid.
29Francis L. K. Hsu, ed.. Psychological Anthropology ; Approaches 
to Culture and Personality (Homewood, 111.: The Dorsey Press, 1961),
p. 6.
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is a significant aspect of the cultural process which addresses its
attention to acculturation or socialization, cultural change, the
institutionalization of modes of coping with individual diversity, and
the like. Furthermore Hsu states:
On the one hand, [culture-and-personality] deals with ideas 
shared by a considerable portion of any society . . . how 
those and other ideas held by the individuals are rooted in 
the diverse patterns of culture in which they grow up. On 
the other hand, culture-and-personality deals with charac­
teristics of societies; reaction to conquest and disaster, 
internal and external impetuses to change, militarism and 
pacifism, democratic or authoritarian character; it is being 
associated with some societies may be related to such things 
as the aspirations, fears, and values held by a majority of
the individuals in these s o c i e t i e s . 3^
Based on social psychology and the culture-and-personality
aspects of anthropological concepts mentioned, Larry Hill, in 1972,
coined the term "political culture-and-personality" to be used in his
study as a new concept focusing upon the personality as the unit of
analysis. It employs the inference of psychological characteristics of
behavior to describe "the important intersectices between man, his
31society, and his political institutions." He mentions the promise 
of using the political culture-and-personality methods for research 
as follows:
30Ibid. Clyde Kluckhohn and Henry Murrey have expressed some 
dissatisfaction with the phrase "culture-and-personality" partly because 
of the dualism implied by it. They feel that "culture in personality" 
or "personality in culture" would serve as better conceptual models.
The usual phrase ignores other determinants of personality besides 
culture. "'Culture-and-personality' is as lopsided as 'biology and 
personality.'" See, Clyde Kluckhohn and Henry A. Murrey, Personality 
in Nature, Society, and Culture (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948),
p. 44. Francis Hsu has suggested the term "psychological anthropology" 
to designate this field. See, Francis L. K. Hsu, ed.. Psychological 
Anthropology (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkmen Publishing, 1972), pp. 8-9.
The writer prefers to hyphenate this phrase to emphasize its unity.
^^Hill, op. cit., p. 142.
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They are best described as eclectic and innovative. Usually 
a variety of procedures is utilized, such as participant 
observation, interviewing, the administration of psychological 
tests, and the analysis of social institutions, in order to 
provide as rich a basis as possible for interpreting the 
phenomena under analysis. Of course, one cannot be blind to 
the danger of such eclectic methods, particularly to the prob­
lems of reliability of intersubjective valuations and of 
inferring culture-and-personality from behavior and institu­
tions. It is possible to minimize error through careful 
observation, through cautious borrowing from previous treatments 
of the subject, and through the development of innovative and 
economical research strategies.
These political culture-and-personality methods can contribute to the
understanding of historical events; i.e., why particular groups of human
beings responded as they did to specific challenges. We cannot
accurately interpret history in terms of economic and political factors
while ignoring human beings. The term political culture-and-personality
OO
is broader than the term "political culture," for it encompasses the 
analysis of political behavior within which is included (as the fore­
going definitions mentioned) behavioral and institutional phenomena that 
are not normally included under the category of political culture.
For present purposes, this concept is preferable to other social
^^Ibid.
33 As Lucian Pye's definition in International Encyclopedia of 
Social Sciences 12: 218, that "Political culture is the set of attitudes,
beliefs, and sentiments which give order and meaning to political process 
and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern 
behavior in thepolitical system." The advantages of the political 
culture concept in research can be seen in the following: Gabriel Almond
and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy
in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); and,
Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds,. Political Culture and Political 
Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).
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psychological terms such as political ideology, national character, 
and political culture because it focuses upon the personality as the 
unit of analysis. As a result, this concept requires a search lei 
political attitude configurations within individual personalities.
Eclectic Nature of the Study 
This study is eclectic in nature, in acknowledgement of the 
fact that the social sciences themselves are eclectic. Drawing from 
other disciplines to build our own framework in a particular case 
seems often to help us get a better perspective. We shall try to 
integrate and see the elite in several dimensions from different 
viewpoints.
The historical perspective involves an orientation to what 
were regarded af- facts and realities in the succession of human events 
in Laos. It assumes that when these facts and realities are depicted
For a thorough discussion of national character and political 
analysis, see, Alex Inkeles, "National Character and M o d e m  Political 
Systems," in Politics and Social Life, ed. by Nelson W. Polsby, et al. 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), pp. 172-189. For studies employing
political ideology, see, David Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent 
(New York: The Free Press, 1964); Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology:
Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does (New York: The Free
Press, 1962); James C. Scott, Political Ideology in Malaysia (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1968); and, Robert D. Putnam, The Beliefs of 
Politicians: Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973).
35For an example of efforts to arrive at unified knowledge about 
man see William F. O g b u m  and Alexander Goldenweiser, eds.. The Social 
Sciences and their Interrelations (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1927).
For the interrelations of anthropology, psychology, and sociology, see 
John P. Gillin, ed., For a Science of Social Man: Convergences in
Anthropology, Psychology, and Sociology (New York; Macmillan, 1954); 
and on economics, history, and sociology, see Mirra Komaroasky, ed., 
Common Frontiers of the Social Sciences (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957);
and Don Martindale, ed., Functionalism in Anthropology, Economics, 
Political Science and Sociology (Philadelphia: The American Academy
of Political and Social Science. 1965).
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their underlying order, or casual connections, would be apparent and 
that the present and the future are to be understood from the past.
The perspective of geography is oriented toward the characteristics of 
human and material resources in defined areas of Laos in relation to 
government and politics. The perspectives of sociology and anthropology 
emphasize concern for institutions and processes, social structures and 
functions, the development and influence customs and techniques, and 
informal as well as formal human relationships. And the perspective 
of psychology emphasizes the ultimate nature of human beings and the 
efforts to discover the principles that explain individual and group 
behavior. Several scholars of the developing areas support such an 
eclectic approach. Monroe Berger, for example, contends that politi­
cal-administrative contexts in developing and developed countries cannot 
be described simply and unidimensionally; accurate descriptions require 
a diversified multidimensional approach that covers all patterns of 
covariance between these dimensions.
For example, in the area of political psychology studies, which
have served as the core of this study, it is noted that psychological
variables are of greatest value as a research tool when used to refine
present knowledge gained from the application of general measures of
socio-economic status, role, political activity, and other sociological
37variables which are now in popular use. In other words, as Richard
36Monroe Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt 
(Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1957).
37For example, see, Herbert McClosky and J. H. Schaar, "Psycho­
logical Dimensions of Anomy," American Sociological Review, 30 (February, 
1965), 14-40. They found that anomie can be studied as either a psycho­
logical or a sociological dependent variable.
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Christie has pointed out, "any attempt to relate personality variables
to political ideology without taking social context into account is
apt to be highly misleading as well as an oversimplification of some
38highly complex interrelationships."
It should be noted that in this kind of eclectic study, we 
are faced with an enormous range of concepts, theories, and frameworks 
in each discipline concerned. In order to use each tool adequately 
it is necessary to review several bodies of literature. However, it 
is impossible to review each of them thoroughly because of limited 
space. Consequently, jumping from one to the other discipline is 
sometimes necessary in order to catch a point to illuminate the 
picture of the elites which we are studying.
Theoretical Assumptions 
It is assumed as a central theme of this study that the Laotian 
political-bureaucratic elites, which from now on will be called "the 
Laotian elites," have a common psycho-cultural configuration that 
knits them together. Based on the elites' deep-seated dispositions, 
as shaped by their personality and culture, there is a single set of 
stable, habitual preferences and priorities in their behavior, thoughts, 
and feelings. As a result of their learned habits, common memories, 
operating preferences, symbols, events in history, and personal associa­
tions, the elites have become used to a certain way of life; they have 
some similar ideas about good, bad, and other things; and they have a 
tendency to act in certain ways.
38Richard Christie, "Eysenck's Treatment of the Personality of 
Communists," Psychological Bulletin, 53 (November, 1956), 428.
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In exploring this central characteristic of the elites, their
39psycho-cultural traits have been studied. The central theme of 
"traits" is mostly concerned with needs, values, personality, and culture 
of the elites in various aspects. The reader may expect to find the 
degree of intensity in each element of the elites' culture-and-person­
ality.
Rationale
It is obvious that different societies have shown differences 
in such characteristics as authoritarianism, dogmatism, closeness, 
openness, and social cooperation— to cite only a few. Obviously, there 
is more individualism and freedom of self-expression in some societies 
than in others. This research attepts to investigate what factors 
bring about such differences.
As mentioned above, the political culture-and-personality research 
approach will provide a means of combining the insights of sociology, 
psychology, anthropology, and political science. Furthermore, it is 
valuable to have descriptive behavioral accounts of the everyday lives 
of the elites in a society which has been studied as little as Laos 
and look at their pattern of personality tendencies. Without such 
documentation we would have a much more limited conception of the range
39By "trait," we refer to a "mental structure" as its meaning 
in "Robert B. Cattell's psychological traits," as example. Gordon 
Allport has defined trait as a "neurotic structure having capacity to 
render many stimuli functionally equivalent, and to initiate and guide 
equivalent (meaningfully consistent) forms of adaptive and expressive 
behavior." Or, in short, trait is "the unique patterns of individual­
ity." See Gordon Allport, Pattern and Growth in Personality (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), p. 373. See also, Calvin S. Hall 
and Garner Linzey, Theories of Personality, 2nd ed. (New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1970).
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of possibilities in human behavior. Related to the foregoing point 
is the consideration that political culture-and-personality researcli 
will contribute to an understanding of the relationship between culture 
and psychological traits. This knowledge should contribute to a more 
relativistic view of forms of elite behavior.
In addition, political culture-and-personality research may 
contribute to an understanding of historical events. Perhaps it will 
help to explain why particular human groups responded as they did to 
particular challenges. We cannot make sense of history by considering 
only economic and political variables, while holding human nature 
constant.
Significance of the Study 
The researcher's motivation to become engaged in this study lay 
in the fact that there is a great deal that is not known about politi­
cal and behavioral patterns in Laos, and that especially little is 
known about the political-bureaucratic elites. These patterns need to 
be identified before theoretical propositions can be formulated. Such 
study must also involve the exploration of elite communication patterns, 
as well as the many ways in which they are linked by various organiza­
tions and cultural ties.
Another motivating factor was that while the decades of the 
1950s and 1960s have seen a phenomenal growth of political/psychological 
research, the problem of its overall relevance and meaning for political 
behavior and political philosophy has largely been neglected. Further, 
while there now exists a body of thoughtful psycho-biographies of 
political elites and a multitude of personality-related field research
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reports, the application of such studies to a developing country's 
elite should present more perspective to the political science discipline. 
For example, the study of the feelings, beliefs, the degree of Intensity 
of both, and the relationships between dimensions of psycho-cultural 
characteristics such as authoritarianism, anomie, dogmatism, misanthropy, 
constant-ple orientation, attitudes toward entrepreneurship, rules 
of the game, political and economic equality, and cynicism, to mention 
a few, should be a worthwhile attempt to see what actually are the psycho- 
cultural dimensions of Laotian political men.
Purpose of the Study 
The main purpose of this study is to explore the patterns of the 
Laotian political-bureaucratic elites' culture-and-personality as these 
are related to politics. The findings may make at least five contribu­
tions. First, they may increase our knowledge of the Laotian elites, 
the key force in moving the country, with regard to their political 
culture-and-personality. Second, the Laotian data, as a case study, may 
serve to test some hypotheses concerning political-bureaucratic elites 
in developing nations or the least developed countries. Third, by 
utilizing political culture-and-personality as a research device, it 
may add to our understanding of individual behavior in developing 
nations. Fourth, this research is meant to detail the way in which 
politically important characteristics can profitably be linked with 
anthro-psychological theory, and as such provide another perspective on 
the growing realization of the utility of anthro-psychological 
explanations in political analysis. And, finally, since a review of 
standard indexes indicates a paucity of advanced field research in Laos,
21
this study is intended to partially fill some of the evident gap in 
scholarly research.
Definition and Terms Used 
For the purpose of this study, the following terms will be 
associated with the meanings given below. The explanations of traits 
will be treated more comprehensively in Chapter V, VI, and VII, but 
the definitions here will serve as introductory conceptions.
Lao
Refers to the ethnic group that forms the majority of Laos' 
population.
Laotian
Refers to the native people or nationals of Laos.
Laotian Political-Bureaucratic Elites
Refers to the high ranking politicians (members of the PGNU, 
members of the JNPC, and members of the National A s s e m b l y ) h i g h  
ranking civil service officials of the first class or higher positions, 
or the comparable positions in the military or police of Laos.
Authoritarianism
Authoritarianism is a pattern of expression and behavior which 
is based upon simple learning of a conception of reality prevalent in 
one's culture or subculture; it includes a high degree of conformity, 
dependence on authority, overcontrol of feelings and impulses, rigidity
The PGNU is the Provisional Government of National Union, i.e., 
the cabinet, and the JNPC is the Joint National Political Council, which 
advises the cabinet.
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of thinking, and ethnccentrism. Authoritarianism represents an
attempt to link deep-seated personality dispositions with the socially
significant forms of belief and social behavior involved in adhering
to a rigid and dogmatic ideology and not discriminating against 
41outgroups.
Theoretically, authoritarians are expected to show cynicism; 
anti-intraception; authoritarian submission (the propensity to demur 
to authority); conventionalism: authoritarian agression (that which
is directed toward violators of conventional values); concern with 
power, and toughness; projectivity; dichotomization of complex issues; 
and acceptance of traditional authoritarian figures— in sum, the atti­
tude that one lives in a hostile, jungle-like milieu, and should
42behave accordingly.
Dominance
Dominance is a pattern in which some individuals assert a higher 
rank than others. (In this study, it is intended to investigate 
capacity for status, sociability, social presence, and sense of well­
being.) As human beings, the elites l e a m  that one way of getting what 
they want is to appropriate and defend a territory of their own. 
Dominance is a drive which some people develop and others do not.
41See T. W. Adorno, et al., The Authoritarian Personality 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1950).
42Richard Christie and M. Jahoda, Studies in the Scope and 




Dogmatism derives from the concept that individuals are seen as
having a "belief system" (things believed, accepted as true) and a
43"disbelief system" (things rejected, disbelieved, seen as false).
The major variable, therefore, is the openness-closedness of belief
systems of individuals, conceptualized as relatively antithetical traits
organized in terms of belief-disbelief, centrality-peripherality, and
certain aspects of time perspective.
Open systems can be characterized by a low degree of rejection
of disbelief systems, and full communication within and between belief
and disbelief systems. Open systems can be conceptualized as showing
a low degree of differentiation (richness of detail) between belief and
disbelief. Conversely, closed systems are hypothesized to show greater
rejection of disbelief, with isolation of parts within and between
belief and disbelief sub-systems.
The determining factors of degree of openness versus closedness
can be seen as two opposing sets of motives— the need to know and the
need to defend against threat. Prevalence of the former theoretically
leads to openness; that of the latter, to closedness. Time orientation
is presumably broader for those with open systems, and narrower and
44more past-oriented for those with closed ones.
^^Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic




Faith-in-people is one's degree of confidence in the trust­
worthiness, honesty, goodness, generosity, and brotherliness of people 
in general. It is alternately called the "misanthropy scale.
Other-Directedness
Other-directedness is the concept of an externalized superego 
which implies the operation of some external agency to serve the
46function of discouraging socially disapproved behavior and beliefs.
Aside from supernatural authority, these sanctions operate 
through people who evaluate and then either sanction or condemn. As 
appropriate roles for different situations are learned, however, a 
kind of precensorship takes place so that sanctioned behavior is 
normally produced. A person's social antenae sense what others expect, 
and thus he avoids ridicule and condemnation. Cultures in which the 
superego is modally externalized are "other-directed" cultures since 
"others" perform the function of the superego.
Anomie
Anomie is viewed as an individual's generalized, pervasive sense 
of social malintegration or "self-to-other alienation" (as opposed to 
"self-to-other's belongingness"). The traditional sociological model, 
e.g., Durkheim, assumes that social conditions give rise to specified 
feelings (anomie) which in turn result in certain behavior.
^^Morris Rosenberg, "Misanthropy and Political Ideology," 




The emotion of anxiety is an effect experienced by the total 
personality. It should be noted here that the term "anxiety" is not 
used as a synonym for "fear." Fear is the reaction to a known
47specific danger while anxiety is the reaction to an unknown one.
Neurotic anxiety. Neurotic anxiety is the result of the 
individual's inability to differentiate between the wish and the action, 
when the wish is repressed and is thereby unconscious.
Social anxiety. Social anxiety is the anxiety that results 
from an anticipation in which the individual recreates, in his fantasy, 
a memory about his society.
Constant-Pie Orientation
Constant-pie orientation is an orientation that assumes a fixed 
scarcity of desired material g o o d s . T h e  "pie" cannot be enlarged 
that all might have larger "slices" but rather is constant, so that much 
of political and economic life is seen as constituting a struggle of 
one individual, family, group, or nation to expand its slice at the 
expense of other individuals, families, groups, or nations.
Rules of the Game
"Rules of the game" refers to widely shared beliefs about how the 
government, or various categories of political actors, ought to behave. 
The concept is rarely used to refer to formal or written rules—
^^See C. Spielberger, ed.. Anxiety: Current Trends in Research
(New York: Academic Press, 1972).
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Scott, op. cit., p. 94.
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statutes, constitutions, court decisions, and the like— but usually, as 
in this study, refers to informal or unwriten rules, attitudes, and 
expectations.
Scope and Limitations of the Study
This research effort has been limited by the time and financial 
resources available to the researcher. The sample survey was limited 
to the Laotian political-bureaucratic elites, as defined above, who 
held office in 1974 when the field research was conducted. (The elite 
population is shown in Appendix C.) Thus, the findings may only be used 
to make inferences about the elites of Laos at that time. However, 
since the Laotian political-bureaucratic elites were and are relatively 
few in number, and because many of them still have impact and influence 
and are even active in political affairs, the generalizations would 
seem to retain a considerable amount of reliability.
Assumptions and methodology always incur some limitations. A 
fundamental problem of the political culture-and-personality research
approach is that it has no theory of its own. Indeed, it is an eclectic
framework. This author, who has been trained in political science, 
therefore has less authoritative knowledge in some of the other fields 
involved. Further, working with the busy people at the top of the society 
within the context of the sensitive situation in Laos at the time of 
interviewing also imposed some limitations. As one political scientist 
(anonymous) was heard jokingly to remark on the use of clinical and 
attitudinal methods in his research: "I'm not going to use psychologi­
cal variables in any field study of mine. The first time we ask a
legislator whether he'd rather crochet or play football, we'd be thrown 
out of his office."
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Further, as Lucian Pye— a pioneer and the most distinctive
scholar in the study of this field— puts it, "work with elites involves
skill in interpreting ideologies, in characterizing operational codes,
and defining the spirit and calculations that lie behind high risk
49political behavior." Political elites have, by and large, quite 
sophisticated and complex political culture-and-personality structures 
and the cruder techniques of survey research may not do justice to the 
subtleties and nuances which are critical to understanding them.
Anthony Wallace has even suggested that the study of culture-and-person­
ality requires the researcher to take formal instruction in subjects 
such as physiology, symbolic logic, mathematics, and cognition theory 
as well as training in descriptive statistics, dynamic psychology and 
projective t e s t i n g . T h i s  study has followed those scholarly works 
which have been most influential in the particular area concerned.
This study is devoted to finding aspects of personality common 
to a group of the elites; as in the concepts of social character, basic 
personality structure, and natural character; but far more, it tries 
to emphasize interrelationships between the elites and their environ­
ments, or natural spheres of action. Twenty psycho-cultural traits 
have been selected and developed from noted studies in anthropology, 
sociology, social psychology, and political science. (See Appendix A).
49Lucian Pye, "Introduction to Political Culture and Political 
Development," in Political Culture and Political Development, ed. by 
Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1965), p. 16. See also his employment of the methods in Politics, 
Personality, and Nation-Building, one-third of this book concerns the 
broader issues of methodology, model building, and a number of valuable 
general propositions concerning politics of transitional societies.
^^Anthony Wallace, Culture and Personality (New York: Random
House, 1969), pp. 3-4.
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In their original forms, most of these scales are in the so-called
"positive direction." This practice has been criticized by many scholars^^ 
on the ground that might, in part, measure acquiescence. Hut,
52according to A. Couch and K. Keniston, acquiescence does not seem to
be a very promising candidate for being the major component in these
scales. However, the acquiescence "set" of some traits are included,
and some other scales have been changed to the "negative direction" in
53order to increase the study's reliability. (The directions of each 
item in the questionnaire can be found in Table 1).
Methodology
Sample Survey Design
The sample survey design chosen for this research effort is 
intended to gain the greatest possible measurement precision under the 
limitations imposed by the practicality of the situation. Commensurate 
with these objectives, the sample size was determined and stratified
T. Cohn, "The Relation of the F Scale to a Response to Answer 
Positively," American Psychiatrist, 8 (1953), 335; B. Bass, "Authorita­
rianism or Acquiescence," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 51 
(1955), 616-623; R. Christie, J. Havel, and B. Seidenberg, "Is the F 
Scale Irreversible?" Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 56 
(1958), 143-159; B. Peabody, "Attitude Content and Agreement Set in 
Scales of Authoritarianism, Dogmatism, Anti-Semitism, and Economic 
Conservatism," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 63 (1961),
1-12; and, J. Kirscht and R. Dillehay, Dimensions of Authoritarianism:
A Review of Research and Theory (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press,
1967).
52A. Couch and K. Keniston, "Yeasayers and Naysayers: Agreeing
Response Set as a Personality Variable," Journal of Abnormal and 
Social Psychology, 60 (1960), 151-174.
53Nevitt Sanford, "Authoritarian Personality in Contemporary 
Perspective," in Handbook of Political Psychology, ed. by Jeanne 
Knutson (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1973), p. 150.
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TABLE 1
DIRECTIONS OF ITEMS IN THE QUESTIONNAIRE
Trait Item Numbers
I = + (.1» 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14)
II = + (15, 16, 19) - (17, 18)
III = + (20, 21, 22, 23, 24)
IV = + (25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38)
V = + (40, 45, 46, 48) - (39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 47, 49)
VI = + (50, 51, 52)
VII = - (53, 54, 55, 56, 57)
VIII = + (58, 59, 60, 61)
IX = + (62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70)
X = + (71)
XI = + (72, 73)
XII = + (74, 75, 76)
XI~I = + (77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90,
91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103,
104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110)
XIV = + (111) - (112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118)
XV = + (119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124)
XVI = - (125, 126, 127, 128)
XVII = - (129, 130, 131, 132)
XVIII = - (133, 134, 135, 136)
XIX = + (137, 140) - (138, 139, 141)
XX = + (142, 143)
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random sampling techniques were used to determine which respondents 
should be requested to answer the questionnaire.
Sample Size Determination. The determination of sample size 
requires a decision as to the amount of error the researcher is willing 
to accept from the sample statistics along with a specification of the 
level of confidence required. The calculation in this instance, using 
the formula developed by Morris Hansen, William Hurwitz, and William 
Madow,^^ indicated that a sample size of 26 would provide a confidence 
level of greater than 95 percent and an error rate of less than 10
C Cpercent. However, since the exact degree of homogeneity of the 
target population, i.e., the Lao political elites, cannot be known, the 
researcher decided to use 66 people, or 50 percent of the population 
universe, to increase the study's reliability.
Because the population elements for this study were separated 
into three mutually exclusive groups or strata, a stratified random sam­
ple method was used. Then, a single random sampling method determined 
respondents in each stratum. The proportional drawing of samples from 
each stratum insured equal representation of each group in the sample, 
while still achieving random sampling. A  table of random numbers was 
used to select the respondents to be questioned. All of the respondents 
chosen, after being contacted personally, agreed to participate in this 
study.
Morris H. Hansen, William N. Hurwitz, and William G. Madow, 
Sample Survey Methods and Theory, Vol. 1 (New York; John Wiley & Sons, 
1953), p. 127. The sançle size calculation is shown in Appendix D.
^^Charles H. Backstrom and Gerald D. Hursh, Survey Research 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963), p. 25.
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Subject Selection. The sample used in this study was composed 
of fifty percent of the Lao political elites who held high positions 
during the period of July-October 1974, when this research was conducted. 
Twelve bureaucratic elites who held high office in the same period 
were added by random sampling method from the list of high ranking gov^ 
ernment officials (first class or higher) including military and 
police. The following table (Table 2) is a summary of the political 
positions held by those in the sample. (The names of the population are 




PGNU Members® 24 12
JNPC Members 42 21
National Assembly Members^ 46 21
Bureaucratic EliteC X 12
NOTE;
^Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister, was excluded because he 
was ill and went to France for recuperation during the research 
schedule.
bpive members of the National Assembly who were selected for the 
test-retest of reliability and other members who were also PGNU or 
JNPC members are not included in this count.
CThe population is unknown. Twelve names were randomized from 
the Ministry of Defense, Interior, Public Health, Finance, and Economics 
and Plans.
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The compostlon of the sample is shown in Table 3. It should be 
noted here that the name "People’s Democratic Republic of Laos" has 
officially replaced the "Kingdom of Laos." The coalition government 
was dissolved in 1975, bringing about big changes for the country. 
However, more than fifty percent of our sample in the PGNU are still 
active in Laotian public affairs. The JNPC and the National Assembly 
were also dissolved. A general election has been set for mid-1976, and 
because of the limited number of political elites, the writer speculates 
that some members of the old National Assembly, still prominent in 
their regions, will be back to play active roles in Laotian politics 
in the f u t u r e . T h e r e f o r e ,  even today the sample is considered to have 
a considerable degree of reliability. However, further research needs 
to be made for confirmation and comparison.
Instrumentation
The questionnaires, as aforementioned, are developed from 
several sources (see Appendix A ) , and are Likert type in form. The 
scales consist of four items— "strongly agree," "agree," "disagree," 
and "strongly disagree."
The following steps were taken in developing the Lao version 
of the questionnaire. First, the questionnaires were selected from 
several sources and adapted to Lao by the researcher. Second, three 
interpreters— one from USAID Vientiane, one from a local newspaper’s 
staff, and the researcher himself— translated them into Lao. Third,
^^See also The New York Times (6 December 1975); and. The 










Married (average 4 children) 61 98.4
Age;
Less than 45 24 38.7
45 to 55 28 45.2
More than 55 10 16.1
Race;
Lao 60 96.5
Tribal and others 2 3.2
Education;
Elementary or lower 5 8.1
Secondary 48 77.4
University 9 14.5
Training or Education Abroad;
Asia 32 51.6
Europe 22 35.5
America and others 4 6.5
Hone 4 6.5
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four judges— two lecturers from Dong Dok Teachers College, one staff 
member from USAID Vientaine, and a local newspaper staff member— were 
selected to make final judgments for the Lao version. Consistency with 
the English version and validity in Lao culture were the main judgmental 
criteria.
The questionnaire consists of 158 items; it took approximately 
one hour to answer. The test-retest method was used to examine its 
reliability. The test respondents— five government officials and five 
members of the National Assembly— were asked to answer the questionnaire 
for the process of test-retest in a two-week period. The formula used 
for reporting reliability was the Kuder-Richardson 21 (KRg^).^^ The 
average reliability of the questionnaire for all trait groups was .62, 
and individual trait group reliabilities ranged from .42 to .68. Ergo, 
given the overall length of the questionnaire, the complexity of the 
subject matter, and the (approximately) two-week interval between test 
and retest, the writer concluded that the reliability of the questionnaire 
would be adequate for this study.
Data Collection
Upon validation of the questionnaire, the strategy for adminis­
tering it to the busy politicians was planned carefully. Each 
respondent was contacted by meeting him individually, mostly in 
Vientiane and Luang Prabang. It was explained that he was requested 
in his personal capacity and on behalf of the research student from the
57The detailed process is shown in William A. Scott, "Attitude 
Measurement," in Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 2, 2nd ed., ed. by 
Gardner Linzey and Elliot Aronson (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley,
1968), pp. 256-257.
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University of Oklahoma to aid in research on developing nations and 
that participation in the study would be strictly unofficial. It was 
also explained to him that the questionnaire was composed of 158 items, 
that it was entirely academic in character, that it was not sponsored 
nor approved by any agency of the United States or other governments, 
that no name would appear on the questionnaire, that his opinions would 
be entirely off the record, and that his name would be guaranteed its 
anonymity— in writing if requested (no one did). Above all else, he was 
asked to answer the questionnaire by himself and then mail it in the 
self-addressed envelope provided. The place and time for answering the 
questionnaire depended upon the preference of the respondent, but he 
was asked to do it at home during a period of relaxation.
Of 66 questionnaires, 62 copies were returned (in a two-month 
period), which constituted a return rate of approximately 93 percent.
In addition to the questionnaire technique, efforts were made to 
interview some of the respondents during the period of administering 
the questionnaire when the opportunity permitted. The respondents were 
interviewed on general aspects of life. Roughly speaking, the inter­
views concerned the elite's life history; family, childhood, and school 
experiences; his estimate of his own personality; his attitude toward 
friends and money; his personal values and religious views; attitudes 
toward social class; his concept of an ideal society, and his notions 
of governmental systems; his concept of equality, freedom, and the 
cause of war and poverty; and his political interests and activities. 
Actually, the interviewing contexts were quite similar to those in the 
questionnaire but permitted a wider variety of responses from the
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respondents. The researcher believes that the transcripts of the inter­
views will offer important support for some of the conclusions of the 
study as well as confirm the patterns found in the questionnaire tech­
nique.
Treatment of the Data
Each item on the questionnaire was scored as followed:
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree No Opinion 
+2 +1 -1 -2 0
For ease of treatment these scores have been converted to absolute score 
ranges from +1 to -1, and the items contributing to each trait have 
been accumulated to produce the trait score (the average of the total 
scores for all items in the trait). The following formula has been 
used to compute the absolute score:
Absolute Score =
[2»a +  »b] - ["c +
2N
where, N = number of all respondents, 
a = strongly agree, b = agree, 
c = disagree, d = strongly disagree.
The directions, positive or negative, are shown in Table 1. Plus 
signs (+) preceding items denote a positive direction, and minus signs 
(-) preceding items denote a negative direction.
To compute the "Item Absolute Score," for example, an item in 
which all 62 "strongly agreed" would receive a score of +1, or
[(2 X  62) + o ]  - [O + (2 X  0)]
  = + 1.0
2 X 62
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For an Item on which all 62 "agreed":
|(2 X 0) + 62] - [O + (2 X 0)]
----------------------------------------------------------  =  +.5
2 X 62
For an ietm on which all 62 "disagreed":
[ ( 2 x 0 ) +  O] - |62 + (2 X 0)]
= -.5
2 X 62
For an item on which all 62 "strongly disgreed": 
[(2 X 0) + O] - [O + (2 X 62)]
2 X 62
=  - 1.0
For an item on which half "agreed" and half "disagreed," or in which a 
mixture of strong and moderate agreement and disagreement was exactly 
balanced:
f(2 X 0) + 3l] - [31 + (2 X 0)]
  =  0.00
2 X 62
[(2 X  11) + 22] - [l4 +  (2 X  15)]------------ d----------------- 1  = 0.00
2 X  62
This method provides each trait with a measurement of intensity. When 
correlations among traits were needed for the analysis, product-moment 
correlation calculation and factor analysis were used through the QUANAL 
computer program. The program is described in some detail in Appendix E.
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Organization of the Study
This Introduction has served as a clearing ground for the 
detailed program of the study; It has Introduced the methodology and 
Identified the research tools. Chapter II will deal with human 
nature; It will begin with an examination of basic human needs, both 
biological and psychological, as these are treated within the discipline 
of psychology. Following that It will go to anthropology for that 
discipline's study of the values that are assumed to knit human society 
together.
Since many salient characteristics of the current Laotian 
elites have been shaped and forged by the events of their history.
Chapter III will present a brief history of the country. Working 
from the premise that It Is Important to describe Laotian society In 
general terms before exploring the top. Chapter IV briefly surveys the 
"Laotian Ways of Life."
Chapters V, VI, and VII present our findings. Each element of 
the elites' responses In the areas of personality psychology, socio­
economic values, and political attitudes Is reported In considerable 
detail. Finally, In Chapter VIII, an attempt will be made to assess 
our findings and Integrate them Into the developing literature on politi­
cal culture-and-personality.
CHAPTER II
PSYCHO-CULTURAL BASIS OF HUMAN NATURE IN POLITICS
INTRODUCTION
Political thinkers of the past— for example, Plato, Aristotle, 
and Hobbes— recognized that if one is to understand political phenomena 
he has to study human nature. On this basis, Graham Wallas has stressed 
that if one were able to photograph a man's activities for an entire 
day and then present him with the film, he would, of course, see that 
many of his actitities consisted of half-conscious repetition, under the 
influence of habits of movement which were originally more fully con­
scious. But even if all cases of habit were excluded he would find 
that only a small proportion of the residue could be explained as being
directly produced by an intellectual calculation.^ Other political 
scientists also emphasize such "dispositions" in political analysis.
However, Robert E. Lane warns that;
Explanations of political decisions which rely wholly upon 
analyses of the social environment, while they may have 
high predictive value, neglect a vital link, they never 
explain why an individual responds to the environment the 
way he does.2
^Graham Wallas, Human Nature in Politics (Lincoln, Nebraska: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1962), p. 47.




Thus, in exploring psychological characteristics, as in this 
study, we need to know first what characteristics are basic to human 
nature, and then how they influence the behavior of the individual.
The study of political-bureaucratic elites can be seen as an attempt, 
within many diverse frameworks, to study human nature from various 
viewpoints. Some view of human nature is assumed in any expression of 
conviction concerning the feasibility and desirability of a particular 
ordering of political relations. S. Wolin has pointed out that any 
view of human nature inevitably delimits the "angle of vision."3
Such traditional philosophers as Plato and Aristotle have opted 
for the view that man is a rational animal and is capable of ordering 
his relationships with other men so as to achieve through society self- 
fulfillment and the "good life." Others, Rousseau particularly, have 
considered man to be naturally good, naturally fulfilled; in political 
society, man finds not the ultimate in self-expression, but rather the 
corruption of his noble nature. Hobbes, on the other hand, has 
pictured man as passionate, power-seeking, unsatisfiable, and inherently 
at war with other men. It is only through the polity's strict control 
of his passions that man can find social peace and order. This social 
peace does not come from within; it is imposed by the great leviathan—  
the state. Machiavelli and some others have attempted to get political 
philosophy out of the fact-free vacuum in which it had been contempla­
ting human nature in relation to various types of social organization, 
and confront it with the problems of social organization in the real 
world.
3g. S. Wolin, Politics and Vision (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1960), chapter 1.
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Up to the present day, political philosophers have based their 
theories on views of human nature that were at times logically consis­
tent, but certainly not empirically verified. For example, Marx held 
that human nature is perfectable to a point where the ordering of 
societal relationships would be a natural function of man's harmony 
with himself and the economic arrangements in his society. But Erich 
Fromm notes that
He did not recognize the irrational forces in man which make 
him afraid of freedom, and which produce his lust for power 
and his destructiveness. On the contrary, underlying his 
concept of man was the implicit assumption of man's natural 
goodness, which would assert itself as soon as the crippling 
economic shackles were released. . . . With their chains 
they have also to lose all those irrational needs and satis­
factions which were originated while they were wearing the 
chains.^
Throughout political philosophy, social controls have been thought 
sufficient to eliminate deviant types. The only categorization offered 
has at times been between the ruler and the ruled.
Since the benchmark work of Freud, political philosophers have 
been able to ask more penetrating questions about human nature. Lucian 
Pye has noted that "in his insight into the full dimensions of man's 
inner nature, Freud made it embarrassingly clear that previous 
theories of political relationships were generally premised on impov­
erished and inadequate notions of human nature."5 Further, cultural 
anthropologists have offered additional refinements of the patterns
^Erich Fromm, The Sane Society (Greenwich: Fawcett Publica­
tions, 1955), p. 232.
^Lucian W. Pye, "Personal Identity and Political Ideology," 
in Political Decision-Makers, ed. by D. Marvick (Glencoe, 111.: The
Free Press, 1961), p. 291.
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which human nature may display.^ An increasing number of political 
scientists have begun to give recognition to the fact that politics 
and political behavior include the study of more than institutions and 
legal frameworks.^ In short, they have begun to appreciate anew 
Plato's insight of pre-political dispositions, and that, in Harold 
Lasswell's words, "the stability of the constitution depends upon the 
molding of the appropriate form of character."®
Most attenq>ts to explain human nature, in general and in 
politics, are entirely based on the background of personality, values, 
and culture in psychology and anthropology. We shall first trace it on 
the psychological basis of taking the individual as a unit of analysis, 
followed by the anthropological theoretical framework of human nature 
based on a group of individuals as a unit of analysis.
Talcott Parsons has pointed out that in studying human nature 
"the contribution of psychological analysis to the social sciences has 
consisted of an enormous deepening and enrichment of our understanding 
of human m o t i v a t i o n . O u r  theories of human motivation are based on 
evidence that man has certain inborn, basic needs which must be
ôThe contributions of the cultural anthropologists will be 
presented in the second-half of this chapter.
7por a useful discussion of this process, see, Harry Eckstein, 
"a  Perspective in Comparative Politics, Past and Present," in 
Comparative Politics: A Reader, ed. by Harry Eckstein and David E.
Apter (New York; The Free Press, 1963), pp. 3-22.
®See a series of essays on Harold D. Lasswell's impact on the 
study of political behavior in A. A. Rogow, ed. Politics, Personality, 
and Social Sciences in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1969).
^Talcott Parsons, Social Structure and Personality (New York: 
The Free Press, 1970), p. 18.
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satisfied to grow to self-actuallzatlon. It Is felt that throughout 
each culture, and In the past as well as the present, the human person­
ality has been shaped by these basic needs and the way In which they are
satisfied or left unsatisfied; It Is posited that these needs are
arranged In a hierarchy of Importance so that after— and only after-— the 
first and most basic Is largely satisfied does the next need become a 
motivating force. Along this line, Abraham Maslow set forth his care­
fully described and clinically derived statements on a "hierarchy of the
basic needs" In Motivation and Personality.^0
Humans' Basic Needs 
Nobody would deny that man everywhere shares physiological needs 
such as hunger, thirst, and sexual gratification and procreation. We 
can be sure about the universality of these needs because they are bio­
logically determined. Generally, needs may be thought of as basic and 
underlying psychic d i s p o s i t i o n s . T h e r e  Is some evidence that an Inabil­
ity to fulfill particular needs will cause perceptual If not behavioral 
distortions.12 More Important, however, for social and political 
analysis, Maslow asserts that the basic needs are hierarchically ordered. 
When an Individual Is deprived of a need In the first category. I.e., 
a physiological need, this condition will activate his central control 
systems so that he will pursue Its satisfaction before returning to 
other activity. He has posited the existence of a need hierarchy In the
^^Abraham Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York: Harper
& Row, 1954).
lllbld.
^2James Davies, Human Nature In Politics (New York: Wiley &
Sons, 1963).
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following order of ascendance: (1) physiological, (2) security, (3)
social-affection, (4) self-esteem, and (5) self-actualization needs.^3 
Physiological needs refer to the need of the body for food, 
sleep, water, or air. Security needs are next in the need hierarchy 
and refer to the need to be physically and psychologically secure. When 
these needs have been met the social-affection needs emerge. The social- 
affection needs refer to the desire for feelings of self-worth origina­
ting in the interplay between personal competence and those social 
norms that govern the area and nature of competence. Furthermore, not 
until the physical, security and social-affection needs are at least 
minimally satisfied will the individual seek satisfaction of his self­
esteem needs. Lastly, when all of these needs have been fulfilled, 
the need for self-actualization emerges. Self-actualization is defined 
as the desire for self-fulfillment, the attempt to actualize what is 
potential, or as Maslow puts it, "to become everything that one is 
capable of b e c o m i n g . I n  political analysis it appears worthwhile to 
observe the impact of all these basic needs.
Physiological Needs
First and foremost is the necessity that the most basic human 
needs be satisfied— that the individual have food, shelter and sexual 
gratification so he and his species can survive. In this connection 
the story of evolution seems to tell us that members of every species 
stake out some particular territory for themselves in order to support
l^Maslow, op. cit.
^^Abraham Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," Psychological 
Review. 50 (1943), 370.
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their needs and enable them to carry on their living. The extent of this 
territory is dependent on what is required for survival of the species.15 
Physiological needs, if unfulfilled, become the basic organizing 
mechanism of human activity. While it may be true that man does not live 
by food alone, calorie deprivation appears to lead to a decreased inter­
est in the surrounding environment and increased interest— one might 
say a preoccupation— with f o o d . 16 physiological deprivation is not 
without its implication for political behavior, as Eric Hoffer notes:
. . .  to be engaged in a desperate struggle for food and 
shelter is to be wholly free from a sense of futility. The 
goals are concrete and immediate. Every meal is a fulfill­
ment; to go to sleep on a full stomach is a triumph . . . .
Where people toil from sunrise to sunset for a bare living 
they nurse no grievances and dream no dreams.1?
Also in reference to the sense of futility and passivity in politics 
that derives from the necessity of being higjxly concerned with psysio- 
logical needs, H. H. Dicks reports the common feeling that "all this is 
far too difficult for me, I am only a small m a n . "^6 Christian Bay also 
points out that "starvation can confine freedom of expression more 
effectively than can political t y r a n n y . "^9 People who live at a starva­
tion level are only peripherally concerned with such higher needs.
^5ihis, incidentally, is a major reason for the hope of some 
psychologists that human beings will regard the whole world as their ter­
ritory now that narrower boundaries are meaningless to atomic weapons.
l^See the discussion of the Minnesota experiments in James Davies, 
op. cit., pp. 11-15. According to this theory, the political apathy com­
mon in developing countries is largely derived from unfulfilled needs.
l^Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (New York: Harper & Row, 1951),
pp. 26-27.
^®H. V. Dicks, "Personality Traits and Natural Socialist 
Ideology," Human Relations, 3 (1950), 118.
^^Christian Bay, The Structure of Freedom (New York: Atheneum,
1965), p. 15.
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Failure to recognize this basic fact has been a stumbling block in 
the attempt of the United States to build democracy in developing 
countries.
Security Needs
Maslow asked "what happens to man's desires when there is plenty
of (food) and when his belly is chronically filled?"
At once (other higher) needs emerge and these rather than 
physiological hungers, dominate the organism. And when 
these terms are satisfied, again new (and still higher) 
needs emerge, and so o n . ^
There is a desire for security to protect gains already made and to 
assure a beachhead from which further advances may be staged. Man wants 
some assurance that one action can lead to another, some definite pro­
tection which provides an orientation and integration through time.
Maslow points out that this need falls into two parts: (1) a
need for physical safety, and (2) a need for psychological security.
The first refers to the need to be secure from attack or aggression 
and to live one's life without being the object of physical threat. The 
second is more subtle and refers to the psychological need for an 
orderly and predictable world.
In children this need takes the form of "a preference for some 
kind of undisrupted routine . . .  (a preference) for a safe, orderly, 
predictable, organized world which he can count on and in which 
unexpected, unmanageable, or other dangerous things do not happen.
^^Maslow, op. cit., p. 80. Also see some evidence in: B. Bettel-
heim. The Informed Heart (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1960); and,
Davies, Human Nature in Politics.
^^Maslow, Motivation and Personality, pp. 86-87.
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This need is not absent in adults. Irving Goffman, for example, has 
noted that adults engage in elaborate "stage managing" in order to 
routinize many of their social interactions, i.e., to enhance their 
feelings of security, and he says that such activities are perfectly 
normal.22 Carried to an extreme, however, the attempt to manipulate 
the environment for psychological security needs begins to resemble 
the compulsive personality derived clinically by K. Homey, and in the 
area of politics by Alexander and Juliette George in their comprehensive 
study of Woodrow Wilson's personality.23
The pervasiveness of this security need has a historical explan­
ation, and has serious implications for political movements in 
present day Laos and some other countries. When the Germans accepted 
Nazi leadership in the p a s t , 24 security needs accounted for a part of 
their motivation. In another aspect, G. M. Gilbert finds a connection 
between the search for security and ardent nationalism. He comments:
With the expansion of ethnic identification groups from the 
primitive tribe to the modern state, the socially identi­
fied security of the individual has been correspondingly 
extended. The aggressive nationalism that has characterized 
many dictatorships must be regarded as an enlarged mani­
festation of the continuing quest for security through 
group solidarity.25
22irving Goffman. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life 
(New York: Anchor Press, 1959).
2 % .  Homey, Neurotic Personality of Our Times (New York: Norton,
1937); and, Alexander A. George and Juliette George, Woodrow Wilson 
and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: Dover Publications,
Inc., 1964).
P. Gert, "The Nazi Party: Its Leadership and Composition,"
The American Journal of Sociology, 45 (January, 1940), 517-541.
25g . M. Gilbert, The Psychology of Dictatorship (New York:
Ronald Press, 1950), p. 8.
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The Needs for Affection and Belongingness
After both the physiological and safety needs have been largely
fulfilled, according to Maslow, the higher needs emerge. Affection
needs, one of the higher ones, include the desire and need for human
warmth and a sense of mutuality in relationships with the human
environment. The deleterious effects on human growth when these needs
are not satisfied have been well-documented in studies by K. Davis.
Organisms deprived of this need early in the life cycle grow up
emotionally stunted, and never seem able to recover. The implications
of the deprivation of this need for the political system may appear
small at first glance, but a further look reveals its importance. A
recent psychoanalytic study of Adolph Hitler suggests that emotion
deprivation had important consequences for his behavior as a political 
27leader.
George and George, for example, in analyzing Woodrow Wilson’s 
personality concluded that "throughout his life, Wilson had great con­
cern with the problem of whether he was loveable and loved, and
28required an inordinate amount of explicit reassurance on this score." 
Then, they comment that while Wilson was driven by a need for self­
esteem, "power was not the only operative value in Wilson’s political
26K. Davis, "Final Note on a Case of Extreme Isolation," 
American Sociological Review, 4 (1956).
27Walth Langer, The Mind of Adolph Hitler (New York: Basic
Books, 1972).
28George and George, op. cit., p. 31.
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behavior . . . .  His desire for power was mitigated by a simultaneous 
need for approval, respect and, especially, for feeling virtuous."29
It appears likely that the person with a great need to achieve 
self-esteem and outside approval will provide a lower quality of 
leadership than that required to help others achieve self-actualization. 
But even more important, the ability of such a psychologically deprived 
individual to assess reality and to perceive new information will be 
severely restricted by his need to hear favorable information. Further­
more, individuals with an unsatisfied chronic need for affection will be 
likely to be intolerant and undemocratic. The need for affection, then, 
is an important determinant of many types of political behavior.
bsteem Needs
Every individual wants to feel that he himself is worthwhile;
he wants to be able to respect himself, to have some faith in his own
values. These desires are called esteem needs. Maslow describes these
needs in two ways:
First, the desire for strength, for achievement, for adequacy, 
for mastery, and competence for confidence in the face of 
the world, and for independence and freedom. Second, the 
desire for reputation and/or prestige, status, dominance, 
recognition, attention, importance, application.^®
Therefore, self-esteem can be thought of as a very positive feeling. An
individual may have either a large or a small amount of self-esteem.
Negative concepts of self may also exist, although they are not
necessarily the opposite of self-esteem; that is, an individual may
29ibid.. p. 320. See also E. V. Wolfenstein's interesting 
analysis of Leon Trotsky, Personality and Politics (Belmont: Dickinson
Publishing Co., 1969).
3®Naslow, Motivation and Personality, p. 20.
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have little self-esteem, but this need not imply "negative" self- 
evaluation. Robert Lane says that "the person who is disappointed in 
himself, and in his status in the eyes of the world, is also disappointed 
about the world that sees him this way."31 In this sense esteem needs 
lie at one point along a continuum of involvement with one's environment, 
which is of great in5>ortance in understanding political behavior.
The word "self" as used here refers to the sense of selfhood that 
forms the core of personality. It can be used interchangeably with "ego" 
to refer to the central attitudes that constitute a person's identity. 
Essential to one's identity, then, are ideas about "who" one is and 
"what" one can do. The first of these ideas involves the individual's 
"self-concept," and the second relates to his feelings of "competence" 
in dealing with different aspects of his world. The self is a major 
point of reference in any person's cognitive system. An elite member 
acts as he does because he is a political leader, department head, 
decision-maker, nationalist, and so on. Many of these beliefs and opin­
ions are "ego involved." That is, they are closely related to one's 
sense of self. The response of a politician depends upon who he is and 
how he compares himself to others with whom he is interacting.
One's self or selfhood is not inborn, nor does it necessarily 
await the development of language. At birth, the infant probably does 
not distinguish self from non-self. Gradually, through experience with
31Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology (New York; The Free Press,
1962), pp. 106-107.
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his own inner sensations, as well as the sights, sounds, and feeling
32coming from outside himself, the infant acquires a primitive identity.
The self is a product of interaction with the social world,
as well as the physical world. The self reflects evaluations and
comparisons with other people. Kuhn and McPartland's study which asked
college students to write twenty answers to the question "who am I?"
found that one's self-conception is strongly rooted in one's group 
33membership. The students tended to describe themselves first in terms 
of group and social class membership, e.g., man, student. Catholic, son, 
or husband. Later items were couched in more evaluative terms such as 
good student, happy, pretty, not very handsome, and so on. According 
to William James, our self-esteem can be expressed as a ratio of our 
accomplishments to the things that we think we can do. He adds that 
" . . .  our self-feeling in this world depends entirely on what we 'back' 
ourselves to be and do."^^
The importance of this need in the study of politics has been 
suggested by a number of scholars. Harold Lasswell has undoubtedly 
been the leader in pointing to the importance that self-esteem lends to 
the striving for power, the seeking of positions of influence, the 
assessment of social situations with regard to their potential 
for fulfilling this desire for influence, and the acquisition of the
32The process of differentiation of the sense of "I," "Me," and 
"Mine" was aptly described by G. Murphy, L. B. Murphy, and T. M. Newcomb, 
Experimental Social Psychology. 2nd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1937).
33M^ H. Kuhn and T. S. McPartland, "An Empirical Study of Self- 
Attitudes," American Sociological Review, 49 (1954), 68-76.
34William James, Psychology: The Briefer Course (New York:
Harper Torchbooks, 1961), p. 54.
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necessary knowledge and skills to achieve political goals. In 
another study a group of political candidates, for example, were asked 
to describe why men sought effective office. The answer was a fairly 
clear picture "of self-interest in which the most important elements 
were personal advancement and p r e s t i g e . T h e  pursuit of power as a 
compensatory personality goal is undoubtedly a significant motivational 
force in politics.
Self-Actualization
The need for self-actualization emerges after all the other needs 
mentioned have been satisfied. As Maslow noted, "what man can be, he 
must b e . "37 Once the other needs have been met then men can concentrate 
on realizing their potential. The relationship between self-actualiza­
tion and political behavior has been analyzed by Jeanne K n u t s o n . 38
Harold D. Lasswell, Power and Personality (New York; W. W. 
Norton, 1948), p. 39. For the details of other studies of self-esteem 
related to political behavior, see a comprehensive review in William 
F. Stone, The Psychology of Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1974),
pp. 97-107.
^^Robert Rosenzweig, "The Politician and the Career in Politics," 
Midwest Journal of Political Science, 2 (1957), 166. For useful examples 
of psychobiographies, see: Erik Erikson, Young Man Luther (New York:
W. W. Norton & Co., 1969); L. J. Edinger, Kurt Schumacher (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1965); and, Betty Glad, Charles Evans Hughes 
and the Illusions of Innocence (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1966).
Maslow, Motivational and Personality, P . 91.
33jeanne N. Knutson, The Human Basis of the Polity (Chicago: 
Aldine, 1972). For the review of the measurements of self-esteem and 
self-actualization, see, John P. Robinson and Phillip Shaver, Measure 
of Social and Psychological Attitudes, rev. ed. (Ann Arbor: Institute
for Social Research, The University of Michigan, 1974), pp. 45-162.
53
Generally, the self-actualizing person is found to be more politically 
concerned, more tolerant and less likely to join extremist groups.
Let us now turn to the personality of the individual. This 
personality, of course, is rooted in the physical organism with its 
generic constitution and its metabolic needs for food, respiration, 
elimination, and so forth. But more importantly, the main structure of 
personality is built through social interaction. It develops through 
the normative patterns governing the child's interaction in social 
situations.
Of course, the primary agency of early socialization is the 
family in which the child is brought up. The process in general starts 
with the development of a deep attachment to the mother. This in due 
course is used as a basis of leverage to motivate and reward autonomous 
behavior, within the framework of a basic security acceptance. Erotic 
components, as we know since Freud, play a central role in these early 
relationships, particularly as a bridge between the needs of the 
organism and the generalization of motivation to the level of socially 
organized patterns of behavior.
With the oedipal transition the child emerges from a life pri­
marily contained within the family. His sex role has become emotionally 
consolidated to a considerable degree, and he enters upon a new and 
rapid process of instrumental learning especially concerned with the 
school and with informal relations with his peers. Then, as he enters 
adolescense, he becomes capable of a much more differentiated set of 
commitments, not only to the continuance of formal education, but to
39lbid.
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responsible participation in assoclatlonal activity, to a re-emerging 
basis of concern with his relations to the opposite sex, leading even­
tually to marriage, and on a new level, with the problem of his personal 
moral commitments and their backing with reference to an orientation to 
the problems of meaning.
Any individual person is bound within the framework not only of 
the generic constitution of the organism and the condition of its 
healthy functioning but also of his personal life history, which is 
never exactly like that of any other, and its bearing on his interests, 
goals, and capacities for dealing with the problems of adult life. And 
this involves all his roots in the biological, social, and cultural 
soil of his experience. He is what and who he is by virtue of the time 
and status of his birth, his sex, his parentage, his many associations. 
In this sense every human life starts from an ascriptive origin and 
can depart from the fixities of this origin only by the paths of 
structured "opportunity" provided by the structure of the culture and 
society in which he is embedded and by the exigencies of his own 
personality.
Dispositions
Maslow's theoretical assumption of basic human needs postulates 
that what makes people act is a "need," or in other terms, "drive." 
Hunger is a drive that stimulates action in the search for and eating 
of food. In other words, most human behavior is caused, motivated, and 
goal directed.40 People do not behave randomly but in order to satisfy
40see Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1957).
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some basic need. What makes people differ is not these needs, but
rather "a tendency to respond in a certain way in a given situation."
These are "dispositions," which change the actual content of needs and
the ways to satisfy them. In sum, form and order are given to behavior
41by a pattern of dispositions.
Types of Dispositions
Dispositions come in several types, such as dispositions toward
certain opinions, attitudes, beliefs, and values. In another dimension,
a disposition can be thought of as a psychological characteristic or
factor, such as personality trait, which is unconsciously related to
other political phenomena. Returning to a discussion of opinions, the
term has been defined as "an explicit verbal response or 'answer' that
an individual gives in response to a particular stimulus situation in
which some 'general question' is r a i s e d . A  particular combination
of opinions can be called an "attitude." In other words, an opinion
has to do with a specific issue, but an attitude has to do with
generality. Lewis Froman defines attitude as "a disposition of an
individual to evaluate some aspect of his world in a favorable or
unfavorable manner, that is, a predisposition to approve or disapprove,
43like or dislike some social or physical objects. In this sense an
^^Clifford Geertz, Interpretation of Culture (New York: Basic
Books, 1973), pp. 140-141.
42H. J. Eysenck, The Psychology of Politics (London: Rutledge
& Kegan Paul, 1954), p. 111.
43Lewis Froman, People and Politics (Englewood Cliffs: John
Wiley & Sons, 1962), p. 20.
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attitude is probably more stable and durable than an opinion. At 
another level, a cluster of attitudes can be called an "ideology." 
Eysenck has called this a "super-attitude."^4 Dispositions can be more 
or less unconscious, thus, we are unaware of many dispositions which 
influence our behavior.
Closely related to dispositions are "beliefs" and "values."
The first is defined as "cognitions with an extra feeling of credibil­
ity which are not beliefs."45 Thus a belief can be true or false, but 
a false belief is no less a belief, for its truth or falsity is 
logically independent of the psychological uncertainty of its believer. 
The relevance of beliefs to political behavior is obvious. What a man 
believes is often the main determinant of what he does and what his 
attitudes are. The second term, "value," is "a statement of 'good* or 
'bad,' 'right' or 'wrong,' something which is desired or thought 
desirable."46 Political scientists often emphasize the importance of 
political values (or values pursued politically) when explaining 
political behavior. As Lasswell has stated, the values that men seek 
in politics are, for example, power, wealth, well-being, skill, 
enlightenment, affection, rectitude, and respect.47 While values are 
not true or false, it is a fact that people have various values and
44Eysenck, op. cit., p. 113. For a view of attitude as "perspec­
tive," see Geertz, Interpretation of Culture, p. 110.
45Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand
McNally, 1965), p. 31.
46proman, op. cit., p. 18.
47Harold D. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1930).
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that the holding of a value can be empirically tested. Alan Isaak says 
that "values in this empirical sense are fair game for political scien­
t i s t s . "48 For a greater understanding of the phenomena of values, we 
shall examine the contributions of anthropologists.
Value System and Culture
Cultural anthropologists assume that every society is composed 
of a multitude of elements; everything from tools, weapons, houses, 
religions, and social institutions is called "culture." Culture is a 
systematic and integrated whole whose parts are linked together by a 
central value system. In addition, since human behavior does not 
operate at random, man in treating his cultural extensions tends to 
develop certain patterns of doing things. Along this line, these 
societal elements created by men are governed by a common set of rules. 
It is this common set of rules which is called here the value system.
An important characteristic of this value system is that a great part 
of it lies hidden and is thus outside the voluntary control of m a n .49 
Because it is passed on from generation to generation, and man learns 
it from his childhood, these patterned ways of doing things lie at the 
root of his subconsciousness in such a way that when he acts he merely 
takes them for granted and most of the time he is not aware of them.
This value system appears to constitute what is called in 
system theory "the basic relationships in a system," those which link
48^1an Isaak, Scope and Methods of Political Science (Homewood, 
111.: The Dorsey Press, 1969), p. 166.
49Man is used here in the sense of men in interaction, not "the 
individual."
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all the parts together to make them a whole. It is in this sense that 
we can say that the whole is reflected in the parts and the parts in 
the whole. Thus, the parts and the whole, man and his creations, con­
stitute an interrelated system in such a way that the basic relation­
ships can be found in any element that bears the imprint of man.^^ It 
should be noted that in stressing the role of man as the only active 
element and the value system as the linking element in culture, it is 
by no means our intention to minimize the role of material elements 
such as technology.
Man and Culture
We have stressed the importance of the value system that exists 
in man because it is man who is the creator and carrier of culture. We 
have to explain why man has this capacity, why individuals in a culture 
tend to share a common value system, and how it directs their behavior 
so that they tend to act in ways different from people in other cultures. 
This uniqueness of man has been described by Leslie A. White in these 
terms:
Man as an animal possesses a number of characteristics which 
qualified him for culture. Among these may be mentioned 
erect posture, which frees the forelimbs for nonlocomotory 
activities, an opposable thumb, which makes an effective 
grasping organ, stereoscopic, chromatic vision, gregariousness, 
and possibly a few other traits. But the most important 
qualification of all is the capacity to s y m b o l . 5l
In the sense that we consider the characteristics of the elites; 
both a part— personality, and a whole— culture; or in an aggregated 
term— culture-and-personallty.
^^Leslie A. White, "The Evolution of Culture," in Cultural and 
Social Psychology, ed. by Peter B. Hammond (New York: The Macmillan Co.,
1964), p. 406.
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And he defines the capacity to symbol as: "the ability freely and
arbitrarily to originate and bestow meaning upon a thing or event, 
and corresponding’y, the ability to grasp and appreciate such meaning."5% 
This capacity of assigning and appreciating values cannot be achieved 
with sensory organs but with man's mind, which is unique among all 
species of living beings. Through his mind man can have greater free­
dom of choice than can other animals whose behavior is governed by 
drives and instinct. It is this freedom to symbolize, combined with 
other unique abilities, that enables man to create cultures— constituted 
of things and events, such as language, institutions, customs, clothing, 
ornaments, tools, and so forth. Since few people would deny this 
unique human capacity, we shall not elaborate on this point. What we 
need to emphasize here, because of its far-reaching consequences for 
the interpretation of human behavior, is the evidence found in physical 
anthropology that the Homo sapiens, or modern man as we know him today, 
is the result of a long-term evolution in which the brain of the 
human species increased gradually in size with the addition of more com­
plex faculties as a consequence of the interaction of the ancestors of 
modern man with the environment. The evolution of the human species 
during the Pleistocene or first million years, according to Washburn 
and Howell's interpretation based on fossil records and archeological 
specimens associated with human fossils, has followed three stages. In 
the first stage, the Australopithecines (which evolved from a mammal of 
the order Primates) were characterized by bipedal locomotion, reduced 
dentition, a small brain, and some sign of early culture. At the middle
SZlbid.
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Pleistocene, came the early Homo stage in which the Homlnids (which 
appeared to have evolved from the Auatralopithecines) were endowed with 
more structural and cultural advances— larger brain, hunting tools.
About forty thousand years ago the Homo sapiens stage began with men 
structurally like ourselves. They possessed large brains and created 
major cultural innovations and rapid technological advances. These 
abilities of modern man are essential to complicated social l i f e . 5 3  
Expressing the belief that "in the future it may become possible to 
demonstrate that this social brain is the outcome of new selection 
pressures which came with an increasingly complex society," Washburn and 
Howell conclude that "from the immediate point of view this brain 
structure makes possible a complicated technical-social life; but from 
the long term evolutionary point of view, it was altered selection 
pressures of the new technical social life which gave the brain its 
peculiar size and form.^^
The proposition that the human mind is a result of the interplay 
between culture and biology seems to have great significance for politi­
cal theory in its interpretation of human behavior. If it is true that 
man has never had an innate nature independent of his culture, human 
behavior must be viewed as the result of the interaction between bio­
logical and cultural factors and not by biological factors alone, as is 
supposed by the stimulus-response model. Between human organization and
L. Washburn and F. Clark Howell, "Human Evolution and 
Culture," in Physical Anthropology and Archeology, ed. Peter B. Hammond 
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1964), pp. 12-25.
5 4 i b i d . .  p .  24.
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environment, culture is the Intervening variable. Man shares with other 
animals basic drives such as hunger, thirst, and a need for sexual 
gratification and procreation, but everywhere In human societies the 
basic drives are given cultural Interpretations. Americans, Indians, 
Laotians— all must eat, but what, how, and when to eat Is culturally 
determined. It Is Interesting to note that some biological needs 
cannot only be restrained, but also con^letely suppressed by the action 
of culture. In response to religious convictions, man may cease to 
procreate and to satisfy sexual urges. Thus, even man's most basic needs 
are given symbolic content and their fulfillment is conditioned by the 
value system of a particular culture.55
In addition to these drives, man possesses another one which Is 
termed by Goldschmidt as "the need for positive affect." This drive, 
which, according to the author, appears unique to man and Is at present 
unproved and perhaps unprovable (because research Into the animal nature 
of man as unaffected by culture Is virtually Impossible), has been 
defined by him as the need for "each person to crave response from his 
human environment. It may be viewed as hunger, not unlike that for 
food, but more generalized. Under varying conditions It may be expressed 
as a desire for contact, for recognition and acceptance, for approval, 
for esteem, or for a mastery."56 ihls drive, which may be called social 
need, had Its original source in biology and thus Is a generalized
^^Walter Goldschmidt, "The Biological Constant," in Cultural 
Anthropology, ed. Hammond, pp. 2-5.
56ibid.« p. 7.
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behavioral attribute universal to man, making him live in social systems 
and seek to attain the approval of his fellow men. If this social need 
as well as the physiological needs are universal to man, the ways to 
fulfill them are culturally determined. In other words, these needs 
may be viewed as constants or universals and the cultural factors as 
variables. lh.e former merely lay down the broad conditions under which 
societies must operate. It is, finally, the cultural, variable that can 
explain the variation in human behavior in different cultures.^?
Since all these needs, biologically derived, change in form, 
content, emphasis, and with the cultural interpretation given to them, 
it appears somewhat hazardous to posit a hierarchy of needs which is 
genetically determined as specified by Maslow. We cannot say that 
physiological needs are more potent than higher social needs— i.e., that 
only after satisfying lower order needs will the human personality begin 
to think of fulfilling his higher needs— simply because the relative 
prepotency of each need is culturally but not genetically determined. 
Moreover, the extent to which a need is satisfied can only be judged, 
even in general terms, by taking into account the cultural factors.
Value System and Culture-and-Personality
We have shown that man has unique capacities that permit him to 
make a culture. Among these, the most important one is the freedom to 
bestow meanings and symbols on things and events. This capacity of 
symbolizing is a product of the human mind which permits man to l e a m  
the symbols and meanings of his culture and to transmit them to his 
posterity. The ability to l e a m  makes man act in response to social
57lbid., pp. 7-8.
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conditioning, rather than to inherited patterns of activity like animals, 
hehavior learned through social conditioning is reinforced by the rela­
tively prolonged period of immaturity and dependence which makes people 
accept the particular symbols of their culture and by the patterns of 
organization of their society. We can not utterly reject these symbols 
and organizational symbols. When people become mature and able to act 
independently, they are already Imbued with the assumptions and impera­
tives of their culture. It is this process of socialization, permitted 
by conscious and unconscious learning, that gives culture its contin­
uity and makes social life possible. Indeed, there would be complete 
chaos if every societal member behaved in a random and unpredictable 
manner. Though the degree of integration may vary from culture to 
culture, some common norms of behavior— more or less shared and inter­
nalized by members through the process of socialization— appear to be 
necessary for the survival of any society.
As a consequence of the process of socialization, a great part 
of these transmitted norms, altered or unaltered from generation to 
generation, are so taken for granted that they normally do not enter 
into consciousness. These norms are referred to by cultural anthropolo­
gists as the underlying principles which govern the behavior of people 
and which make for the particularity of each culture. Because these 
principles exist mostly at the level of subconsciousness and are rarely 
stated explicitly, they can seldom be observed directly but only 
inferred on the basis of consistencies in thought and action. The fol­
lowing example given by Kroeber and Kluckhohn may give an idea as to 
what an underlying principle is: the Navaho Indians hide their faces
and see to it that no other person can get any of their bodily parts or
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products such as hair, nails, or spit. They are also very careful to 
keep their personal names secret, and tend to have a negative verbal 
reaction when asked about witchcraft. All of these behavioral patterns, 
as well as others not mentioned, are, according to the authors, a 
manifestation of an underlying principle or "cultural entheymeme" which 
may be called "fear of the malevolent activities of other p e r s o n s . "58 
These underlying cultural principles are usually termed by 
anthropologists "implicit culture" or "covert culture," in opposition 
to the "explicit" or "overt" culture which consists of observable 
human behavior and its resulting products. Others call them "uncon­
scious canons of choice," "world view," "culture theme," "configurations," 
"thought patterns," "background phenomena," "ethos," "value orientations," 
etc.59 The importance of these underlying principles in helping us 
understand the behavior of people in a culture has been emphasized by 
Kroeber and Kluckhohn in these terms:
The logical construct, culture, is based upon the study of 
behavior and behavioral products. It returns to behavior and 
behavioral products in that the concept of culture makes more 
behavior intelligible and, to an appreciable extent, makes 
possible predictions about behavior in particular areas. But 
culture is not behavior nor the investigation of behavior in 
all its concrete conçleteness. Part of culture consists in 
norms and standards of behavior. Still another part con­
sists in ideologies justifying or rationalizing certain 
selected ways of behavior. Finally, every culture includes 
broad general principles of selectivity and ordering
A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, Culture: A Critical Review
of Concepts and Definitions (Cambridge: Harvard University Peabody Museum
of American Archeology and Ethnology Papers, 1952), pp. 336-337.
59About these concepts, see, Victor Barnouw, Culture and 
Personality, rev. ed. (Homewood, 111.: The Dorsey Press, 1973), pp.
55-90; Bert Kaplan, ed.. Studying Personality Cross-Culturally (Evanston, 
111.: Row, Peterson and Co., 1961); and, Kroeber and Kluckhohn, op. cit.
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("highest common factors") in terms of which pattern of 
and for culture contents are reducible to parsimonious 
generalization.GO
All of these underlying principles are assumed to be related 
to one another in a certain manner because human behavior is supposed 
to strive toward a certain degree of consistency. A number of prin­
ciples may derive from higher principles, which in turn may stem from 
one oversummative principle. Some principles may be in conflict with 
each other, iiow these underlying principles are integrated to form 
what we call here the "value system" is a great issue confronting 
anthropologists, who differ as to how they are really related. There 
are those who hold that the value system is integrated by one highest 
principle. The highest principle is called "world-view," "Weltanschau­
ung," or "ethos," which may be roughly defined as the basic attitude 
imprinted tpon man by his perception of nature. Spengler, in The 
Decline of the West, attributes the Apollonian, static character of 
Hellenic culture to the clear air of the innumerable islands of the 
Aegean Sea and the Faustian, dynamic, progressive Western European 
culture to the darker landscape and the incessant fog which lingered 
over the forests of Europe. Similarly, the scenery of the Indian 
jungle, with its superabundance of plant and animal life, is thought to 
be formative of the Indian value system, which is dominated by ü;e cult 
of the supernatural because man feels so small before such a spectacle 
of nature.G1 Along the same line Benedict describes the value systems
^^Kroeber and Kluckhohn, op. cit., p. 375.
Gloswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, vol. II (New York: 
Knopf, 1939), p. 57.
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of some Indian tribes as dominated by one basic spirit— Dionysian or 
Apollonian.G2
Others see child-rearing practices, i.e., the relationship 
within the family, as the determinant of the main value systems of a 
culture. Parent-child relationships with such patterns as dominance- 
s lib mission, succoring-dependence, and esdiibitionism-spectatorship are, 
according to Mead,^^ what makes cultures differ. The difference 
between the English and American character has been attributed by the 
author to habits acquired since early childhood. For example, the 
British have a tendency to "understate" and the American to "over­
state," and they accuse each other of "arrogance" and "boasting." The 
author explains this divergence in character as resulting from the 
different patterns of exhibitionism-spectatorship in British and 
American families.
In Britain it is the father who exhibits to his children: 
he is the model for their future behavior. Father does the 
taking and provides the model, before a very quiet and sub­
missive audience; in accordance with the deep ethical 
disapproval of the use of strength he understates his posi­
tion, speaks with a slight appearance of hesitation in his 
manner, but with the cool assurance of one who knows. In 
the United States, this position is reversed: at the
American breakfast table, it is not the Father but Junior 
who talks, exhibits his successes and skills, and demands 
parental spectatorshlp and applause with an insistence 
that can be clamoring and assertive because, after all, he 
is speaking from weakness to s t r e n g t h .
^^Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (Boston: Hougton Mifflin
Co., 1934).
^%argaret Mead, "The Application of Anthropological Tech­
niques to Cross-Cultural Communication," in Every Man His Way, ed. by 




Along the same line, Hsu maintains that the core value acquired 
in the family tends to pervade all other spheres of life. Cultures 
may be classified according to the prevailing relationship in the family 
system; father-son, husband-wife, mother-son, etc. The Chinese family, 
dominated by the father-son relationship, stresses a value of mutual 
dependence which spreads over the whole way of life of the Chinese 
people. The Chinese tends to depend upon his clan to fulfill all his 
physiological as well as social needs, making the clan the most impor­
tant group in Chinese society. On the other hand, the American family 
is dominated by the value of individualism, a self-reliance expressed 
in the primacy of the husband-wife relationship (free association 
between equal partners). This value acquired in the family, in turn, 
influences the way of life of an American society characterized by a 
proliferation of voluntary clubs and associations throuÿi which 
Individuals can fulfill their n e e d s . i n  contrast to this view that 
the value system and consequently the culture is dominated by a single 
integrative principle, there are those like Op1er who argue that the 
value system is made up of a limited number of themes— "dynamic 
affirmations"— which are not necessarily pervasive but which interact 
with and balance one another.
Another maintains that the values or underlying principles that 
compose the value system of any culture are the same, with the differ­
ence between cultures resulting only from differences of emphasis.
GSprancis H. Hsu, The Study of Literate Civilizations (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1969).
^^Morris E. Opler, "Themes as Dynamic Forces in Culture," 
American Journal of Sociology. 51 (1945), 198-206.
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combination, or rank-ordering. For instance, Alisjahbana has classified 
values into six types— theoretical, economic, political, solidarity (or 
social), aesthetic, religious— which are assumed to exist in the value 
system of any culture, group or individual.
In the author's opinion it is the interrelationships between, 
and the hierarchy of, values subordinated to one or two higher values 
that determine the difference in value systems and consequently in 
individual, group, and cultural behavior. Religious people tend to 
stress their religious values, other values being subordinated to it and 
supplementing it. Businesspersons tend to emphasize the economic 
value, scientists the theoretical value, and politicians the political 
value. The family gives primacy to the solidarity value, business 
corporations to the economic value, universities to the theoretical 
value. Similarly, some cultures give more weight to the economic or 
theoretical values, others to the religious and aesthetic values. As 
every individual, group, and culture tends consciously or unconsciously 
to realize these values, the products of their actions are the expres­
sion of these values. If we look at the American culture, what strikes 
us most is the number and size of the buildings that house the business 
firms, banks, and universities, that are the concrete manifestation of 
the economic and theoretical values. There are, of course,also govern­
ment buildings, churches, parks, and tourist sites, that are the 
emanation of the political, religious, and aesthetic values. But these 
structures are overshadowed by the ones dedicated to economic and
Takdir Alisjahbana, Values as Integrating Forces in Person­
ality, Society and Culture (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press,
1969) .
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theoretical values, and they tend in some way to support and contribute 
to the realization of these higher values. Government and bureaucracy, 
which are concerned with the political value, serve to strengthen the 
economic value in the American culture. Religion, via the Protestant 
ethic, also tends to contribute to economic development. Scientific 
research, which is the realization of the theoretical value, is not done 
merely for the sake of science but ultimately for utilitarian purposes. 
On the other hand, the Indian culture shows a preference for the reli­
gious value expressed in the abundance of holy persons, animals, 
placesj and things.
If we look at each cultural item separately, we can see the 
value system of its creator reflected in it. A church, for example, is 
the realization of a hierarchy of values dominated by the highest one; 
economic, aesthetic, and theoretical values are also expressed in the 
church, but they are secondary to the highest value. We can also say 
that any cultural good has one objective aspect, depending on its 
inherent physical or biological qualities, and a subjective aspect 
stemming from the subject who perceives and evaluates it according to 
his own value system. Thus, the meaning of goods changes with the value 
system of the evaluating subject. A church may change its meaning under 
the Communists, who may use it as a museum.
The difference between individuals, groups, and cultures 
depends \q>on the hierarchical arrangements of the six values in their 
value system and the forms and ways of achieving these values. If we 
want to know how the value system of a culture integrates the various 
elements, we must view each individual as a totality in itself within 
a higher totality— the social group, which, in turn, is part of a larger
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totality— the society, which is also a subsystem of total mankind. 
Personal behavior tends to realize a personal value system dominated by 
a higher value, with group behavior reflecting group values which are 
subordinated to some more predominant one. By realizing their own value 
systems, they tend directly or indirectly to realize the highest value 
or values of their cultures. In short, it can be said that individual 
roles, group norms, folkways, morals, customs are all expressions of 
cultural values; and they determine a people's way of life, which tends 
to realize the highest values of its c u l t u r e .
With Alisjahbana we have seen that the value system is made up 
of the same values everywhere, with local differences only in emphasis 
and combination. This universality of values is also claimed by 
Florence Kluckhohn and Fred Strodtbeck, who assume that human values and 
acts are directed toward the achievement of problems common to man in 
every culture. These include conceptions about; (1) the nature of man, 
(2) the relationship between man and nature, (3) time and space, (4) 
man's activity, and (5) man's relation with other men. All values in 
any culture are oriented toward the solution of these problems (which 
stem from the inherent nature of man), and cultures differ only in the 
patterning or rank-ordering of these value orientations. Value orienta­
tions are defined by the authors as:
Complex but definitely patterned (rank-ordered) principles, 
resulting from the transactional interplay of three analyti­
cally distinguishable elements of the evaluative process—  
the cognitive, the affective and the directive elements— which 
give order and direction to the ever-flowing stream of human
68Ibid.
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acts and thoughts as these relate to the solution of "common
human" problems.
This definition differs from those of certain others— e.g.,
Clyde Kluckhohn's "configuration," Opler's "cultural themes," Thompson's 
"core culture," Kardiner and Linton's "personality type," Redfield's 
"world view,"— in three main respects, i.e., according to Kluckhohn and 
Strodtbeck (1) values are complex principles which are variable only in 
rank ordering— for example, in relation to time, cultures may be oriented 
toward the past, the present or the future; (2) the principles are on 
an implicit-explicit continuum and not in terms of either/or; (3) the 
directive aspect of the total process is of primary importance and 
derives from biology. The concept of value orientation in the system 
can be used to explain change of two kinds: first, elaboration of the
same pattern, and second, basic change. An exançle of basic change 
might be a change in the rank-ordering of values, e.g., a shift from a 
harmony-with-nature orientation toward a mastery-over-nature orientation.
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck devised a questionnaire to test the 
value orientations of five subcultures in the United States— Navaho,
Zuni, Spanish American, Mormon, and Texan. The results showed a highly 
significant statistical difference in the patterning of value orienta­
tions among these cultures, supporting the authors' hypothesis that 
those subcultures (Mormon and Texan) that had the same rank-ordering 
of value orientations as did the majority of the American people have 
been able to assimilate with it without difficulty. Whereas those
G^Florence R. Kluckhohn and Fred L. Strodtbeck, Variations in 
Value Orientations (Evanston, 111.: Peterson and Co., 1961), p. 4.
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whose patterning of value orientations differed the most from the 
majority culture tended to remain the most isolated from it.^®
Many other empirical studies have also confirmed the difference 
in value systems between people of different cultures. Morris has 
measured the value profiles of students in ten cultures— the United 
States, China, India, Japan, Norway, Canada, Pakistan, England, New 
Zealand, and Italy— using a questionnaire containing thirteen "ways to 
live" deriving from a combination of three basic conponents of human 
personality— dionysian, promethean, and buddhistic— which are roughly 
equivalent to the values of dependence, dominance, and detachment, 
respectively. These ways of life are summarized by the author as 
follows: (1) preserve the best that man has attained; (2) cultivate
the independence of persons and things; (3) show a sympathetic concern 
for others; (4) experience festivity and solitude in alternation; (5) 
act and enjoy life through group participation; (6) constantly master 
changing conditions; (7) integrate action; (8) enjoyment; (9) wait in 
quiet receptivity; (10) control the self stoically; (11) meditate on 
the inner life; (12) chance adventuresome deeds; (13) obey the cosmic 
purposes.
These thirteen "ways to live" are fragments or aspects of world 
views or value orientations. The research study was an attenpt toward 
the building of a theory of value or a science of preferential 
behavior. The results showed that in each country, the ratings of 
individual questions were made along the same common value dimensions
70lbid.
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and that there was an underlying value structure which was very much 
the same in the culturally diverse group of students.
Morris's findings generally agreed with the results of Hsu's 
study, which used the Thematic Apperception Test to measure the 
"indlvldual-centeredness" of samples of American, Chinese, and Indian 
students, respectively.
Another very inçortant finding which supports the hypothesis 
that the value system integrates all other systems in a culture has been 
reported by the anthropologist Thompson. In the Indian Education, 
Personality, and Administration Project (lEPA), which was a multidis­
ciplinary empirical study of several Indian tribes in the 1940s, six 
systems of variables were studied:
1) The ecological system (the pattern of transaction between 
the community and its natural environment)
2) The sociological system (the transacting human organisms 
which comprise the community, viewed as a society or 
social structure)
3) The symbolic system (the communal symbolic system, includ­
ing language, ceremonials, arts and crafts, mythology, 
folklore, etc.)
4) The psychic system (the community viewed as a group of 
transacting personalities in process of formation and 
self-realization)
5) The somatic system (the community viewed as a system of 
transacting somatic units)
6) The core value system (the community's system of largely 
implicit emotionally tinged beliefs and attitudes regarding 
the nature of the world of man, of animals and plants, the 
relationship between them and the sources and dynamics of 
power within that system.
^^Charles Morris, Varieties of Human Values (Chicago: Univer­
sity of Chicago Press, 1956).
^^Hsu, op. cit.
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The findings reveal that the core value system functions as the key 
Integrating mechanism between several interdependent systems of vari-
a I rue tu re and group personality structures have been 
found as interdependent "not overly and directly, but indirectly and 
covertly, through a common set of basic values and through the somatic 
system."73 The personality system is related also to the ecological 
system; not directly, but indirectly through the core value system and
through the somatic system. On the other hand, the somatic and the
personality systems are interrelated both directly as aspects of the 
psychosomatic system as a whole, and indirectly through the core value 
and symbolic system. Similarly, the ecological system and the sociolog­
ical system are related "directly through their reflection of a common 
set of core values."74
The role of the value system as an integrating element in cul­
ture has been emphasized by Thompson in these terms:
. . .  a major finding of the lEPA project was the discovery, 
by means of empirical observations and tests, of the key 
role played by the core value set of variables in the com­
munity supersystem. A related finding was that contrary to 
the initial assunçtion of the research staff, the group of 
personality set of variables was not related directly to 
the social structure, but rather was related to it indirectly 
by means of the core value set of v a r i a b l e s . 75
We have reviewed the literature about the different theories of
value and the empirical studies supporting them to provide a theoretical
basis for what we are exploring. Thougji using different conceptual
73Laura Thonçson, Toward a Science of Mankind (New York; 
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1961), p. 60. (Underlining added).
7 ^ I b l d . , 67. (Underlining added).
75Ibid.. p. 164.
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dlipruaclitis and reaearch methods, many scholars have arrived at the same 
conclusion: that there exists an underlying value system, which is
distinctive for people in each culture, and that this value system can 
be used to explain certain consistencies and regularities in their 
behavior which, in turn, make for the particularity of each society.
The relationship between value and behavior needs to be elaborated 
further to avoid misinterpretation.
Value and Behavior
As we have seen, anthropologists emphasize that the value system 
is made up of largely implicit, unstated, or unconscious values, prin­
ciples, or ass imitions that make people behave the way they do. By 
this it is meant that when people act, they are most of the time unaware 
of the tacit values directing their action; it is merely their custom 
to act in a certain way. These values, transmitted from generation 
to generation, modified or not, have been internalized in such a way 
that they are taken for granted; they seem to be something too obvious 
to be consciously considered. What is obvious to a person is the most 
difficult thing for him to see, and as Kroeber and Kluckhohn put it,
"the really important thing to know about a society is what it takes 
for granted."76 lb is inçortant in the sense that inçlicitly it
motivates people to do what they do without questioning it, and in this 
way it helps maintain social life.
For a society to survive, the following imperatives, according 
to John Bennett and Melvin Tumin,77 must be fulfilled: (1) maintenance
^^Kroeber and Kluckhohn, op. cit., p. 336.
^^John W. Bennett and Melvin M. Tumin, "Some Cultural Impera­
tives," in Cultural Anthropology ed. by Hammond, pp. 9-21.
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of the biologic functioning of societal members; (2) production and
distribution of goods and services; (3) reproduction of new members;
(4) socialization of new members into functioning adults; (5) mainten­
ance of order; and (6) maintenance of meaning and motivation. Among 
these the last one, that of maintaining meaning and motivation, is a 
"master category which is present and gives tone and support to all 
the five preceding categories," because "no human activity is possible 
unless humans are motivated to perform the activity in question."^8 
And motivation is provided by making Individuals internalize the values 
inherent in the activity itself;
Society builds motivation right into each of the major prob­
lems and patterns of activities attendant upon them. Thus,
the motivation to pursue survival activities is not an 
abstract and separate feature of our lives. It is built 
right into the pattern of activity itself. We are taught work 
habits, how to conduct our social relations, and the like, 
in such a way that their desirability and the reason for 
engaging in them are not questioned but taken for granted.
Or if questioned they are rationalized for us so that the
answers are usually satisfactory and become part of our very 
innermost core of personality.
The relationship between value, understood in this sense, and behavior
is that value determines behavior almost automatically.
It is important to note that in stressing the mechanistic aspect 
of the relationship between value and behavior, anthropologists are by 
no means deterministic because they do not dismiss the fact that value 
is, in turn, the product of a host of other factors— technology, his­
tory, geographic conditions— thus implying a theory of multiple causation 
and interaction. Moreover, they recognize that besides the inçlicit
78ibid.. p. 19. 
^^Ibid.
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values that exist at the level of unconsciousness and thus direct man's
behavior outside of his awareness, there are those that belong to the
level of consciousness and are consequently under his control.
The differentiation between the conscious and unconscious, and
their mutual interaction and their impact upon human behavior, are
great issues confronting anthropologists and have a great significance
for technical assistance. It suffices now to note that it is mainly the
tacit values that make for the difference in behavior between people in
different cultures. The following example given by Clyde Kluckhohn
may give us an idea as to how the implicit values determine the reaction
of people in different cultures to the same problem.
Five groups, each with a distinct culture, who carry on subsis­
tence agriculture in the same ecological area in the Southwest, 
are faced with severe drought. Two groups react primarily with 
increased rational and technological activity, two with increased 
ceremonial activity and one with passive acceptance.80
Because values are so much an intrinsic part of our lives and 
behavior it appears very difficult to be completely rational or objec­
tive, to base one's decision just on facts and avoid value judgments.
It also seems difficult to exclude values from the study of politics.
Research findings have demonstrated, for example, that "personal values
81are important determinants in the choice of corporate strategies,"
because implicit values are "the guidance system a personality uses
82when faced with a choice of alternatives."
80Clyde Kluckhohn, "Values and Value Orientations in the Theory 
of Action," in Toward a General Theory of Action, ed. by Talcott Parsons 
and Edward A. Shils (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 405.
81William D. Guth and Retano Tagiuri, "Personal Values and Corpo­




In one empirical study, Guth and Tagiuri used the classifica­
tion of values developed by Spengler to identify six types of men in 
accordance with the highest value in the hierarchy of values of their 
respective value systems— theoretical, economic, aesthetic, social, 
political, religious.83 It was found that the value system of business 
managers tended to be dominated in order of decreasing importance by 
the economic, theoretical, and political values, in contrast to men in 
other professions. In the field of religion, for example, the value 
system of ministers tended to be dominated in order of decreasing 
importance by the religious, social and aesthetic values. The findings 
revealed that corporate managers tended to choose corporate strategy 
in accordance with the dominant value or values in their own system.
The economic man is more likely to emphasize an increase in productivity, 
the theoretical man to maintain truth and honesty in relation to sup­
pliers, dealers, and employees, the political man to strengthen his 
personal power. Yet, each one is convinced that his decision is the
rational one based on facts.
Summary
A lengthy exploration has been made of the basic ground of human 
nature in general, and the relationships of this to political behavior
in particular. We have considered Maslow's theory of a hierarchy of basic
needs, and since men are rational in acting to achieve their goals, this 
theory has helped us to understand why men act as they do in various 
cultural circumstances. Further, we have noted that man as a social 
animal creates his own societies and that these give rise to complex
83lbid.. pp. 123-132.
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cultures. Culture itself has been described as a systematic and inte­
grated whole, whose parts are knitted together by a central value 
system. Then, in considering that human characteristics are guided by 
the basic needs and shaped by the standard norms of each society, we 
would seem to have a solid framework within which to understand human 
nature.
In the next chapter we shall survey the history of Laos to find 
patterns that have appeared in the past. We shall observe history as 
an element of the environmental system that has shaped the political 




Laos is a new addition to the regional map of the world. Prior 
to the second World War, "Laos" was more of a geographic expression 
that a nation, and there was little sense of internal identification.
Its peoples differ widely in social organization, culture, and politi­
cal identity. To the extent that there is a dominant group it is the 
Lao Loum, or lowland Lao, who live along the Mekong River, and it is 
their elites who have traditionally played the strongest roles in 
Laotian history. The Lao Loum have their own divisions, but in general 
they share a common life style, language, religion, culture, and history, 
and the present Laotian political-bureaucratic elites have been drawn 
mainly from their ranks.
There are especially great differences among the hill tribe 
peoples, who make up about half of the population and who occupy more 
than half of the land area of Laos. Further, these people have little 
or no identification with the cultural, social, and political systems 
of the lowland Lao. So achieving a national identity and integrating 
these various groups of the people into a nation-state will be a great 
challenge for this country, and especially for the elites— in addition 
to the problems of economic development and modernization. The moun­
tainous geographical setting seems to be one of the major variables
80
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complicating this task, as it tends to block internal communication and 
social mobility. Moreover, it divides the people into graups with 
different cultures and even histories. These factors affect the culture- 
and-personality of the elites as a whole. In sum, the Laotian elites 
have their own unique environmental problems.
Country and Environment
"Soft countries," wrote Herodotus, "invariably breed soft men, 
and it is impossible for one and the same country to produce splendid 
crops and good soldiers." The Persians, he continued, chose "to live 
as an imperial people in a rough country rather than to cultivate the 
lowlands as some other nation's s l a v e s . S u c h  classical writing on 
history and politics contends that the nature of human character and 
the societies that in some sense derived from it were ultimately 
rooted in the soil and the climate. Geographers, historians, and 
political scientists generally accept some relationship between societies 
and environments.2 What they argue about is the extent to which the 
broad lines of history and politics in a society are influenced by the 
physical setting.
At the most fundamental level, land is a necessary component of 
a state; a state is inconceivable without area and without a government 
in effective and sovereign control of it. Policy is the set of choices.
1 Herodotus, Herodotus IX Book (New York: A m o  Press, 1973),
p. 112.
2The historian Arnold J. Toynbee emphasized the importance of 
such relationships, see, A Study of History (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1934). For other ecological environments, see, for example : John 
A. Morrison, "Russia and Warm Water," United States Navel Institute 
Proceedings, 78 (1952), 1169-1176; James Fairgrieve, Geography and World 
Power (London; University of London Press, 1921); and, Sidney F.
Markham, Climate and the Energy of Nations (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1944).
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made by the elites within the state, of ends and of the means by which 
those ends may be most conveniently adileved. Power Is the sanction 
which enables the elites, as decision-makers, to pursue the policies of 
the state. And the basic common factor In the various policies pursued 
by every state In the modern world Is the preservation of Its own 
territorial Integrity and the welfare of Its own citizens— despite varied 
perceptions regarding the nature of security and welfare, and In spite 
of the devious and sometimes unrealistic courses by which their 
achievement Is sought. Power, or at least power to maintain an Indepen­
dent state, then, Is the means whereby the state seeks to secure its own 
well-being, and the power of a state Is Itself made up of two elements. 
First and most obvious are the physical and tangible components of 
power: land and agricultural wealth, fuel and mineral resources;
population, man-power, and manufacturing industries; defensible boun­
daries and other simple facts of geographical location. Second, less 
tangible though no less real, are the non-material components: the
morale and social cohesion of its peoples; the energy and intelligence 
of its leadership; and the image of itself which It succeeds in pro­
jecting before the world.
It is not difficult to name states that by the vigor of 
their leadership alone have raised themselves to a degree of importance 
inconsistent with their size and natural endowment. Nor is it hard to 
name states whose internal weight has been greatly enhanced by their 
internal stability and good order— political, social, and economic.
But tangible resources are a necessary if not always sufficient basis of 
national power. In considering the geographical components of power, as
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they might be used in the implementation of policy, two terms require 
definition: state and nation. The first describes an inhabited land,
politically organized, with a sovereign government in effective control. 
The term nation, by contrast, connotes a body of people with strong 
internal bonds of cohesion, such as common language, tradition, history, 
religious faith, and social values. And in reference to the second of 
these, Sol Sanders indicates that "by no criterion is Laos a nation."3 
We are concerned here with the geography and history of Laos 
as a part of the environmental system of the elites. In sum, we are 
assuming that they must have adapted their way of life to their envir­
onment,^ and that through better understanding of the ecological 
environment and the background of the "nation" we can achieve better 
understanding of the culture-and-personality of the elites.
Geographical Sketch 
The modern Laos is a landlocked state of 91,425 square miles, 
almost the same size of Great Britain, located between 13 and 28 north 
latitude on the tropical Southeast Asia mainland. Its width ranges 
from 300 miles in the northern part to 90 miles in the middle. (See 
Figure 1.) The elevation ranges from sea-level plains to highlands; 
the Boloven Plateau in the south has an altitude of 3,500 feet, the 
Xieng Khouang Plateau in the north has an altitude of 4,500 feet.
3sol Sanders, A Sense of Asia (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1969), pp. 34-35.
^Theoretical assumptions about the influence of ecological 
factors on culture are discussed in J. L. M. Dawson, "Research and 
Theoretical Bases of Bio-Social Psychology," Gazette, 16 (1969). 
1-10.
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and the highest peak in Laos is 9,242 feet.^ The highlands of Laos at 
particular altitudes have remained the province of hill tribe peoples 
who are sometimes nomadic, who practice hunting, gathering, and slash- 
and-bum agriculture, and who seem scarcely to have evolved from 
Neolithic life.
The jungled mountains and narrow river valleys that form the 
northern terrain give way in the south to sparsely forested tablelands. 
From the long mountain chain separating Laos and Vietnam, many rivers 
flow westward toward the Mekong River, which serves as the major 
communications link between north and south along the greater length 
of the Laos-Thailand border. Laos is also bordered by China and Burma 
in the north and northwest and by Cambodia in the south (see Figure 2).
The Mekong River, which flows from the Tibetan mountains 
through Laos and feeds into the South China Sea in Vietnam, provides a 
major source of food and an important communication network for the 
country. But its frequent rapids and low water level in the dry 
season prevent year-round, large-scale, long-distance transportation; 
and the great falls at Rhone in the south rule out its international 
use.
There are two distinct seasons: dry and wet. The dry season
begins in November and ends in April; the wet season of monsoon rains 
is from May to October. It has been reported that the mean annual 
rainfall is about 70 inches, with a range from 40 inches around Saya- 
bury in the north to 160 inches oij the Boloven plateau in the south.^
^Frank LeBar and Adrienne Suddard, Laos: Its People, Its 
Culture, Its Society (New Haven: The HRAF Press, 1965).
^Ibid., p. 28.
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Further, Laos has a tropical climate. The highest temperatures, in the 
90°s; come in March and April. But in December and February, Tempera­
tures in the 30°s have been reported on the highest plateaus.
The population was estimated to be about 3,180,000 in 1973 (see 
Table 4). The people are Mongoloid in race, but of diversified ethnic
TABLE 4
POPULATION ESTIMATES FOR LAOS
Year Total Male Female
Average per 
Square Mile
1904 2,469,000 1,301,000^ 1,268,000 28.09
1965 2,631,000 1,331,000 1,300,000 28.78
1966 2,694,000 1,363,000 1,331,000 28.92
1967 2,759,000 1,369,000 1,363,000 30.18
1968 2,825,000 1,429,000 1,396,000 30.90
1969 2,893,000 1,464,000 1,429,000 31.64
1970 2,962,000 1,499,000 1,463,000 32.40
1971 3,033,000 1,535,000 1,498,000 33.17
1972 3,106,000 1,483,000 1,523,000 33.97
1973 3,181,000 1,621,000 1,560,000 34.79
SOURCE; Ministry of Economics and Plans, Annuaire Statistique 
(Vientiane, 1973), p. 10.
backgrounds. The Lao, one of the Tai ethnic groups who live in the 
lowlands, make up about half of the total population and have been 
dominant in the political affairs. The remainder is made up of tribes 
of Kha or Lao Theung, Meo, Man or Yao, Ho, and Tais. The Kha tribes
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originally occupied what is now the highlands of Laos, before the Lao 
people came in the thirteenth century.^
Culturally, the Tai tribes are closely related to the Lao, and 
they speak Sino-Tibetan languages that are distantly related to those 
of the Meo and Man. The Meo and Man are believed to be the most recent 
immigrants; they came to Laos about 1850, and are closely related to the 
Chinese. The Kha tribes, which are made up of small groups, speak the 
Mon-Khmer language of Cambodia and the Malay penninsula. In addition, 
there are foreign minorities comprised of Vietnamese, Chinese, Indians, 
and Pakistanis, who are mainly concentrated in the urban centers. The 
proportions of these ethnic groups in the total population are shown 
in Table 5.
TABLE 5 







Meo and Yao 5
Others 4
SOURCE; S. Kunstadter, ed.. Southeast Asian Tribes, 
Minorities, and Nations (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 260.
For an ethnological outline, see, G. Coedes, The Indianized 
States of Southeast Asia, trans. by Susan Brown Cowing, ed. by Walter F. 
Vella (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1968), pp. 10-13.
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Historical Background
Laos has been a country without peace. The m o d e m  history of 
Laos began with the arrival of the French in 1893, and since its 
independence in 1954, Laos has suffered from an internal conflict that 
reflects the worldwide ideological confrontation of communism and 
capitalism. 'The elites were drawn into opposing camps, thus creating 
an unpleasant atmosphere hostile to the forging of a common national 
identity. In 1975 the country changed its name to "People’s Democratic 
Republic of Laos" and espoused Marxist-Leninist ideology.
The Lao are not, however, entirely without a traditional heri­
tage— common origins, recorded events, and cultural symbols. This 
heritage (to be described below) might facilitate the development of 
an integrated national culture. Although modern writings in history 
tend to stress the continuity of the Lao tradition as the sole unify­
ing human factor of the Laotian state, this story is not all true. The 
land called "Laos" at present actually consists of many Lao states 
that were in the past independent. This loose integration is character­
istic of Laos. To the elite, the history of Laos is the story of the 
ethnic Lao people. Most of the political-bureaucratic elites before 
1970 were members of the nobility and quasi-nobility— the mandarinats—  
of the royal families of the principalities of Laos. The main princi­
palities were Luang Prabang in the north, Vientiane in the middle, and 
Champassak in the south. At present, the elite group includes members 
of common families, but the old elites are still active and are counted 
as the most intellectual and modernized members of society. Pride in
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historical heroes seems to be little evident among the elite, perhaps 
because they derive their ancestors from different kingdoms, and it is 
almost non-existant among the common man except in terms of various 
fables.
In sum, the political culture-and-personality of the present 
Laotian elites is partly the product of a long and evolutionary Laotian 
history, 'iliis personality is very complex, having been influenced by 
the shared Lao culture, historical background, geography, economic 
resources, colonialism, the impacts of the recent war, and the changing 
international political setting. Understanding this background 
increases our comprehension of the elites' political culture-and- 
personality, showing why they perceive their world as they do and why 
they possess particular characteristics and pursue certain goals. For 
this reason, the remainder of this section will present a brief history 
of Laos, limited to those elements which help to illustrate the themes 
of the Lao culture-and-personality.
Early Period
The history of Laos merges into archaeology in one direction 
and blurs into fables in another. According to most scholars, the Lao 
were originally a Tai^ ethnic group dwelling south of the Yangtze River 
in China. Their earliest unification was the Kingdom of Nan Chao—  
which in Mandarin Chinese means "South of the Clouds"— in north Yunnan 
in the middle of the seventh century A.D. Successfully resisting
8"Tai" is used as a generic term to those peoples who originated 
in South China and who are today scattered throughout Northern portions 
of Southeast Asia. It is different from "Thai" which refers to Tai who 
live in Thailand.
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Chinese efforts at conquest In the eighth century, Nan Chao slowly 
spread its domain southward and eastward. By the ninth century it had 
invaded Tonkin in what is now North Vietnam.
Nan Chao fell to the Mongols in 1253 when Kublai Khan was con­
quering China. Before Nan Chao's fall, however, bands of Tai had 
already moved into the Shan states of Burma and into parts of present 
North Vietnam, Laos, and Northern Thailand. The Tai of Burma later 
came to be called Shans; those of Laos were called Lao; and those of 
Vietnam called Tai Dam (Black Tai) and Tai Dang (Red Tai). Tai 
settlements were eventually established as far west as Assam in India 
and as far east as Hainan Island off the Southwest coast of China.9
Before Nan Chao's fall the area of present-day Burma, Thailand, 
Laos, and Cambodia was occupied by the Mons in the West and the Khmer 
in the East. The Mons established the kingdom of Dvaravati with its 
capital in the area of N a k o m  Fathom, thirty miles southwest of the 
present Bangkok. Dvaravati was in contact with Ceylon from earlier 
times, and through this contact was responsible for spreading Hinnayan 
or Theravada Buddhism among the incoming Tai.10
The Mons were notably receptive to the art and literature of 
India and Ceylon and were important as disseminators of Indian civiliza­
tion to the courts of mainland Southeast Asia. They are thought to have 
been the source of important artistic, literary, and governmental fea­
tures of the Khmer, the Burmese, and the Tai. Their political control
9coedès, op. cit., pp. 189-191. 
lOlbid.
92
waH Heldom extensive, however, and tliey repeatedly fell under the 
domination of stronger neighbors. By the end of the tenth century 
Dvaravati and other Mon kingdoms along the Chao Phraya River had come 
under the control of the Khmer Empire, which had grown up on the site 
of ancient Funan in Cambodia. The Mon Kingdom of Haripunjaya in the 
north of Thailand remained outside the Khmer Empire but fell to the 
incoming Tai in the thirteenth century. The cultural dominance of the 
Khmer over Laos was also enhanced by extensive contact during later 
periods.
The Tai peoples developed the art of writing only after they 
left Nan Chao and became associated with the Indianized Khmer. This 
Indian influence is also evident in their rites and mythology, which 
provided supernatural sanction for their rulers. The elaborate legend 
of their origin provides a semi-divine ancestor, the sage Khoun Borom. 
According to legend, he established the Kingdom in the area of present- 
day Dien Bien Phu and divided the land among his seven sons; the 
divisions corresponded to the various lands into which the Tai 
peoples migrated. Khoun Lo, the eldest son, was given the lands of 
Muong Swa, from which Lan Xang developed.
Lan Xang Domination
The recorded history of the Lao began a hundred years after the 
fall of Nan Chao, under Fa Ngum, who was the twenty-third successor to 
Khun Lo. While he was young. Fa Ngum found assylum at the Court of
llcoedes points out that the countries of Southeast Asia were 
never political dependencies of India, but rather cultural colonies, 
ibid., pp. 252-253.
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Angkor and married a Khmer princess. With Khmer assistance, he sub­
sequently regained his heritage in Muong Swa and carved out an empire 
comprising all of present-day Laos and much of northern and eastern 
Siam. In 1353 he united the territory as the Lao state of Lan Xang.
It was Fa Ngum who accepted Theravada Buddhism and received a 
mission of Khmer Buddhist monks who carried with them a revered golden 
statue of Buddha— the Prabang. Prabang became the principal religious 
symbol of Laos in honor of which Muong Swa was later renamed Luang 
Prabang. Despite Fa Ngum's establishment of Buddhism as the state 
religion, the majority of the people continued to worship the phi—  
spirits representing the forces of nature. In the period of King 
Fa Ngum, Lan Xang extended its boundary to Cochine Annamitique in the 
south, to the Black River in the north, and to the watershed between 
the Mekong and Chao Phraya River in the west.
After Fa Ngum, his son Sam Sene Thai reigned between 1373-1416 
and consolidated and organized the Kingdom. He developed an adminis­
trative structure that lasted for centuries. Based on the principle 
of absolute monarchy, the system employed princes of royal blood as 
the King's principal advisers. These advisers were supported by a 
hierarchy of officials, judges, collectors of tribute, and minor
l^For the details of the founding of Muong Swa, see "Annals of 
Lan Xang," in Kingdom of Laos, ed. by Rene de Berval. et al. (Saigon: 
Francie-Asie, 1959), pp. 375-410; and, Katay D, Sasorit, "Historical 
Aspects of Laos," ibid., pp. 24-31. In the same volume, Coedès (p. 20) 
states that Fa Ngum's success was facilitated by the decline of Sukho- 
thai, a kingdom of Tai which in the thirteenth century exercised 
sovereignty over the Mekong River but later became a vassal of the King­
dom of Ayutthaya, a Tai which was founded in 1350 on the lower Chao 
Phraya River. See also, Coedès, The Indianized States of Southeast Asia, 
pp. 223-236.
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functionaries. These officials held their positions at the pleasure of 
the King— only those of the royal family being hereditary. I'Jext to the 
King in political power was the maha otipahat— the second King. The maha 
oupahat was the King's most intimate adviser. Chao muong or governors 
of districts might be royal appointees, sometimes princes, but often 
were selected by a local council of notables, usually from among the 
family of the previous incumbent. In practice, any qualified person 
could rise to high office regardless of birth.
During the reign of Sam Sene Thai, the Buddhist monk began to 
assume a place of honor in the community. The pagoda became the center 
of community life, serving as school and place of worship and social 
gathering.
Fa l'îgum and Sam Sene Thai established Lan Xang when the sur­
rounding states were variously embroiled with one another or with China. 
Lan Xang encompassed more territory than the Lao have controlled during 
any other period, and the subsequent history of the Lao has been one of 
struggle to regain the lands of Lan Xang.
The following King, Phothisarath, reigned from 1520-1547 and 
was notable for his devotion to Buddhism, his temple building, and his 
attempt to suppress the cult of the phi by royal edict. He succeeded 
in strengthening the official position of the established religion, 
but the common people remained as much spirit worshipers as Buddhists. 
Phothisarath also embroiled Lan Xang in a power struggle with Siam and 
an expanding Burma by taking advantage of an interregnum in Lan Na 
(another Tai kingdom) to obtain its throne for his son Setthathirath.
In 1547, Setthathirath inherited the throne of Lan Xang and returned
95
from Lan Na with an important religious statue known as the Emerald 
Buddha. During his reign, Lan Xang— usually in alliance with Siam—  
experienced more than forty years of warfare with Burma.
Seeking a closer association with Siam, and especially to 
improve their military communications, Setthathirath moved his capital 
to Vientiane, fhere he built the Wat Keo and the That Luang, the ruins 
of which are venerated by present-day Laotians. Simultaneously he gave 
the old capital, Muong Swa, its present name of Luang Prabang. After 
1571, Lan Xang succumbed to conquest and endured twenty years of 
Burmese rule. Then the resurgent Siamese expelled the Burmese, 
retaining control of Lan Na for themselves.
Lan Xang soon entered a period of nondynastic rule, followed 
by the ascendency of a collateral line of the original royal family 
and a power struggle from which Souligna Vongsa emerged as King in 1637. 
He held Lan Xang together and ruled until it fell to the small Lao 
Kingdom of Xieng Khouang in 1694.
An interesting point about the history of the early period is 
that the Indian cults of Vishnuism, Brahmanism, and Buddhism all 
appeared officially at all royal ceremonies. Since that period, Budd­
hist cosmogony and cosmology^^ and the doctrines of retribution for one's 
acts and transmigration have been deeply implanted in even the humblest 
classes, and both the Buddhist monks and mandarinates have been
l^The Dharmasastras are political treatises, and have contributed 
to the hierarchical administration, conduct, and theoretical rule by the 
king and mandarinates. See, P.V. Kane History of Dharmasastra (Poona 
Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1941).
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elevated to positions of high e s t e e m . L a o  religious characteristics 
are deeply drawn and are the products of this heritage.
Along with the Indian religious heritage, the influence of 
Indian law has been profound. The Dharmasastra,^^ and especially the 
most famous of them known as the "laws of Manu," have formed a frame­
work for the ordering of Lao— and several other Southeast Asian coun­
tries'— customs, through royal courts, in somewhat the same fashion 
that Roman law served the Western countries. This facet of early Lao 
culture seems to be imprinted in the deep-seated political concepts of 
the modern Laotian elite.
Divided Kingdom
The succession struggle at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century destroyed the territorial unity of Lan Xang. The prince ruling 
at Vientiane, who controlled a considerable area of both sides of 
the middle Mekong, was tributary to Annum. Another prince established 
a separate kingdom at Luang Prabang and sometimes held the allegiance 
of the semi-independent northern tribesmen. A third prince established 
the kingdom of Champassak, which controlled the southernmost provinces on 
both sides of the M e k o n g . T h i s  historical evidence helps to explain
^^The mandarinates were relatives of the King, and what we are 
really saying here is that the Indian cults served to establish some 
sort of "divine right to rule" for the Lao royalty.
l^One excellent discussion of this cosmology's implications for 
Laos is the anthropological study of S. J. Tambiah, Buddhism and Spirit 
Cults in Northeastern Thailand (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 
1972).
According to its annals. Champ assak developed independently 
during the seventeenth century from a mere town situated on the Mekong 
River into a quasi-principality whose jurisdiction was confined to a
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why in modern times the integration of Laos as a nation-state is very 
loose. Each of the three ex-kingdoms tends to hold its own identity 
as it was in the past.l?
Throughout the eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries, 
the nao states quarreled among themselves and also struggled against 
invaders from neighboring states. The city of Vientiane declined 
steadily and at last was occupied by Siam, while also accepting vassal­
age to Annam. Such double vassalage was possible because it customarily 
implied little more than a symbolic act of deference, and little 
other obligation from either party. Eventually Chao Anou, a former 
maha oupahat who had obtained the throne with Siamese support, involved 
Viantiane in war with Siam. In 1828 Vientiane was destroyed and later 
annexed alternatively by Siam and Annam.18
Luang Prabang suffered from wars with Vientiane, Burma and Siam. 
Later, Meo tribesmen migrated into its northern territory and were 
often rebellious. In the late nineteenth century, in the aftermath of
small area and whose control over the populace was limited. It remained 
outside of the mainstream of events in the north. See Department of 
Fine Arts, Thailand, "Pravatsart N a k o m  Champassak" (History of Cham- 
passak) in Choomnoom Pongsavadam (Collected Chronicles), 70 (Bangkok, 
1941), pp. 1-23; Term Vibhakbhanakij, Pravatsart Isan (History of Isan), 
(Bangkok: Social Science Association Press, 1973), pp. 35-137; and
Thao Nhouy Abhay, "En marge de l'histoire du Laos," Francie-Asie, 3 
(April, 1948), 460-463.
^^See an excellent description of how these three powerful 
families recently expressed their own prestige and identity in Arthur J. 
Dommen, "Lao Politics Under Souvanna Phouma," in Indochina In Conflict, 
ed. by Joseph J. Zasloff and Allen E. Goodman (Lexington: Lexington
Books, 1972), pp. 81-98.
^®See David K. Wyatt, "Siam and Laos, 1767-1827," Journal of 
Southeast Asian History. 4 (September, 1963), 13-21; and, Walter F. 
Vella, Siam Under Rama III (Locust Valley, N.Y.: J. J. Augustin, Inc.,
1957), pp. 80-86.
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the Taiplng and Moslem rebellious, rebels and bandits ravaged the area. 
Simultaneously, Siam tightened its control in an effort to prevent 
French encroachment. In 1885 it reduced King Oun Kham of Luang Prabang 
to the status of a governor, and later did the same to the king of 
Champassak.l9
Colonialism Experienced
The French began to penetrate Indochina in 1858. After annex­
ing Cochin China and asserting a protectorate over Cambodia, they 
displayed interest in the area of present-day Laos. Ostensibly to 
suppress Chinese bandits, but actually to prevent French assertion of 
Annamese suzerainty claims, Siamese troops occupied Xieng Khouang and 
Houa Phan in 1885. The French recognized Siamese suzerainty, but 
they secured the right to maintain a vice consul in Luang Prabang.
They credited vice consul Auguste Pavié with winning the area of 
present-day Laos by convincing the royal court of Luang Prabang that 
France had its best interests at heart. Apparently genuinely sympa­
thetic to his need for protection against Chinese raiders, Pavie^ induced 
King Oun Kham to request French protection.
Siam formally ceded its claims to all territory east of the 
Mekong to France only after a French fleet moved up the Chao Phraya 
River to blockade Bangkok in 1893. In 1896 a treaty with Great Britain
^^Vibhakbhanakij, op. cit. For further details, see also D. G. 
d. nail, A History of Southeast Asia (London: Macmillan, 1955), pp.
207-210, 376-385, 591-612.
^^Auguste Pavid, et al.. Mission Pavie; Indochine. 1879-1895.
6 (Paris: E. Leroux, 1911), 113-114.
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established the boundary between the Shan states of Burma and French 
territory at the M e k o n g . B y  1905 a series of treaties with Siam 
had expanded French territory to include the west bank section of Luang 
Prabang and the province of Champassak. By 1895 a series of treaties 
with China had established the boundary in the north along geographical 
features. An inconclusive treaty in 1904 between France and Siam 
affected the border between Champassak and Cambodia. In fact, this 
boundary, like that with the territories in Vietnam, was determined by 
French administrators.^2 in 1899 a French Résident Superiëur was 
stationed in Vientiane, and the territories of Luang Prabang and Xieng 
Khouang and the former kingdoms of Champ assak and Vientiane were given 
the French administrative designation of Laos. The French reduced 
Vientiane, Xieng Khouang and central Laos to provinces and made no 
effort to revive their former royal families. After he pledged loyalty 
to France, the only son of the late King of Champassak was made 
governor of Champassak, but was accorded no royal status. The king 
of Luang Prabang retained his royal title and prerogatives under 
French protection, but his realm was indirectly governed by the French. 
French commissioners, ultimately responsible to the Résident Supérieur, 
more directly administered the eight provinces outside of Luang 
Prabang. The French army commanded the northernmost area, now Phong 
Saly, which was designated a military territory.
21The Anglo-French agreement of 1896 and the fourteen-power 
Declaration on Laotian Neutrality of 1962 bear a remarkable similarity. 
See the text of the 1962 agreement in The New York Times (22 July 1962) 
For the Anglo-French rivalry, see Hall, op. cit., pp. 591-612.
^^Historically, Annam's rights in Laos were more verbal than 
real and were exaggerated to serve France's cause. See, Luang Vichitr 
Vadakam, Thailand's Case (Bangkok; Thai Commercial Press, 1941).
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On the whole, the hand of French rule rested lightly on Laos.
The French generally accepted the advice and employed the services 
of the local elite, especially the tribal chiefs. Insofar as patterns 
of local rule and local custom and tradition were compatible with French 
principle and ultimate sovereignty, they were unmolested. At the outset, 
the French were adamant only in abolishing slavery and tightly control­
ling all fiscal administration. Gradually, they influenced the 
judicial and educational systems and, later, undertook an innovation 
by establishing a service of health and sanitation.
After realizing that the Mekong River was not the important 
communication route they had originally thought it to be, the French 
considered annexing Laos to Annam. Lao resentment caused them to 
abandon this idea. The traditional Lao mistrust of the people "from 
the other side of the mountains," who were noted for greater energy and 
personal aggressiveness, had been intensified by French introduction 
of partially French-trained Annamese into minor positions in the 
government.
Otherwise, the Lao caused the French no trouble. Returning 
from his studies in Paris to assume the throne of Luang Prabang in 
1904, King Sisavang Vong accepted French overlordship, as had his pre­
decessor. Only three situations required military force, none involving 
the Lao. between 1901 and 1907 a groiq) of southern Mountain Mon-Khmer 
rebelled, apparently in opposition to French suppression of their 
customary slave trading. Tlien, Yunnanese bandits kept the colonial 
army fully occupied in the military territory between 1914 and 1916. 
Finally, apparently excited by visionary dreams of a messianic kingdom, 
tne Meo raided the Lao and the various tribes from 1919 to 1921.
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Otherwise, the French administered the country without incident until 
World War II.
World War II and Transition
. By the time of the fall of France in June 1940, Japan in its 
southward march in Asia had reached almost to the Indochina border and 
had signed a treaty of friendship with Thailand. The next Japanese 
move was to get from the Vichy French regime a concession permitting 
the movement of troops into Indochina. Meanwhile, Japan permitted 
Thailand (previously known as Siam) to seize the parts of Luang 
Prabang and Champassak west^of the Mekong that had earlier been ceded 
to France. In July 1941 all of Indochina was occupied. A few Lao 
engaged in underground resistance against the Japanese, but, generally, 
the Lao showed little resentment toward either the Thai or the Japanese, 
and life went on much as usual. Inability to protect the country from 
Japan— or even from Thailand— severely damaged French prestige, which 
further declined with the realization by the people of Laos that their 
former colonial masters were merely obeying the orders of an Asian 
power that chose to rule through them.
In August 1941 a treaty with the Vichy French extended the 
domain of Luang Prabang to include the provinces of Vientiane, Xieng 
Khouang and Houa Khong. It also authorized King Sisavang Vong to 
form a Cabinet conçosed of a prime minister and four other ministers, 
appointed with Vichy French concurrence. In addition to his tradi­
tional duties as maha oupahat. Prince Phetsarath assumed the post of 
prime minister.
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In March 1945 the Japanese decided to oust the Vichy French 
officials, who were discredited completely by the Allies' liberation 
of France, and declared the colonial regime ended. Whereas Tonkin and 
Annam united to form the Republic of Vietnam, and Cambodia declared 
itself an independent kingdom, the aging King of Luang Prabang and his 
son. Crown Prince Savang Vatthana, delayed the assumption of indepen­
dent status for one month. Even then, they left the southern provinces 
free to decide for themselves. During this period the Japanese sent 
the Crown Prince to Saigon, leaving Prince Phetsarath a relatively free 
hand in running the country. Vichy French officials were interned and 
replaced with Japanese military representatives.
The vacuum thus created by the Japanese surrender on August 14, 
1945, resulted in agitation. Japan had few troops in Laos, however, 
and looked favorably upon the development of anti-European movements. 
Chinese forces, which the Potsdam Conference had authorized to receive 
the surrender of the Japanese as far south as the 16th parallel (the 
level of Saravane), did not enter Laos until September. After assuming 
control of Champassak, the Free French prepared to reoccupy the entire 
country, including the area which had been temporarily occupied by 
Thailand, and to reinstitute colonial rule.
On August 18, 1945, Prince Phetsarath declared a Japanese- 
instigated declaration of independence from France to be in force for 
all of Laos, unified under King Sisavang Vong. The Prince formed a 
committee of Lao Issara (Free Lao), which soon included virtually all 
the Western-educated elite. Few of the members originally were motivated 
strongly by ideology, or had any history of resistance to colonialism;
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Most had served in the colonial administration, and a few had joined the 
anti-Japanese resistance.
Against the will of Prince Phetsarath, French paratroopers soon 
occupied Vientiane, further alienating members of the Lao Issara by 
ignoring them. Other paratroopers entered Luang Prabang, and a few days 
later King Sisavang Vong announced the resumption of the French protec­
torate. Explanations of the King's action differ, one version asserting 
that the Chinese, who arrived at that time, offered him a choice 
between French protection and their own.
These events stiffened the reaction of the Lao Issara members in 
Vientiane. In response to Prince Phetsarath's dismissal as prime 
minister and maha oupahat. a Committee of the People was formed in early 
October. The Committee proclaimed a provisional constitution, which 
provided for a legislative assembly. Prince Phetsarath indirectly 
determined the policies of the Lao Issara government that was then set 
up.
King Sisavang Vong refused to approve the constitution and govern­
ment, whereupon the National Assembly deposed him on October 20, con­
tending that he was not a free agent. No responsible official was willing 
to accept the deposition of the King as a final solution, and a 
delegation went to Luang Prabang to apprise him of the attitude of the 
factions represented at Vientiane and elsewhere. As soon as he realized 
the strenght of the movement, he accepted the constitution and denied 
any binding agreement with the French. The National Assembly then 
unanimously voted to reinstate him as a constitutional monarch. On April 
23, 1946, amid traditional ceremony, Sisavang Vong was enthroned as King 
of all Laos.
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Meanwhile, the French had assembled a larger ground force in 
the south. Advancing up the Mekong, this force put down the resistance 
offered by the small Lao Isaara forces. Supported by Communist Viet 
Minh troops sent by Ho Chi Minh, the Lao Issara force broke up into 
guerrilla bands. Many of these bands escaped into Thailand, followed 
by the whole Lao Issara government. Prince Phetsarath then set up a 
government in exile and called himself the Regent of Laos.
After reoccupying Vientiane and Luang Prabang, the French 
became more conciliatory. A modus vivendi produced by a newly formed 
Franco-Laotian Commission was signed on August 27, 1946. It confirmed 
an autonomous country unified under King Sisavang Vong, who was made 
a constitutional monarch. Prince Boun Oum of Chançassak renounced his 
sovereign rights to that principality, in return for which his title 
as prince was confirmed and made hereditary, and he was appointed 
Inspector General of the kingdom for life. The modus vivendi also pro­
vided for the election of a constitutional assembly; the election was 
held in January 1947. Forty-five delegates were selected despite 
widespread rural violence. Tiie Constitutional Assembly produced the 
Constitution, which was promulgated by the King on May 11, 1947.
These events occurred during the absence in Thailand of most 
of the politically sophisticated elite, whose government in exile 
experienced dissension. Prince Phetsarath was resolutely anti-French. 
His next younger half brother. Prince Souvanna Phouma, led those who 
desired conq>lete independence but were inclined to work with the French 
to get it. A half brother of the other two. Prince Souphanouvong, 
who had commanded the Lao Issara army, advocated collaboration with 
the Viet Minh, whose ideas and methods he favored. All intermediate
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shades of opinion were represented. A homeward trend began in late 
1947 when the Lao Issara's continued operation in Thailand was 
threatened by a change in the Thai Government. The Lao Issara dis­
solved itself in 1949 after the conclusion of a new Franco-Laotian 
convention which fulfilled many of the Lao Issars’s demands. With 
the notable exception of Prince Phetsarath, who remained in Thailand, 
the leaders of the exiles returned to reenter government service. 
Prince Souphanouvong was expelled from the Lao Issara shortly before 
its dissolution and went to Hanoi.23
The Franco-Laotian Convention of 1949 inaugurated Laotian 
independence as an Associate State of the French Union. Laos obtained 
greater authority in the conduct of foreign affairs, including the 
right to apply for membership in the United Nations. As a result of 
an open rebellion of the Viet Minh in Vietnam in 1950, the French 
hastened progress toward Laotian independence. With the conclusion 
of the Franco-Laotian Treaty of October 22, 1953, Laos became fully 
sovereign.
It was constituted as a parliamentary democracy with the King 
as titular head of state. Diplomatic representation abroad no 
longer required French approval, French courts disappeared, and all
23Souphanouvong attended the Lycee Albert Sarraut in Hanoi.
There, short of money, he was befriended by an innkeeper, whose 
daughter, a member ofthe Vietnamese Communist Party, he later married.
In 1937, at the age of twenty-five, he graduated from the Ecole des 
Ponts et Chaussées in Paris. He then returned to Hanoi, where he was 
employed by the Public Works Department. In 1945 he was contacted by 
the Viet Minh, who sent him south to Vinh; there he was joined by 
seventy Laotian and Vietnamese guerrillas with whom he attacked 
Tchepone in east-central Laos. See Sisouk Na Champassak, Storm Over 
Laos (New York: Frederic A. Praeger, 1961), pp. 21-29; Zasloff, op. cit.,
pp. 114-116; and, Wilfred Burchett, Mekong Upstream (Hanoi: Red River
Publishing House, 1957), pp. 257-258.
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French control of ministries ended. Earlier attempts to create for 
the Indochinese states certain common organs, mostly economic, had 
failed. Thus, even though Laos voluntarily accepted the presumed bene­
fits of membership in the French Union, the term "Associate State" had 
little substantive meaning. In late 1954, France and the Associated 
States ended the economic and customs union established four years
before. The kip replaced the Indochinese piaster as the Laotian unit
of currency. In 1956 the Constitution was revised to omit all
reference to the French U n i o n . 24
Civil War Period^^
Independent Laos immediately encountered economic, military 
and political difficulties. Its perennial financial deficit was no 
longer made up from the favorable balances of the other Indochinese 
states, the newly independent governments of which had their own 
troubles. In fact, political independence encouraged economic depen­
dence by requiring the support of a larger bureaucracy. Beginning in 
1955 the United States got involved in Laos, and this involvement 
increased until interrupted by the Pathet Lao takeover in 1975.
In 1950 the French began to withdraw their troops from Laos 
to points of more imminent Viet Minh attack elsewhere in Indochina.
As a result, Laos was compelled to form its own army, which was 
accomplished under French tutelage. This National Army required
24Alfred W, McCoy, "French Colonialism in Laos, 1893-1954," in 
Laos; War and Revolution, ed. by Nina S. Adams and Alfred W. McCoy 
(Harper & Row, 1970), pp. 67-99.
25For more details than presented here see a study by Nina S. 
Adams, "Patrons, Clients, and Revolutionaries: The Laos Search for
Independence, 1945-1954," Laos; War and Revolution, pp. 100-122.
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complete French financial and logistic support, furnished from funds 
and stocks supplied to France by the United States.
Laos was among the least prepared of the former French colonies 
for indepe' ^ence and its conq>ound problems. Before the coming of the 
French, the peoples of the present day Laos composed three feudal 
kingdoms, the political legacy of which persists to this day in the 
form of the main contending families. Richard Butwell observes that, 
before the Japanese declared Laos's independence in 1945, "there had been 
no nationalist movement seeking to replace French with Laotian rule, 
nor did even the elite think in Laos-wide teirms but rather in terms 
of three traditional feudal k i n g d o m s . it was the Japanese occupa­
tion, however, that stimulated Lao nationalism, as it did elsewhere in 
Southeast Asia.
It is of considerable significance that Ho Chi Minh's communist 
party in 1929, called the Indochinese Communist Party, poured over into 
the left-wing nationalist movements in Laos in the early 1950's. The 
Viet Minh, indeed, treated all Indochina as the battleground in its 
war with the French and fought in Laos against France before the 
termination of the Franco-Viet Minh war in 1954.
In the wake of the second World War the young Laotian nation­
alist leadership split into two main groups. One of these sougjht to 
negotiate independence from French rule and after independence was 
obtained, tried to steer a "middle way" in terms of political tactics 
and foreign policy. The other chief faction chose to fight for
26Richard Butwell, Southeast Asia: A Political Introduction
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 29.
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freedom from the French, joining in alliance with the Viet Minh, and 
became the insurgent Pathet Lao— which was not wholly Communist in 
the beginning but became very much so by 1954. French colonial rule 
had served to link the Laotian people— the minorities of the northern 
and eastern hill country as well as the majority western lowlands 
Laos— together, but in a real sense this only affected the elite level.
The Pathet Lao, which has been strongly aided by the Vietnamese 
communists through the years, controlled an estimated three-quarters 
of the total territory of Laos (in which, however, lived a minority 
of the population) at the time of the February 1973 political agree­
ment that ended most of the fighting in the country. The Pathet Lao 
assumed full control over Laos near the end of 1975.^^
Although Laos was a battlefield in the eight-year Viet Minh 
war to oust the French from all Indochina, it did not assume any real 
importance in the struggle until toward the end. It was the moderates, 
moreover, who controlled the government of the country in the wake of 
the 1954 Geneva settlement, although the two northeastemmost provinces 
were held by the Pathet Lao (who were never to give them up, even 
when they entered into the coalition governments with the non- 
Communists in 1957, 1962, and 1973). In a very real sense, indepen­
dence was won for Laos by the Ho Chi Minh-led Viet Minh in neighboring 
Vietnam, a fact that has not been lost on any of the major parties
7por the history of the Pathet Lao and its organization, see 
Zasloff, The Pathet Lao; Nina S. Adams and Alfred W. McCoy, 
eds., Laos; War and Revolution (New York: Harper & Row Publishers,
1970), pp. 411-460; and, Paul F. Langer and Joseph J. Zasloff, North 
Vietnam and the Pathet Lao: Partners in the Struggle for Laos (Cam­
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).
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involved in Laotian politics since 1954— the moderate nationalists, 
the Pathet Lao, and the communist Vietnamese.
The political history of Laos since the 1954 Geneva Accords 
illustrates the difficulty for the great powers in seeking to legislate 
a framework within which the political development or growth of a 
country like Laos should proceed. The Geneva Settlement clearly pro­
vided for the international neutralization of Laos, and for the 
establishment of a coalition government in which the Pathet Lao should 
participate together with the moderate nationalists (who in the 
immediate post-1954 years were dominated by their right, rather than 
left wing). The non-communist nationalists sought the integration 
of the Pathet Lao into the government, but the communists, suspicious 
of the moderates for pursuing an intentional delaying tactic, resisted 
such incorporation into the legitimate Laotian political process. 
Elections were held, accordingly, in 1956 without the Communists.28
In 1957 Prince Souvanna Phouma, as Premier, was able to 
negotiate a political agreement with the Pathet Lao, and supplementary 
elections were held in which the Communists made a very inuressive 
showing. A coalition government was then formed. Right-wingers within 
the government, however, then moved against the communists, possibly 
with American CIA encouragement, and the Pathet Lao military forces, 
in the process of being Incorporated into the government's ranks, were 
fortunate to escape liquidation. The political die, accordingly.
Z^Marek Thee, "Background Notes on the 1954 Geneva Agreements 
on Laos and the Vientiane Agreements of 1956-1957," in Laos; War and 
Revolution, pp. 121-138.
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waa cast for Internal struggle for years to come: the Communists, denied
a legitimate role in the country's political process, seemed to be jus­
tified in their renewed resort to force and even, possibly, in their 
alliance with the North Vietnamese.
Things went rapidly from bad to worse, as the CIA played a 
role in the emergence of the rigjit-wing as the dominant force in the 
national government and may have aided the military takeover of that 
government in 1960. In August of the same year, however, the limits of 
great-power direction of Laotian politics were most dramatically demon­
strated when a hitherto obscure Laotian Air Force captain, Kong le, 
led a coup d'etat that unseated the pro-American regime and returned the 
popular and politically skillful Prince Souvanna Phouma to the premier­
ship. Following that, the United States— acting largely through the CIA 
and with the aid of Thailand— sought to establish Prince Boun Oum 
(of one of the three onetime independent Laotian kingdoms) and 
General Phoumi Nosavan as the political leaders of the c o u n t r y . T h i s  
bold and unconcealed power play by the Americans provoked a strong 
counterresponse from the North Vietnamese, who intervened even more 
dramatically than they had hitherto been doing. Tlie result was a 
veritable rout of the pro-Americans, a second Geneva Conference that 
produced the 1962 Laotian Accords, and the United States' acquiescence 
in the return of Souvanna Phouma as the country's Prime Minister.
29por a good description of the American involvement, see Adams 
and McCoy, op. cit., pp. 283-407.
30gee, Wilfred G. Burchett, The Second Indochina War: Canibodia
and Laos (New York: International Publishing, 1970), pp. 97-188.
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Tnls sequence of events was to seem particularly ironic in the middle 
and late 1960's and the early 1970's, when the United States accorded 
strong diplomatic, economic, and military support to the same Souvanna 
Phouma as Premier against the Communists. Yet, on two occasions in the 
late 1950's and early 1950's the United States endeavored to engineer 
Souvanna Phouma's replacement as leader of the Laotian Government for 
his allegedly excessive willingness to negotiate with the Pathet Lao.
The 1962 Geneva Accords, like those for all Indochina eight 
years earlier, sought the neutralization of Laos and a nationalist- 
communist coalition to rule the country. Such a coalition was, in fact, 
set up but was quickly abandoned by the Pathet Lao, who resumed their 
military struggle against the moderate nationalists, including Souvanna 
Phouma. In all likelihood, the Laotian Communists developed second 
thoughts about the wisdom of a political coalition with the able and 
adroit Souvanna Phouma, but ensuing events, such as the murder of the 
anti-American "neutralist" Foreign Minister of the country, probably 
also renewed their fears of a new rigjht-wing move against themselves.
In the decade that followed the break-up of the 1962 coalition 
government, the Communist Pathet Lao was to increase dramatically the 
amount of national territory under its control. It was able to do this 
despite all-out United States' military, economic, and other aid to the 
Souvanna Phouma government, despite American bombing activity in 
support of the non-communist regime, despite U.S. training, support, and 
leadership of the fiercely fighting Meo tribesmen of the country against 
the communists, despite participation of more than 20,000 Washington-
31see Adams and McCoy, op. cit.. pp. 139-212.
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paid Thai "mercenaries" in the war (in Laotian uniform), and despite the 
steady and general improvement of the Laotian armed forces (though, not 
to the level of the fighting ability of the Pathet Lao).3% The reasons 
for the Pathet Lao military successes are not easy to determine. Although 
variously aided by the more militarily capable North Vietnamese (who 
often fought the Laotian government forces directly), the Pathet Lao was 
outnumbered by Souvanna Phouma*s army, was far less equipped, and had 
no air power whatsoever at its disposal. The communist Vietnamese on 
whom the Pathet Lao depended, moreover, were themselves foreigners— whose 
visible participation in the war ought to have provoked some kind of 
nationalist reaction. The North Vietnamese, in addition, were inter­
ested primarily in the battle for control of Vietnam itself and clearly 
gave the Laotian struggle secondary priority-except, of course, for the 
purpose of keeping open the so-called "Ho Chi Minh Trail" for the move­
ment of supplies through eastern Laos into South Vietnam.
In February, 1973, a month after the U.S.-North Vietnamese 
agreement to end American direct participation in the Vietnam war, the 
two Laotians factions— the nationalists and the communists— agreed to 
end their fighting, too. Actually, they reached much greater political 
agreement than was to be achieved between the two Vietnamese sides in 
the political war in the adjacent country. This was probably because 
there were fewer and less deep-divisions between the communists and the 
Souvanna Phouma-led nationalists, except for the extreme right-wing 
military and feudal elements among the latter.
32oouglas F. Uowd, "The CIA’s Laotian Colony; or. An Interview 
with Souvanna Phouma," in Laos; War and Revolution, pp. 377-381.
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More than half a year after the fighting had largely stopped in 
the war for Laos, Prince Souvanna Phouma*s anti-communist side and the 
Pathet Lao reached an agreement in principle on the sharing of port­
folios in a new coalition government— the third to be attempted in the 
country since the end of French colonial rule. The superior military 
position of the Communists, who controlled about three-quarters of the 
country, was not reflected in the proposed composition of the cabinet.^3 
Souvanna Phouma would again be Premier; probably everybody, including 
the Pathet Lao, recognized that the popular prince, at 72, was nearing 
the end of his political career. Deputy premierships were to be shared 
by the nationalists and the Communists, each having one, with the 
portfolios otherwise to be equally divided between the two sides, with 
Souvanna Phouma*s group holding most of the key ministries. Another 
half year passed, however, without the establishment of such a govern­
ment, but in February, 1974, on the eve of the first anniversary of 
the 1973 cease-fire, agreement was reached on the composition of police 
and military forces guarding the country*s twin capitals, royal and 
administrative, and in April, for the third time since 1957, a coalition 
government finally took office.
"People*s Democratic Republic of Laos"
Through a steady erosion of the third coalition government and 
with the collapse of South Vietnam in April 1975, the Pathet Lao gradu­
ally increased its influence over Laos. And after 19 months, through 
political maneuvering, it achieved a bloodless coup resulting in its
33see names of the members of the cabinet and the members of 
the National Assembly in Appendix C.
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complete takeover of the landlocked "Kingdom of Million Elephants" and 
abolition of monarchy in December, 1975.34 % e  country has proclaimed 
the formation of the "Democratic People's Republic of Laos" and 
announced a new government: Prince Souphanouvong is the President;
Kaysone Phomvihan (also Secretary-General of the Laos People's Party) 
is Prime Minister; and Neuhak Phomsuvan (the second-ranking leader of 
the Laos People's Party) is the First Deputy Prime Minister.35 While 
on its way to political socialism, Laos has been reported to be slow 
in moving to the extreme left. The historical and present Laotian 
tendency to move in the middle way seems to reflect the "Lao way of 
life" that be presented in the next chapter.
A Note on the Laotian Political Elites
The Lao elites stem largely from the traditional Lao aristocracy 
which still holds most of the political power and public service 
positions in Laos. They are the descendants of the influential families 
(largely royal) of Luang Prabang, Vientiane, Champassak and Xieng 
Khouang provinces, or of commercial leaders in the towns. Two reasons
34ïhe New York Times (1 December, 1975), p. 9; The New York Times 
(4 December, 1975), pp. 1, 10, 11; and. The New York Times (5 December, 
1975), p. 4.
35Raysone is the son of a Vietnamese father who served as a sec­
retary to the French Resident in Savannakhet— southern Laos. He had 
his secondary and university education in Hanoi; one of his teachers 
was Vo Nguyen Giap, and he also was personally close to Ho Chi Minh. He 
was the first Laotian to join the Indochinese Communist Party (TOP) in 
1946, and was Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Peoples' 
Party of Laos in 1967.
Nouhak also was b o m  in Savannakhet, the son of lowland Lao 
peasant parents, and was closely tied with the Viet Minh leaders begin­
ning in the 1940's. For more details of their biographies sec Xasloff, 
The Pathet Lao,
115
why they have held their near-monopoly are that (1) they came from the 
well-to-do families and could afford an education which helped to make 
them qualified for political and public service posts, and (2) the 
cultural characteristics of Laos in the area of lineal relationships, 
which will be presented in the next chapter, create a patrimonial 
system in Lao public affairs. Since Laos i,s a small country, the 
elites are also limited in number. All of them share not only family 
relationships, but many have gone to school together and have served 
together in the independence struggle and in war.
Besides those traditional hereditary elites, the new political 
elites who rose to power in 1975 are also largely from well-to-do 
families. Among them are Kaysone Phomvihan, Prime Minister, from 
Savannakhet; Nouhak Phomsuvan of Savannakhet; Faydang, a Meo chieftain 
from Xieng Khouang; Phoumi Vongvichitr, an ex-district official of 
Xieng Khouang; Sithone Khoiranadam and Sisana Sisane, both Khas from 
Saravane and Savannakhet respectively; General Singkapo Chounlamany of 
Savannakhet; and Colonel Phoune Sipraseut of Khammouane. There are, in 
addition, dozens of well-known former civil servants and a few ex­
governors . 36
Summary
Auguste Comte considered that the history of mankind was to be 
found in the history of its beliefs, while Gaetano Mosca thought that 
the history of all societies was the history of their ruling c l a s s e s . 37
36ihe New York Times (6 December,1975); and The New York Times 
(19 December, 1975).
37caetano Mosca, The Ruling Class, trans. by Hannah Kahn (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1939).
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This brief treatment of the history of Laos certainly has indicated that 
various elite groupings have played key roles in the country's evalua­
tion. The following chapters will show the inportance of this tangled 
political history to the understanding of the political culture-and- 
personality patterns of the country's ruling classes.
It is evident that as the least-developed country in Southeast 
Asia, Laos has been more a geographic expression than a nation. With a 
population of about three million, its people differ widely in social 
organization and political identity. The lowland Lao who live along 
the Mekong River valley share a common life style, a common language, 
Theravada Buddhism, and an economy based on wet rice agriculture. They 
have developed political loyalties to the powerful families of the 
various regions, and only in recent years have these regions been 
joined, still loosely, into a single nation.
As for Laos in the past, its land was relatively empty and its 
rulers ordinarily were concerned far less with controlling land then 
they were with gathering and controlling manpower. Lao rulers in 
practice conceived of their states as groupings of people, rather than 
as bounded tracts of territory; and they saw these groups of people as 
organized on hierarchical scales of leaders and followers or patrons 
and clients, with individuals bound to leaders and hierarchical groups 
bound to rulers by mutual ties of loyalty and obligation. These ties 
of loyalty were necessarily fragile and highly personalized. Most 
local rulers in rural Laos governed in provinces and districts that 
their fathers and grandfathers had ruled before them. They had ties 
to local individuals and families going back some generations, and each 
party to such a relationship could feel that the other could be turned
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to in times of trouble. There was thus a mutuality, and flexibility, 
plus a personal give-and-take to government that in normal times could 
be a source of considerable strength and stability.
Two additional features of the pre-modem order in Laos are 
worthy of mention: the nature of the cities, and relations with ethnic
minorities. If one could call Luang Prabang, Vientiane and Champassak 
"cities" in the nineteenth century, then one would have had to use the 
term in a very traditional sense. These were Buddhist ritual centers, 
centers of royal and religious life, and cultural centers; but economic 
centers more by virtue of their administrative functions than in their 
own right. Just as all power was legitimized by flowing out through 
the capitals to the outlying districts and provinces, so was all supra- 
local trade legitimized by spilling over from governmental activities—  
as in the marketing to passing traders of commodities collected as 
taxes in lieu of cash or labor service.
It is evident that there are great differences among the peoples
of the mountains which cover about half of the country. At the middle 
altitudes are a great variety of Mon-Khmer, known as Kha or Lao Theung, 
and at the higher altitudes are Sino-Tibetan peoples, the Meo and Yao, 
each group with its own language and social organization. These moun­
tain-dwelling peoples traditionally lay outside the social mainstream, 
were left virtually autonomous, and were related to the court and 
lowland society mainly by tribute payments and ceremonies. In most
cases they were not at all integrated into the life of the lowland
society, and both sides probably were satisfied with this state of 
things so long as neither posed a military threat to the other. Tiiey 
have been loosely connected to the indigeneous elites and to the
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government, sometimes by being given rank and title in the bureaucracy 
or by ruling elite and by recognition of their leadership in their 
communities.
The political-bureaucratic elites of Laos have traditionally 
been drawn largely from the lowland Lao, specifically from the powerful 
families of Luang Prabang and Xieng Khouang in the north, Vientiane in 
the middle, and Champassak in the south. The new elites include 
members of common but well-to-do families, plus a few ethnic minority 
members such as the Lao Theung. While the powerful mandarinate 
families have lost some of their monopoly on power, they still exercise 
strong influence in Laos and are expected to continue to do so for 
some time.
There has been little modernization in Laos. The brief, 
indirect French rule did not break down the traditional institutions 
of the society. Visitors to Laos have consistently noted the gayety 
and equanimity of its people. However, the tragedy of war has changed 
this harmonious image. In the chapter following we will explore the 
culture-and-personality of Laotian people in general, as a background 
against which to understand the elites’ political culture-and-person­
ality.
CHAPTER IV 
THE LAOTIAN WAY OF LIFE 
Introduction
We have followed the psychologists in studying basic human needs, 
and the cultural anthropologists have assured us that every culture is 
a whole, more or less systematically integrated by a common set of 
values. Ergo, in order to lay a solid background for exploring Laotian 
elite characteristics, in this Chapter we shall attempt to identify a 
system of values characteristic of the Lao in general and to relate 
these values to the ways of life of the Laotian people. The Laotian 
elites are, after all, a component of the mass political culture of Laos, 
so it is believed that an analysis of the overall value structure is 
needed as a basis for later comparisons and contrasts with the values 
of the elites. In other words, our purpose is to use "value" as a means 
of discovering certain consistencies and regularities in the behavior 
of the elites in the Lao culture.
The value system which will be discussed hereafter is assumed to 
be generally shared by the majority of Laotians, and especially by the 
Lao Loum— the majority ethnic Lao. The ethnic minorities— as mentioned 
in Chapter III— seem to be less influenced by the elite culture-and- 
personality pattern. It should be emphasized again that these values 
are mostly taken for granted by the Laotian people, and that they direct 
Laotian behavior almost outside of the people’s awareness. In brief,
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these values are basic, implicit assumptions of the Laotian culture that 
have been inculcated into the people through the normal process of 
socialization. And although the Lao experienced years of colonialism 
(as we have seen in the last chapter), the basic pattern of Lao values 
has been relatively unaffected by civilatrice française— or by anything 
else. A general satisfaction with their traditional ways of life makes 
the Laotians reluctant to change.1
Lao Value Orientations 
In order to clarify the value system of the Lao culture, an 
attempt will be made first to identify some "value orientations." These 
orientations are assumed to exist in every culture, because of the 
problems to which people everywhere must be oriented. As has been men­
tioned in the last Chapter, Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck consider value 
orientations to be the cardinal categories in any value system. These 
include: (1) human nature orientation; (2) man-nature orientât::.;
(3) time orientation; (4) space orientation; (5) activity orientation; 
and (6) relational orientation.%
From these orientations certain "focal values," or core values—  
about which numerous "specific values" cluster— will be derived. Thus,
^Frank M. LeBar and Adrienne Suddard, Laos, Its People, Its 
Society, Its Culture (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1967), pp. 95-103. The
writer also observed during the field work that, even when there were 
good relationships with the United States, the Laotian government 
heavily censored most of the Hollywood and other Western movies showing 
in Laos. The reason was that they ran counter f.n the l.aoi. 1 an eus I oim 
and culture and might be harmful to tiiern.
^Florence Kluckhohn and Fred L. Strodtbeck, Variations in Value 
Orientations (New York: Row, Peterson and Co., 1961), pp. 10-20.
In fact, space orientation, though considered a cardinal category, was 
not used by the authors in their empirical study because it had not been 
sufficiently worked out.
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it is assumed that a value system is made up of specific values cen­
tering around focal values which, in turn, stem from "value orientations," 
as suggested by the anthropologist Cora Du Bois.3 It is implied in this 
assumption that "no system of values can encompass genuine contraries," 
and "in any value system where such spurious oppositions exist there will 
be a strain for consistency."4
Human Nature Orientation
This orientation is concerned with the character of innate 
human nature. Cultures may conceivably view man as inherently good, 
evil, both good and evil, or simply neutral. Moreover, the goodness or 
badness of human nature may be conceived as changeable or not change­
able during the course of an individual's life. The Laotian orientation, 
under the influence of Buddhism and Hinduism, tends to hold that man is 
essentially of a good nature— but corruptible.5 Thus, he must constantly 
work to keep it good. This seems to be reflected in the constant pre­
occupation of the Laotian with self-examination, which he does with the 
intent of improving his moral self. LeBar and Suddard remarked that, 
for Laotians;
Suffering in life is ascribed to man's struggles to fulfill 
his own desires, but there is a way or method— the Eight-
3cora Du Bois, "The Dominant Value Profile of American Culture," 
in The Character of Americans, ed. by Michael McGiffert (Homewood, 111.: 
The Dorsey Press, 1964), pp. 224-231.
4lbid.. p. 225.
^LeBar and Suddard say that: "Accepting man's mixed nature In
his capabilities for good and evil, Theravada Buddhism is largely non- 
prescriptive and nonprohibitory in relation to the individual, especi­
ally the laymen." See LeBar and Suddard op. cit., p. 96.
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fold-Path— by which one may avoid or cancel out suffering in 
this life or future lives through the acquisition of m e r i t . "6
This orientation is largely derived from the teachings of Buddhism and
from Brahman beliefs that are rooted in the early history of Laos.
Man-Nature Orientation
According to philosophers, cultural historians, and anthropolo­
gists, any culture tends to emphasize one of three main conceptions 
about the man-nature relationship— subjugation to nature, harmony with 
nature, and mastery over nature. The subjugation-to-nature orientation 
is characterized by an attitude of passive acceptance of the forces of 
nature— e.g., storms, floods, illness, death— as inevitable. In the 
harmony-with-nature conception, man, nature, and "super-nature" are 
viewed as but parts of an harmonious and unified whole. There is a 
close interrelationship between parts which are simply extensions of one 
another. In contrast to this, the mastery-over-nature position is 
dominated by a strong confidence that man can control and subdue nature, 
which is to be put to the use of human beings.?
A central theme of the Laotian culture is that everything is 
made up of the same substance. Man, animal, vegetable, mineral are 
all the subsumed elements of the universe, the soul and matter of which 
they contain. Reciprocally, the universe is endowed with elements, and 
a soul identical to that of man and his animal, vegetable, and mineral 
brothers. With these pantheist conceptions, the souls of creatures and
Gibld.
^Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, op. cit., p. 13.
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the divine soul are of exactly the same substance and are conceived as 
complementary parts of the universal soul. In sum, the basic Lao 
orientation is toward harmony with nature.
Time Orientation
Besides a view of nature, every culture must have its concep­
tions of the past, the present, and the future. While all societies 
have to deal with these three aspects of time, their ençhasis upon one 
or another of them may be of great consequence for their way of life—  
in planning, changing, conforming, etc. While other cultures (for 
exançle, the American) tend to think that people should look forward to 
the f u t u r e , 8 Laotian culture appears to be more attached to the past. 
This is reflected in spirit worship,9 strong family traditions, and 
respect for older people^O— and especially for the "passionless sage," 
who is supposed to be more experienced and more knowledgeable of the 
rules of the ancients and the customary and time-honored norms of 
behavior which serve as guides for others in their everyday life. The 
living depend on the support of their forefathers* souls in their 
efforts to live in happiness and prosperity.
Space Orientation
Time seems to be closely linked to space. People who are more 
oriented to the future tend to stress movement and mobility. According
8por a detailed treatment of the American conception of time, 
see, Edward T. Hall, The Silent Language (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett
Publications, Inc., 1959), pp. 128-145.
9see LeBar and Suddard, op. cit., pp. 45-46.
lOlbid., pp. 97-98.
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to the French author André Siegfried, if ingenuity is the dominant trait
of the French national portrait, tenacity of the English, discipline of
the German, and mysticism of the Russian, then dynamism is the key
aspect of the American character.H And to the extent that "dynamism"
involves mobility, which it certainly does, the American stands in
sharp contrast to the Laotian: because of his attachment to the past,
and the great importance of the extended family and the village to his
way of life, the common Laotian does not want to move away from his
ancestral home. Since he depends upon his family and village to satisfy
almost all of his biological and social needs, he seems to feel lost,
lonely, and insecure outside these primary groups. His world is really
a village world as LeBar and Suddard have said:
Loyalty to one's village is probably a strongly developed 
trait, although there is relatively little information 
available upon which to base such opinion. Most rural 
people have little contact with the world beyond their village. 
The fact that the partners to a marriage tend to come from 
within the same village, the fact that most disputes are set­
tled within the village, and the involvement of the entire 
village in the religious life of the monastery are all factors 
which would tend to strengthen the individual's psychological 
identification with his own village.
Activity Orientation
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck have classified this orientation into 
a threefold range— "being," "being-in-becoming," and "doing." The 
"being" orientation is the tendency to act to satisfy one's impulses and 
desires. In other words, it is the spontaneous expression in activity
^Quoted by Jan 0. M. Broek, "National Character in the Perspec­
tive of Cultural Geography," The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science . 370 (March, 1967), 10.
12LeBar and Suddard, op. cit., p. 102.
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of Impulses and desires. This orientation appears to be dominant in 
some cultures, such as in Mexico with its ramified patterns of fiesta 
activities.
The "being-in-becoming" orientation shows a preference for 
activities which develop all aspects of the self as an integrated whole. 
Unlike the "being" orientation, it stresses the control and containment 
of impulses by means of meditation and detachment.
While both the "being" and the "being-in-becoming" orientations 
are concerned with what the human actor rather than what he can 
accomplish, the "doing" orientation emphasizes the accomplishment itself 
and prefers "the kind of activity which results in accomplishments that 
are measurable by standards conceived to be external to the acting 
individual." These three orientations are roughly equivalent to the 
"Dionysian," "Apollonian," and "Promethean" tendencies coined by Charles 
Morris.
The "being-in-becoming" orientation appears to be characteris­
tic of the Laotians as well as other Orientals belonging to the Indian 
and Chinese cultures. This is reflected in the Buddhist "Middle Path" 
which urges self-control, meditation and caution in one's actions.
The Laotians devote a great deal of time to leisure activities, 
such as celebration of the New Year, the boun, or religious holidays, 
and the ngan. or formalized courtships. All of these involve great 
feasting and celebration— enjoyed with special foods, drink, ballad 
singers (mo-lum), reciters of legends (mo-khub), and experts at repar­
tee. This Laotian love of leisure and of organized feasts is notorious.
^\luckhohn and Strodtbeck, op. cit., pp. 15-17.
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However, it is important to note that all of these activities are aimed 
at "making merit" in the Buddhist sense.
Relational Orientation
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck have said that the character of man's 
relation to other men can be divided into three patterns— lineal, col­
lateral, and individualistic. While all three variations exist inI
every society, in predominantly "individualistic" societies the autonomy 
of the individual is pronounced, and individual goals prevail over those 
of collateral or lineal groups. If "collaterality" is predominant, 
the individual is not ing)ortant except as he is a part of a social 
order— a laterally extended group— such as the extended family, the goals 
and welfare of which are prevalent. When the "lineal" principle domin­
ates the relational system, group goals again prevail over those of the 
individual, but one of the most important of these goals is the contin­
uity of the group through time; ordered positional succession occurs 
within the group.
The principle of lineality has governed the Chinese extended 
family or "clan" for thousands of years, as described by the anthro­
pologist Hsu.15 The clan stresses mutual dependence, not just among 
living members, but also between the latter and the dead, and between 
both of these and all future generations. All are bound together by a
^^Ibid., pp. 17-19.
l^See, Francis L. K. Hsu, Clan. Caste and Club (Princeton, H. J .: 
D. Van Nostrand, 1963); Under the Ancestor's Shadow. Kinship. Person­
ality and Social Mobility in Village China. 2nd ed. (New York; lioufjJe- 
day & Co., 1967); and, American and Chinese: Two Ways of 1,1 fe (Nt*w York;
henry Schumann, Inc., 1953).
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clearly defined network of reciprocal obligations that have the goal 
of strengthening and perpetuating the clan. This Is manifested In such 
traditions as the common house for ancestor worship, the common grave­
yard, family solidarity and mutual help, and the exercise of 
authority by family elders. The role of the Individual, who exists 
mainly for the clan. Is clearly defined within this network of relation­
ships. The culture of Laos and the Laotian family system have been 
almost totally dominated by the principle of l i n e a l i t y . L e B a r  
and Suddard observe that:
The rl^ts and obligations that exist between an Individual 
and the relatives who constitute his "spatially extended" 
family, or kindred, are extremely Important. A man borrows money 
and rents land from a relative, because he can expect to pay less 
Interest and less rent that he would to a nonrelatlve. When 
parental households disintegrate or are no longer able to accom­
modate the grown children and grandchildren, a man or a woman 
may look within the kindred for a relative whose house group 
he can join . . .  a person's kindred are bound to him and to 
one another by common obligations and mutual help and support.
In this discussion of some Important assumptions of Laotian culture, no
claim Is made that the problems selected are wholly definitive or that
the possible range of solutions given to them Is exhaustive. Nor It Is
assumed that any one of these value orientations overrides all others,
to form an ethos or oversummatlve principle governing every aspect of
life In a society. The classification scheme should rather be considered
as a tentative formulation that would permit one to Identify some degree
of consistency among the solutions given to certain basic human problems
and also to predict the amount of emphasis to be placed on different
behavioral spheres In a culture. It should be noted that In studies of
^^LeBar and Suddard, op. cit.. pp. 62-68. 
l?Ibld., p. 68.
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the Laotian character, one can see definite relationships between the 
orientations of good-but-corruptible human nature, harmony-wlth-nature, 
past time. Immobility In space, belng-ln-becomlng, and lineality. Com­
bined together, these orientations lead to a focus of Interest on the 
Intellectual-aesthetic behavioral s p h e r e s . 18 xhe Identification of 
these six basic assumptions of Lao culture Is likely to help one relate 
the Innumerable complex, disparate, and contradictory value patterns of 
Lao society Into a meaningful framework which may demonstrate certain 
consistent tendencies, resolve apparent contradictions, and explain 
why the Laotian people behave the way they do.
Laotian Focal Values 
From the basic Laotian value orientations already mentioned, the 
following focal values appear to emerge: self-control, harmony with
environment, social hierarchy, and mutual dependence.
Self-Control
It has been said that an underlying assumption of the Lao 
culture is that man Is b o m  good, but is corruptible. And in the 
activity orientation, the Laotian tends to be preoccupied with the 
control and containment of his impulses and desires, in order to develop 
his self as an integrated whole. These two cultural themes seem to be 
the sources of the Laotian's constant concern with self-examination—  
which he does in an attempt to master himself and thereby maintain his 
inherent goodness— and the improvement of his moral self. This Is likely
^^Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, op. cit., p. '31.
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to be the reason why the personal virtues most desired by Laotians are 
based on the control of self: moderation, modesty, equanimity, moral
probity, and resignation.
Harmony with the Non-self
This harmony Is manifested In one's relationship with nature 
and with other men. Harmony with the universe Is assumed to be realized 
when man conforms to the existing natural order about him. Thus, the 
location of houses or graves, for example, must take Into account 
terrestrial Influences and other natural laws, since any site can 
bring happiness or misfortune depending upon Its disposition in accor­
dance with the stars and benevolent planets. There are "good" as well 
as "bad" days for engaging In any kind of activity. Before doing 
something Important, such as travelling or building a house, it Is 
advisable to consult a geomancer, an astrologlst, a horoscoplst, or a 
chiromancer. Even a Sovereign must not trouble world harmony; any 
wrong deed on his part may bring about catastrophes for the country—  
floods, epidemics, earthquakes.
Harmony should be maintained not only between man and nature, 
but also in social relationships. The general code of conduct here is 
to seek equilibrium by following the Buddhist "Middle Path." The fol­
lowing qualities are required for the maintenance of this path: 
avoidance of Injury to others, concern for not taking advantage of 
susceptibility, compromise, politeness, delicacy, tactfulness, 
gentleness, suppleness, and flexibility. Anthony Eden observed that 
"patience and a general reluctance to slit a neighbor's throat seemed
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to be national traits."19 He added that the Laotians were In no sense 
crusaders.20
Because face Is something extremely Important to the Laotian, 
there Is a great concern for sparing others the humiliation of losing 
face. Thus, care should be taken never to hurt anybody’s ego. Com­
plimentary terms should be applied to others and deprecatory terms 
used for oneself.
The previous examples may suffice to give some Idea of the 
Laotian preoccupation with achieving harmony of action In both the 
natural and the human environment. As a result of this concern for 
harmony, a high premium Is placed on the status quo, and change tends 
to be considered as disruptive of the existing harmonious order of 
things. Consequently, the best way to preserve existing harmony Is to 
follow the ways of the past, which have been proven by experience.
The future is not anticipated In terms of change and progress, 
but only as an extension of the past and present order of things. By 
the same token, attachment to one’s place and land, and to routine 
everyday activities, may contribute to the preservation of this harmony. 
This seems to be one of the reasons why Laotian culture has remained 
static for hundreds of years.
In this respect. Hall’s distinction between "agerlc" (active) 
and "non-agerlc" (non-active) cultures may shed light on one differ­
ence between the Laotian culture and others. In an agerlc culture—  
for example, the American— "just plain sitting, trying to capture a
19Anthony Eden, Toward Peace in Indochina (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1966), p. 52.
20ibid.
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sense of self, is not considered to be doing anything." In a non-ageric 
culture— for example, the Laotian— "in the process of handling the 
matter of ’becoming late’ it makes no difference whether you do some­
thing or not." In other words, so long as you do not disrupt the 
present order, there is no difference between "the ’active' and ’dormant’ 
phases of things."21 This present order is also one in which the rights 
and duties of everyone are clearly defined according to their positions 
in the social hierarchy.
Social Hierarchy
Social hierarchy is an adaptation of the cosmic order and is 
consequently strongly related to the harmony-with-nature orientation, 
as well as to the lineal principle in the relational orientation. The 
universe, as conceived by the Laotians, is dominated essentially by the 
hierarchical principle. This view, derived from both Buddhism and 
Hinduism, is based on the assumption that hierarchy, and not equality, 
is the natural order of everything in the cosmic system. Heaven is 
superior to earth, male to female, husband to wife, father to son, and 
sovereign to subject. Since inequality is the law of nature, to live 
in harmony with nature is to conform to this hierarchical system, to 
know one’s position in it, and to behave accordingly. The subordinate 
is supposed to obey the superior, whose authority is taken for granted. 
Thus, the society is based on a clear hierarchy of status, which in 
turn is supported by a body of formal rules governing the relationship 
between people at the higher and lower levels. These formal conventions
2lHall, op. cit., p. 139.
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must be adhered to by everyone, and conformity becomes a necessary 
virtue. Accordingly, using hierarchy as a focal value, we can derive 
the following sub-values: concern for status, formalism, and con­
formity.^2
Concern for Status. - Awareness of status appears to be very 
strong in Laotian society. The most striking thing about the cultural 
patterns in which Laotian concepts of personal identity are embodied is 
the degree to which they depict virtually everyone— friends, relatives, 
neighbors, and strangers; elders and youths; superiors and inferiors; 
men and women; chiefs, kings, priests, spirits; even the dead and the 
unborn— as stereotypes. Each of the symbolic orders of person- 
definition, from concealed names to flaunted titles, serves to stress 
and strengthen the standardization of relationships between individuals. 
Geertz observes that such symbolic structuring reflects the impact of a 
time perception that recognizes in oneself and in one's fellowmen the 
process of biological aging— the appearance, maturation, decay, and 
disappearance of discrete individuals throughout one's life.23
Linguistic devices abound for the purpose of distinguishing 
status. In English, "I" and "you" can apply to anybody in the conver­
sation. In Lao, there are no such "status-free" personal pronouns.
The child calls his father "paw" and himself "kha-noi," his elder 
brother, "eye"; and so on. (Calling those of higher status by plain
22por the Laotian conception of the cosmos and hierarchical 
system, see, S. J. Tambiah, Buddhism and Spirit Cults in Northeastern 
Thailand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).
23Clifford Geertz, Interpretation of Culture (New York: Basic
Books, 1973), pp. 360-361.
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names is to insult them.) The same personal pronouns can also be used 
in non-family relationships, by equating the other person to one’s 
grandfather, father, mother, brother, or sister, depending upon his age 
and status. Status is awarded great importance because it is the 
legitimate basis of authority; according to Hindu doctrine, authority is 
legitimate only to the extent that it derives from status.
The Laotians seem to accept authority with little obvious ten­
sion. Preference, courtesy and proper respect are always expressed 
toward those in authority. Normally, the wisdom or competence and 
efficiency of the authority figure is not openly questioned. However, 
if the authority figure does not honor accepted reciprocal relationships, 
the oppressed individual may quietly cease to follow higher directions. 
This latter course will be done without rudeness, discourteousness or 
any other public display of indignation.
Passiveness in regard to authority seems to be an acceptable 
solution to the Lao, who view power as a by-product of virtue, or of 
Buddhist merit. The higher an individual’s status within the Laotian 
social hierarchy, the greater his piety and wisdom are thought to be.
Even when a misuse of power occurs, the Laotian— with his faith in 
cosmic retribution— is supposed to remain undisturbed— after all, 
tyrants can be reborn as dogs, while those who are abused by tyranny 
are not really martyrs. Instead, they are simply persons who must bow 
to their Karma because of misdeeds in previous existences. Since power 
comes from an unknowable source, its effectiveness is the major criterion 
for judging its magnitude. The passivity with which the Laotians appear 
to have accepted the abolishment of their monarchy and the establishment 
of a socialist state is a case in point.
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Formalism. - To preserve this hierarchical structure, heavy 
stress is laid upon formal rules of conduct. An extensive system of 
ceremonial conventions has been devised to maintain order in social 
relationships. In a meeting, each must be properly seated according to 
his social position. There are prescribed patterns of speech for 
greetings between superiors and subordinates and between equals, 
depending upon the positions held in the social hierarchy. A person 
loses face if he does not receive the treatment to which his status 
entitles him.
Conformity. - In such a formalitic social structure, conformity 
to rituals and etiquette is highly valued because it contributes to the 
maintenance of social harmony and order. Submission to authority is 
something taken for granted. The precision of the patterns of conduct 
to be observed in each situation leaves no room for initiative or 
ambiguity. The good child is the one who obeys his parents without ever 
questioning their orders. A good student never challenges or doubts his 
teacher’s authority and knowledge. This seems to be the reason why 
many foreign observers point out that the typical Laotian evinces a lack 
of imagination and inventiveness, and has a tendency toward Imitation 
and indiscriminate borrowing in lieu of creativeness. But to the 
Laotian, he is simply conforming with accepted social values. Most 
Laotians are peasants, and the predominance of conformity helps to 
explain why there is no history of Laotian peasant revolt.
Mutual Dependence
Conformity, formalism, and concern for status arc reinforced by 
a clearly delineated network of mutual dependence. As we have seen in
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the relational orientation, Laotian society is dominated by a principle 
of lineality according to which the interests of the group prevail over 
those of the individual. If the American individualistic orientation 
makes self-reliance an esteemed quality, the predominance of the group 
goals in Laos makes mutual dependence among group members a highly 
desirable value. Solidarity and reciprocity are thus the cornerstones 
of relationships between members of the family and of larger social 
groups.
In the same vein, if one member of the extended family is 
successful in his work, the whole family will profit from it; if he 
does something wrong, the whole family will bear the disgrace of his 
deeds. For this reason, a stranger who is kind is a relative, and an 
unkind relative is a stranger.
Mutual dependence, which plays such an essential part in 
family life (filial piety is, of course, a cardinal virtue), is 
also an important principle governing non-family relationships. Here it 
is expressed in the form of gratitude, which applies in the exchange 
of assistance and presents. The Laotians believe that mutual give-and- 
take produces mutual satisfaction, and that "if one receives a kilo of 
pork one must return a kilo of chicken."
This principle of solidarity creates especially strong ties 
among members of a village, which usually consists of a group of related 
families and occupies their ancestors' land. Loyalty to the village 
is a great virtue, since the individual depends upon the village for 
almost everything.
The relationship between sovereign and subject was also tra­
ditionally governed by the same principle of mutual dependence, ihe
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subject depended on the sovereign for his title and the privileges 
attached thereto; the sovereign relied on the subject's service.
With this discussion of mutual dependence and its origins, we 
conclude our examination of the Laotian value system. In the next part, 
we shall see how these value patterns influence the way of life of the 
Laotian people.
Values and the Laotian Way of Life 
The value configuration mentioned previously has been assumed 
to be more or less shared by the majority of the Laotians. To be sure, 
few people in Laos conform completely to the expected value patterns, 
and everybody would agree that Laotians do differ in their individual 
character and behavior. It can be expected, nevertheless, that these 
values constitute a central tendency around which individual behavior 
varies or deviates, or a general ideal which the Laotians strive to 
achieve in their everyday activities. In this sense, although the 
utility of the value configuration in predicting the behavior of 
individual Laotians may be limited, it can at least permit us to set 
forth some generalizations about the overall way of life or recurrent 
behavioral patterns of Laotians as a people, The following comment by 
Hoebel on Hsu's book. Clan, Caste and Club, may serve as a guideline 
for understanding the relationship between cultural values and national 
behavior:
On a moderately high level of generalization, Hsu's data and 
analyses do portray clear and notable differences in the idea­
tional and behavioral character of Hindus, Chinese, and American 
engros . . . .  Its (Hsu's work) may have only limited predic­
tive value for individual behavior in a particular situation, 
but there is no question but that it goes a long way in shedding 
a rational light on the major attributes of what one may expect
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In the main from Hindus, Chinese, and Americans as people. And 
that Is all reasonable anthropologists are likely to ask of 
national character studies today.24
Value, Need and Behavior
Few people would deny that Laotians, with all other people, 
share physiological needs for food, drink, sexual gratification, and 
procreation. We can be sure about the universality of these needs 
because they are clearly biologically determined. On higher level needs, 
usually referred to as "social" needs, opinion differs as to whether 
they derive from biology or from culture and also as to what they 
really are. As we have seen at the outset of this Chapter, Goldschmidt 
calls all these social needs the "need for positive affect," and the con­
troversy regarding their biological or cultural origin seems to have been 
resolved for him In favor of the biological.25 And even though 
many anthropologists and psychologists appear to doubt the assumption 
that the ultimate source of these social needs Is only biological, and 
although research cannot bring rigorous evidence to bear In either 
direction due to methodological difficulties, one must at least view 
this need as Inherent In man because:
Our theoretical orientation requires a preestablished motive 
for human acqulescense to the demands of social existence.
If we treat It as a product of culture and then explain cul­
tural phenomena In terms of It, we are engaging in circular
24^damson Hoebel, "Anthropological Perspectives on National 
Character," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, 370 (March, 1967), 7.
25walter Goldschmidt, "The Biological Constant," in Cultural 
and Social Anthropology, ed. by Peter B. Hammond (New York: The
Macmillan Co., 1964), pp. 2-9.
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reasoning. To say it is biological is not to say it is 
"instinctive," as that word is habitually used, but rather 
that it is a generalized behavioral attribute universal to 
normal human beings that derives directly from some biological 
quality (or combination of biological qualities) with which 
they are endowed. Whatever the source, this need for positive 
affect is a constant and recurrent element in human social 
behavior.26
Briefly, according to Goldschmidt, though culture may change 
the content of the social need and the way to fulfill it, this need can 
be viewed as a biological constant which is universal to all mankind.
The same point of view has been held by such social scientists as 
Erasmus, Hsu, and Cantril.27 iiius, we may conclude that Laotians, like 
people everywhere, have social needs to be fulfilled.
Need for Sociability, Security, and Status 
But what do these social needs consist of? What are they? Here 
again we have to select among a variety of social needs that seem to 
have universal existence. Hsu, a Chinese-American, feels that because 
many people in Western societies tend to seek satisfaction of their 
needs outside the family, sociologists and psychologists conceived such 
culture-bound needs as Maslow's "self-actualization." Thomas's "wish 
for new experience" and Rogers' "greater independence of self­
responsibility" are but variations of the same Western theme. In Hsu's 
opinion, all of the so-called social needs— Linton's "psychic need," 
McClelland's "motive," Maslow's "higher order needs"— may be subsumed 
under three main types; (1) the need for "sociability" or "the
Z^Ibid.. p. 8.
2^Charles J. Erasmus, Man Takes Control— Cultural Development 
and American Aid (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1961),
pp. 9-14; Francis L. K. Hsu, Clan, Caste and Club, op. cit., pp. 138- 
161, and 232-262; and, Hadley Cantril, The Pattern of Human Concerns 
(New Brunswick, W. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1965), pp. 8-20.
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individual's enjoyment of being with his fellow men," (2) the need for 
"security" or "the individual's certainty of his bonds with his fellow 
men," and (3) the need for "status" which "gives the individual his 
sense of importance among his fellow men in all or most situations which 
concern him." Briefly, these three kinds of social need, which Hsu 
assumes to be universal, are the need "to be with other human beings, 
to be related to them, and to be of importance to some or all of them."^®
Impact of Culture Upon Need Satisfaction 
How the satisfaction of these needs has been influenced by 
cultural values to result in different ways of life has been tested by 
Hsu in relation to the cultures of the United States, India, and China.
In the American culture, which is dominated by the individual-centered 
orientation, social relationships are based mainly on the "contract" 
principle, and "clubs," or free associations among equals, are the 
instruments through which individuals can best satisfy their social 
needs. The Indian supernatural orientation has led to the "hierarchy" 
principle in interpersonal relations, and to the predominance of the 
"caste" as the group which can best satisfy individual social needs.
The harmony-centered orientation of the Chinese culture, on the other 
hand, has made "kinship" the leading principle in social relationships 
and the "clans" or extended families the ideal means by which individual 
social needs can be fulfilled. Hsu's hypothesis has been supported by a 
series of Thematic Apperception Tests administered to samples of
^®Hsu, op cit. The need for status or "prestige motivation" has 
been particularly emphasized by Erasmus who views It as a stimulus to 
cultural development. See Erasmus, op cit.
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American, Indian, and Chinese s t u d e n t s . A l t h o u g h  his model for 
expressing the relationship between value and behavior, using "need" 
as an intervening variable, appears to need further empirical validation, 
it seems quite applicable to our purpose in studying the relationship 
between value and the Laotian's way of life.
In short, it is assumed that Laotians seek to satisfy— in 
addition to their biological needs— the three kinds of social needs 
(sociability, security, and status) which may be regarded as common to 
all mankind. Some of the difference between the Laotian way of life and 
that of other peoples may be explained in terms of the impact of cul­
tural values upon the way individuals fulfill these needs. In the 
interest of brevity, we shall concentrate on two basic aspects of 
social life; the way people organize themselves into groups, and the 
kinds of activity pursued for the fulfillment of these needs.
Group Organization
Throughout history, man as a social animal has not lived alone 
but in social groups. Depending upon the values and beliefs of a cul­
ture, the. human groups created to deal with the problems of life will 
be organized along different lines. If, for example, the value system 
stresses the principle of inequality among men, the organization will 
tend to be dominated by hierarchy and the power of superiors over 
subordinates. In case equality is valued, cooperation and teamwork 
will be given more emphasis than power and hierarchy. If individual 
goals are predominant, groups will tend to form according to the
29Hsu, Clan, Caste, and Club.
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principle of contract. In contrast, status is more likely to be 
stressed in situations where group goals prevail over those of the indi­
vidual. It should be noted that these are all questions of "more-or- 
less," because all these principles of organization— hierarchy, power, 
cooperation, and status— are present in any type of organization. But 
to the extent that one or two principles are emphasized, others must be 
deemphasized to a similar extent. Moreover, within a culture, empha­
sis on any one of these principles may differ depending upon the nature 
and purpose of the organization— military groups must require more 
hierarchy and discipline than voluntary clubs.
Nevertheless, from a cross-cultural perspective, it can be 
said in general that each culture tends to stress one or two organiza­
tional principles at the expense of others. Bureaucratic organizations 
require a certain amount of hierarchy and status distinction anywhere, 
but it seems no exaggeration to say, for example, that because of the 
prevailing social values in German culture, power and hierarchy are 
given more emphasis in German bureaucracy than in American.
As already indicated, anthropologists and others have suggested
that the value system of a culture is reflected first and foremost in the 
family, which is the socializing agent par excellence, and that starting 
with the study of kinship behavior, one can hope to explain the behavior 
of a people in other spheres of life.
The Family System. - In Laos, conjugal union tends to be a
social contract rather than a personal relationship; its primary purpose 
is the continuation of the lineage. Because the perpetuity of the family 
is assured by male descendants, it is the father-son relationship which is 
most salient. The selection of spouse tends to be decided by parents and
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relatives based on family considerations rather than on mutual attrac­
tion between individual partners.
Within this framework, children have been raised to respect 
and obey submissively not only their parents and older brothers and 
sisters, but also grandparents, aunts, uncles, and grand cousins, and to 
live in a relationship of mutual dependence with them. In spite of 
almost a century of contact with French culture and all the recent 
political, economic, and spiritual upheavals, the Laotian society is 
still governed, though to a lesser extent, by a system of order and 
values which leave little room for individual self-expression.
The Family and Satisfaction of Individual Needs. - As a result 
of this process of socialization, the clan has become a world in which 
the Laotian can satisfy almost all his social needs. The certainty of 
his bonds with fellow members, or fulfillment of his needs for security, 
is assured by his position within the clan, and his duties and rights 
are clearly defined. In case of disaster, he can expect to get help 
from his relatives just as the latter can expect to be assisted by him. 
His enjoyment of being with others, or fulfillment of his needs for 
sociability, are satisfied by numerous opportunities for interaction 
with other clan members— meeting at the wat in public ceremonies, 
mutual courtesy visits during special holidays, and also visits at 
regular intervals to inquire about health and everyday activities. The 
frequency of interaction varies with the degree of closeness and kinship 
and the network of interaction extends not only to relatives on the 
father's and mother's sides but also to in-laws. These activities may 
occupy almost all of his spare time.
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ttis need for status is fulfilled by putting himself in a 
position to give more help, assistance, and gifts to his kinsmen than he 
himself gets from them. The best way to satisfy his need for prestige 
is to strive to reach the top of the social ladder, i.e., to become a 
leader or bureaucrat through educational achievement. By entrance to 
the elite class, a young man's dreams are fulfilled, for he has at once 
discharged his duty to his family, assured its prosperity, and gained 
for himself and his venerated ancestors an honored position in society.
The Village as a Wav of Life. - Because the Laotian is able to 
satisfy almost all his needs within the village network, he does not 
seem to be much interested in what happens outside of his world. Since 
he has been trained to depend on his clan for almost everything, he 
tends to distrust strangers, making it difficult for secondary groups 
to develop. The predominance of the clan seems to be responsible for 
the absence of strong social groups in Laos— such as political parties 
and labor unions— capable of serving as a meaningful check upon the 
central government and thereby making democracy viable. Moreover, the 
paternalistic pattern of the family system, which is the principal 
agent of socialization, has been extended to all other fields, includ­
ing village administration and central government. The village, which 
is but a group of clans, was traditionally governed by a council of 
elders. Given this cultural background, we can understand why it has 
not been easy for democracy in the Western sense to develop quickly in 
Laos.
Spheres of Occupational Activity
In every culture, certain types of activity will be more psycho­
logically rewarding than others, depending upon the prevailing value
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configurations. As Williams has pointed out:
All associations have standards of character and proficiency 
and accord rewards to those best meeting whatever standards 
are most highly appraised, whether of military prowess, ritual 
knowledge, asceticism, piety, or what not.30
Thus, activities which are used as social criteria for judging personal
excellence are most likely to fulfill the individual need for status.
The consequence for the whole culture is that these activities tend to
be more developed since they are more appealing to the best elements in
the society.
By way of example, if American culture appears to care more for 
economics, business, and science than for politics and the civil service, 
Laotian culture is more likely to give preference to the latter.31 This 
seems to be a logical consequence of the Laotian value system, which 
lays heavy stress upon moral virtues and harmony in social relation­
ships rather than on material production. The view that the nature of 
man is "good but corruptible" has led to the idea of a need for self 
control and the moral virtues related thereto. "Harmony with nature" 
has suggested that one has to accept the order of things as it is, and 
not to change anything lest this harmony should be disrupted. The 
"being-in-becoming" orientation requires containment of desires and 
passions through reflection and detachment, so as to behave in accor­
dance with the "middle path." The "lineal principle" in social
3^Robin Williams, Jr., "Values and Beliefs in American Society," 
in The Character of Americans, ed. by Michael McGriffert (Homewood, 111. ; 
The Dorsey Press, 1964), p. 177.
3^Ibid. ; Florence Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, op. cit.; and, 
Geoffrey Gorer, The American People, rev. ed. (New York: W. W. Norton
& Co., 1964).
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relationships signifies that one exists primarily for the group, with 
staLiis and role clearly defined. One has to conduct himself accord­
ingly in order to conform to the natural harmony in society. Hence, 
the heavy emphasis on social hierarchy and mutual dependence.
Since the scholar and especially the priest, is the ideal man, 
businessmen have been looked down upon. The merchant is viewed simply 
as an "intermediary exploiting others for his personal profit," 
possessing no virute or education. Even though he may have plenty of 
wealth, the old proverb continues to be repeated "sib paw ka bo thow 
phagna lieng." or "ten merchants cannot be compared to one phagna’s 
servant." For this reason, it is not unusual for businessmen to feel 
insecure about their status as "rich but not noble," and to try to make 
friends with the literati so as to share in the letter's prestige. 
However, most business in Laos is in the hands of foreigners, mainly 
Chinese.32
Farmers are made respectable by the staple food they produce for 
the society. Even though they are usually uneducated, they are loved 
for their honesty and for the way they conform to nature. "Still at 
work after sunset, they are already out of bed before sunrise."
To be poor in Laos means to have no rice, hence the proverbs 
"lack of rice brings turmoil to the country" and "with rice in the bam,  
there is nothing to be worried about." Conforming to this value.
S^According to the doctrine set forth by the new "Democratic 
Republic of Laos," businessmen who employed more than three people as 
well as those political-bureaucratic elites who have business interests 
are designated as enemies of the Laotian people. See Joseph J. Zasloff, 
The Pathet Lao (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973), p. 22.
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previous kings and other elites preferred working on their farms to 
going to goll courses, when time was available. In Laos, as in other 
rice consuming countries, rice means many things: the major starch
eaten at every meal, the major source of cash, and the object of most 
labor. Its production, consumption, and sale are the topics of most 
village conversation; even the verb "to eat" is "to eat rice."
Religion and Culture-and-Personallty
Laos is a country steeped in Buddhism, "which is not only a 
religion, but a civilization, a way of life. The monks are the priests 
of the Buddha's teachings, but they have always been seen also as 
terchers responsible for educating the m i n d . "33 There is a critical 
balance in which the structure of society stands between the cultural 
system and its religious components on the one hand, and the person­
ality on the other. And the focus of the set of interconnections is the 
set of values institutionalized in the society and internalized in the 
personality. As crucial as social values are in the dynamics of the 
social system, they cannot be the sole determinants of process in 
society. Process is a function of the resources which are available 
for implementing values and goals, and is an outgrowth of many internal 
adjustments by which various strains and tensions can be handled.
Talcott Parsons points out that the religious anchors of 
societal values stand at a higher level of cultural generality than do 
the societal values themselves. And they stand above societal obliga­
tions, personal obligations, and those independent of either--for
33Bounthong Vixaysakd, "Primary Education in Laos," Paper presen­
ted to the UNESCO Regional Office for Education in Asia, June, 1973, 
p. 1. (mimeo)
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example, obligations to scientific "truth" or to religious salvation.
On religious levels these very highest valuational choices are grounded 
in the higher-order orientations of m e a n i n g . I n  this sense, Clifford 
Geertz concludes that a religious system is not a thing in itself, but 
a facet of the total culture in which it occurs; it permeates other 
institutions and is in turn permeated by t h e m . 35 in the following 
section we will turn to the effects of Buddhism on Lao culture-and- 
personality.
Buddhism and the Lao Culture-and-Personality 
Any meaningful discussion of Lao values and culture demands 
knowledge of Buddhism, because it provides the Lao with a set of values 
or life standards. Buddhism is thought of as a way of life, rather 
than as a religious society. The political implications of this are 
crucial; the elites, whoever they are, cannot at any point afford to 
ignore, or even to neglect, the "national consciousness" of Lao
Buddhists.36
3 ^ T a l c o t t  P a r s o n s ,  S o c i a l  S t r u c t u r e  a n d  P e r s o n a l i t y , r e v .  e d .  
(New York: The F r e e  P r e s s ,  1970), pp. 101-102.
3 5 c i i f f o r d  Geertz, Islam Observed (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1968).
36xhe "Twelve Point Program" of the Laotian Patriotic Front in 
1968 declared its destiny to be the protection and guardianship of 
the religion. "To respect and defend Buddhism, preserve the purity of 
monks and their right to practice Buddhism, protect pagodas, encourage 
unity and mutual assistance among monks and believers of various 
Buddhist factions, and encourage solidarity among the priests and fol­
lowers of other religions." In designating "enemy of the people" 
categories, they neglected Buddhism while including the king, the royal 
family, those with business interests, and employers of more than 
three employees. See Joseph J. Zasloff, op. cit., chapter 2. Tambiah 
points out that "one of the most important features of Theravada 
Buddhist policy is its active consciousness of historical continuity."
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The "Four Woeful States"
The ordinary Laotian conceives the "four woeful states," or 
apaya realistically and materially as outside himself, to be attained 
after death (These are "hell," or naraka; "the realm of beasts," 
dira.jana; "the hungry ghosts," or peta; and "the frightened ghosts," or 
asura.) But in the language of the Dharmas, i.e., the canons, the 
woeful states are experienced here and now: "The hungry ghosts of the
Dharmas are purely mental. Ambition based on craving, worry based on 
craving— to be afflicted with these is to be b o m  a hungry ghost." "If 
one is afraid, one is simultaneously b o m  an asura." Whenever greed, 
anger and delusion cause us to be excited and heated, we become 
creatures in the hell-like samsara. Again, in dealing with the 
paired concepts of heaven and hell, Buddhadasa declares that while in 
everyday language there are outside realms to be attained after death, 
"the heaven and hell of the Dharma language may be attained any time 
at all depending on one's mental make-up."39
Ibte Doctrinal Perspective
The canonical texts of Buddhism (like the Bible of Christianity 
or the core texts of any other religion) are complex and rich in meaning.
See S. J. Tambiah, "The Persistence and Transformation of Tradition in 
Southeast Asia," in Post Traditional Societies, ed. by S. N. Eisenstadt 
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1972), pp. 55-84.
^^Buddhadasa Bhikku, Pasaa Khon Pasaa Dham (Layman and Dhamma 
Language) (Bangkok, 1968).
3®Buddhadasa Bhikku, In Samsara Exists Nirvana, Mutual Under­
standing Between Religions, Series 12. (Bangkok, 1970).
39lbid., pp. 23-24.
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and by the same token sometimes ambigous or subject to different levels 
of interpretation. But most authorities would agree with Buddhadasa, 
one of the most renowned scholar-monks, when he wrote that: "The aim
of the Buddhist quest is 'complete freedom from selfhood' (anatta) 
and the attainment of 'emptiness' (sunnatta), which is beyond both good 
and bad action (karma). To train oneself not to cling to anything with 
the feeling of 'I' or 'mine'— that is the highest system of spiritual 
culture."40 This interpretation is compelling to Laotians because it 
stems from one basic thrust; it is the world "here and now" that is 
relevant. This fundamental point has many ramifications and resonances. 
Not only does it call for action here and now as being productive, but 
it also "interrorizes" the Buddhist cosmology— declaring that heaven 
and hell, rebirth (samsara) and liberation (nirvana), are within one's 
mind and are not outside events or experiences. Central to this 
exposition is the flat assertion that the language of the common man is 
sometimes misleading and different from the language of the Dharmas.
In explaining the concept of nirvana, Buddhadasa states that 
there are different levels of this, and says; "Nirvana is attained at 
any moment that the mind becomes free from confounding. [Compounding 
means grasping and clinging with attachment.%] Freedom from compounding, 
at any moment, is nirvana. Permanent cessation of compounding is full
nirvana."41
40Buddhadasa Bhikku, Exchanging Dharma While Fighting, Mutual 
Understanding Between Religions, Series 10. (Bangkok, 1969), pp. 32-33.
ĥhid.
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The concept is that the world here and now, our own present time, 
our own mental states, comprise the stage for urgent and immediate 
action to achieve Buddhist goals. The quest for nirvana does not mean 
abnegation and renunciation of action in this world; the ideal is that 
man should act in this world with metta, with loving kindness and com­
passion, not for his own selfish gain but for the collective good. 
Finally, the Buddhist monks totally reject the view that Buddhism is 
"pessimistic" and "misanthropic" and stands for a devaluation of this 
world.
The most well-known doctrines among lay Buddhists, however—  
the Five Precepts, The Four Noble Truths, and the "middle way" Eight- 
Fold Path— are much more passive than the action-oriented credo of the 
professional monks.
The Five Precepts. - Buddhists are taught that the basic rules 
by which ordinary people should live are as follows: (1) refrain from
taking life, (2) refrain from taking what is not given (don't steal),
(3) refrain from improper sexual behavior, (4) refrain from false 
speech, and (5) refrain from intoxicants and other stimulants which dull 
the mind.
Failure to live in accord with these precepts will jeopardize 
one's happiness, wealth, and achievement and block the way to nirvana. 
Violation of these precepts may cause one to be reborn into a scale 
lower than that of human beings. Incidentally, according to Buddhist 
dogma, there are at least five levels of living existence, so the 
foregoing warning is no light matter. Moreover, only through the 
elimination of ignorance can emancipation within Buddhism become a 
reality. Since there is no God, saint, or intervening power to help
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man, iie must gain his own "salvation." No one can protect himself from
the results of his own deeds since the impersonal Karmic Law declares
that each must suffer or benefit from his own actions.
The Four Noble Truths. - It is proclaimed that the Four Noble
Truths were discovered by Buddha and taught by him in support of his
basic doctrines. The first Noble Truth is dukkha. T h e  following
excerpts from the Buddhist Canon may provide insight into the meaning
of this Truth for the ordinary believer;
This is the noble truth of suffering: birth is suffering,
old age is suffering, sickness is suffering, death is suf­
fering, union with unpleasant things is suffering, separa­
tion from pleasant things is suffering, not obtaining what 
one wishes is suffering; in short, to cling to existence is 
suffering.43
The eye, 0 Monks, is burning, visible things are burning . . . 
burning with the fire of lust, the fire of anger, the fire of 
ignorance, burning with the anxiety of birth, decay, death, 
grief, lamentation, suffering, dejection and despair.44
The second Noble Truth is samudaya which declares that the
origin and continuing cause of suffering is "desire," or excessive
craving. The people are taught that the gratification of what a
Westerner might consider to be ordinary drives or basic needs is really
42xhis term seems to have no completely satisfactory English 
equivalent. Such terms as "unsatisfied," "imperfect," and "suffering" 
are frequently substituted. According to Vibhanga 199:99 (this refer­
ence indicates volume and page in the Buddhist Canon, Pali Text Society, 
Romanized Edition), dukkha means un-ease of both body and mind.
4 % u d d h i s t  Canon, Vinaya Mahavagga 1:6:10.
4 4 B u d d h i s t  Canon, Mahavagga 1:21:2.
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the fundamental reason that one cannot find happiness and cannot
escape the cycle of life and move into nirvana. T h e s e  excerpts from
the Buddhist Canon may be further descriptive of samudaya;
And this, 0 Monks, is the noble truth of the cause of suf­
fering: desire (craving) which leads to rebirth, accomr
panied by delight and passion, rejoicing at finding delight 
here and there, the craving for lust, the desire for exis­
tence, and the desire for non-existence.^^
On ignorance depends karma; on karma depends consciousness; 
on consciousness depends name and form (nama-rupa); on name 
and form depends the six organs of sense; on contact depends 
sensation; on sensation depends desire; on desire depends 
attachment; on existence depends birth; on birth depends 
old age and death, sorrow, lamentation, misery, grief and 
despair. Thus does this entire aggregation of misery a r i s e . 47
The third noble truth, nirodha, is that dukkha, (suffering),
comes to an end when all cravings and deisres c e a s e . 48 Moreover, as
there is no transcendant savior, man must bring this about through his
own effort. These excerpts from the Canon are offered as further
explanation of this Truth:
And this, 0 Monks, is the noble truth of the cessation of 
suffering: the complete and trackless cessation of desire,
abandonment of it, relinquishment, release and aversion.49
4 5 s u m u d a v a  i s  t o  k n o w  t h e  c a u s e  o f  t h e  a r i s i n g  o f  d u k k h a . The c a u s e  i s  c a l l e d  t a n h a , o r  c r a v i n g ,  a n d  i s  c o m p o s e d  o f  t h r e e  p a r t s :  (1)w a n t i n g  o b j e c t s  o f  e m o t i o n a l  a t t a c h m e n t ,  (2) w a n t i n g  t o  b e  t h i s  o r  t h a t ,  a n d  (3) w a n t i n g  n o t  t o  b e  t h i s  o r  t h a t .  (See V i b h a n g a  199:99).
4 ^ B u d d h i s t  Canon, Vinaya Mahavagga 1:6:10.
47}3uddhist Canon, Sarnyutta Nikaya 22:90:16.
48gy completely quelling craving, dukkha is also quelled and 
ceases. The cessation of dukkha is called nirodha. (See Vibhaga 199: 
99).
4 9 u u d d h i s t  Canon, Vinaya Mahavagga 1:6:10.
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The fourth noble truth, magga, is that success in reaching
nirvana can come only by the Eight-Fold Path. Through this Path, all
mankind is provided a way to find release from dukkha— an existence
with less suffering— and reach nirvana. Again, an excerpt from the
Canon is offered:
And this, 0 Monks, is the noble truth of the path that leads 
to the cessation of suffering; this is the noble eight-fold 
way: right views, right resolve, right speech, right action,
right livelihood, right effort, right moodfniness and right 
concentration.50
Because Theravada Buddhism holds these four Noble Truths, it in 
essence declares that a Way of Salvation is gained by means of Intuitive 
Knowledge. This Intuitive Knowledge of Enlightenment is gained by means 
of the Eight-Fold Path. Essentially this is achieved by two types of 
personal effort: (a) to break the chain of 12 Nidanas (Chain of
Causation) at the link of desire through moral discipline and detach­
ment (upekha) so that there is no cause for future rebirths; (b) to so 
train and discipline the mind through concentrated meditation that the 
mind is freed from all earthly ties, a trance-like state is attained, 
with a final intuitive flash of Insight or realization which is 
Enlightenment leading to nirvana.
The Eight-Fold Path. - The eight-fold path that the good Buddhist 
must consider as his set of rules for a healthy life and a way to nirvana 
is described as follows:
1. Right Understanding requires awareness of the 
Buddha's teaching, plus a thorough self-examination in connection with
^°Ibid.
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each experience encountered in life. The Buddha taught that such 
examinations should be without self-delusion or rationalization. This 
permits each event or emotion to be seen in its true perspective, 
instead of as it might appear to be. Real "right understanding" is 
arrived at through the Four Noble Truths.
2. Right Thought requires sufficient detachment from the 
idea or event to enable one to view it objectively. Moreover, right 
thought even pennits one to examine one's own motives in his feelings 
toward others. The elements of "right thought" are; (a) thoughts of 
getting free from desires, (b) thoughts in which there is no vindic­
tiveness, and (c) thoughts in which there is no idea of doing harm.
3. Right Speech precludes saying anything about others 
that may be displeasing, even though it may be completely true. One 
application of this teaching, within cultures strongly affected by 
Buddhism, results in foreigners being told what they want to hear rather 
than the straight hard facts. Thus the Westerner is often faced with a 
facade which is quite different from reality, but which he should 
accept and work through rather than demonstrate impatience, anger or 
discouragement. The elements of "right speech" are avoiding; (a) false 
speech, which means telling lies, speech which provokes anger and 
discord, coarse speech, and talking nonsensically; (b) backbiting and 
slander; (c) rough and harsh speech; and (d) rambling speech and 
nonsense.51
4. Right Action encourages action in harmony with the 
Buddha's thoughts and teaching; it requires the adherent to act quite 
differently than he might be Inclined to act. Certainly right action
SlAnguttara Nikaya, V;28l.
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makes excellent sense in a closed community, and most of Laos is com­
posed of closed communities. The Patmokka gives 227 rules of right 
action and conduct for the monk. In general, "right action" falls into 
three broad categories which involve avoiding: (a) killing another
being; (b) stealing or cheating; and (c) improper sexual behavior.52
5. Right Livelihood requires that one's occupation 
fall within certain accepted parameters, i.e., it should be one that 
benefits as many living things as possible while avoiding harm to all.
It is a practical application of ahimsa, "compassion."
6. Right Effort declares that constant practice is 
required if thought is to result in proper development. Thus one must 
l e a m  to practice self-control, self-appraisal, self-discipline, and 
engage in continuing efforts to understand oneself.
7. Right Mindfulness requires that one's total per­
spective be kept in focus. This will permit the individual to relate all 
thought and actions to reality instead of to the illusions which some­
times dominate life.
8. Right Concentration provides a means for the 
individual to gain insight with its resultant knowledge, through delib­
erate concentration on Dharma or a single suitable subject. This 
concept is rooted in the various approaches to the practice of meditation.
The Behavioral Perspective
It can almost be said that to be Lao means to be Buddhist, 
since the Lao Loum who dominate the country are Buddhists. However, a
52Ibid.
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more accurate cleHcription of the Laotian’s religion is Buddhism with a 
very heavy admixture of animism— belief in benevolent and manevolent 
spirits who must be appeased, and animation— belief in "magic" or the 
existence of power residing in natural phenomena, which when mani­
pulated properly can bring about desired results, and a sprinkling of 
Brahmanism— mostly appearing as elements such as chants in certain 
ceremonies and rituals.
If Lao Buddhism is examined behaviorally rather than doctrin- 
ally, that is, as actually practiced by ordinary people, the dominating 
concept is that relating to merit-making (boun). From birth to death 
the Lao individual, villager or urbanite, peasant or elite member is 
ceaselessly engaged in a wide variety of merit-making activities— feed­
ing the monks, helping in construction or repair of temple structures, 
serving in the monastery as monks or novices for varying periods ranging 
from one day to several years, giving alms to the poor, releasing 
trapped animals (usually birds and fishes), participating in religious 
festivals and ceremonies, and generally observing the Buddhist codes of 
conduct (sila).53 By these various actions the individual amasses merit 
and thereby ensures for himself (or herself) a more secure position 
in the next life. However, there is considerable evidence that the 
individual is thinking in terms of this life as well. Thus, by living 
a meritorious life a person may fall heir to unexpected prizes, as 
in a lottery, as well as achieving increased moral happiness.
^octrinally, merit-making is only a way of decreasing craving, 
with that in turn decreasing dukkha. "Angutara Nikaya, IV:241" indi­
cates that a meritorious field of action can be acquired by giving 
(generosity); maintaining Buddhist precepts of moral behavior (sila); 
and developing Bhavana or training one's mind in meditation.
158
in this mixture of Buddhism, Brahmanism, and animism, the Lao­
tian perceives that all living beings stand in a hierarchy of varying 
ability to make their actions effective, and of varying degrees of 
freedom from suffering. As actions become more effective, beings suffer 
less; such is the nature of existence. Above man is heaven— a land of 
gods and angels who can get everything they need. Man, moreover, must 
accumulate much merit or virtue (kuamdee) in order to be free from 
suffering and to be reborn into this heaven. Below man are animals 
who share with him some ability to make their actions effective, and 
in the lowest hierarchy are satans and demons in various levels of hell.^^
To the Westerner "merit" implies a fairly fixed characteristic, 
but among Laotians all beings are seen as constantly gaining or losing 
merit. Merit-making is perhaps the most important motivating or 
driving force in life for the individual Laotian; it sustains and 
shields him from birth to death. If the highly individualistic 
Laotian is commited to anything, it is to this concept and all that it 
implies.
There are countless ways in which animistic (spirit) and 
animatistic (magical) beliefs manifest themselves. In times of crisis, 
such as drought, flood, or sickness, the people supplicate different 
spirits or attempt to ritually manipulate powerful superhuman forces in 
order to seek relief or favor. Shamans, or spirit doctors, are con­
sulted in time of serious illness. Amulets to ward off diseases or 
evil spirits are commonly worn. Practically every Lao village has a
^^For an excellent presentation of Laotian Cosmology, see S. J. 
Tambiah, Buddhism and Spirit Cults in Northeastern Thailand (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 53-57.
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guardian spirit for whom a special shrine Is maintained, usually at 
the edge of the village. Astrology, which is something of a mixture of 
animism and anlmatlsm. Is religiously observed by people generally.
Direct Effects of Culture-and-Personallty
It Is Important to observe that in all social relationships an 
Individual must strive to display an appearance of equanimity, and In 
addition endeavor to suppress feelings of anger, hostility, disappoint­
ment, and any other emotion that may cause embarrassment to others.
But this is only part of the story, because in actuality the Lao 
personality resembles a pendulum swinging back and forth between 
Apollonian and Dionysian values— the bipolar concept which Ruth Benedict 
employed in contrasting the Hopi and Kwakuitl Indian c u l t u r e s . O n  
the one hand, the individual is taught to curb his emotions in all 
ordinary social relationships— the Apollonian value. On the other, he 
is encouraged vigorously to indulge in fun and frivolity in socially 
approved ways— the Dionysian value.
Actually, the search for equanimity or serenity is basically 
a Buddhist value, not merely Apollonian in character. The perspective 
of all the dharmas (Buddhist doctrine) requires, as aforementioned, the 
elimination of all emotions, producing equanimity in all three types of 
behavior: body action, speech, and thought. This is the first
essential step toward the ultimate goal of nirvana, as well as toward 
the more immediate goal of good social relationships.
55Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (New York: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1934).
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In their socialization process Laotians are infused with Buddhist 
values; the teachings of Buddha are absorbed from earliest childhood as 
a natural part of the environment. In everyday life they are heavily 
involved with the religious norms of the community, and in school many 
precepts and doctrines are recited or appear in textbooks. Before 
marriage men are normally expected to serve in the monkhood, and while 
there they are taught 227 points of discipline designed to control 
their bodies, speech, and thoughts. And when leaving the monastery 
they bring back with them sets of rules (sila-dharma) to govern their 
lives as laymen. In sum, it can be seen that Buddhist values are both 
reinforcers and originators of the principles we are considering. A 
few of the more important Buddhism-based characteristics of the Laotian 
culture-and-personality are described below.
Jai-yen. - The culture places great value on internal equanimity, 
i.e., upon being jai-yen, or having a "cool heart." This enables one to 
take life as it comes, without strain or excitement. To be jai-yen is 
to be without anxiety; to rest at ease, survey and weigh the situation, 
accept cheerfully what must be, and then take advantage of the circum­
stances— including the stupidity of others. The maintenance of a 
"cool heart" is supported by an attitude epitomized in the common 
phrase "bo-pen-young-dog," meaning "it's of no importance," "never 
mind." The expression is more than a phrase; it symbolizes a defense 
mechanism for minimizing events which might otherwise disturb a "cool 
heart."
Social Patterns. - One of the most important rules of Lao 
social behavior is to maintain smooth interpersonal relations. This 
may be an expression of an existential anxiety about the essential
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Instability, uncertainty, and Impermanence of all life (Including their 
own), anxiety which has Its cognitive basis In the "Wheel of Law" and 
other Buddhist doctrine. They tend to avoid overt expressions of 
hostility and open conflict by withdrawal, and prefer not to have 
aggressive encounters. Were uninhibited aggression permitted, a fun­
damentally distasteful degree of Involvement In each other's lives 
would result.
An almost profound concern with personal freedom-of-choice 
appears to encourage the rural Lao to Ignore or emotionally Isolate 
himself from the Influence and effects of others. This withdrawal 
might be Interpreted as a resort to Isolation based on difficulties In 
relating to others, but It Is more likely that the rural Lao Is 
emotionally tough, with sufficient self-reliance and emotional security 
that his need of others Is not Imperative.
Generally, the connections between religious or ethical values 
and behavior patterns are not articulated. These connections are 
Interwoven In the cultural milieu so that conscious perception Is 
seldom evident. But there Is one definitive pattern pertaining to the 
concept of Individuality that accounts for much of the foci of life, 
and this Is the assumption that much of the individual's basic char­
acter Is b o m  with him, with many of his tendencies already well 
formed due to his previous existence. This belief affects not only 
childhood, but the whole life, as It is built around the concept that 
each Individual Is uniquely different In his approach to nirvana, 
and outside Interference Is wrong.
Charity. - Buddhist practices In Laos have traditionally been 
"materialistic," In the sense they have supported the people's standard
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of living at a static level not too much above that of subsistence. 
Charity has not, therefore, been so freely distributed in Laos as in 
some Western countries. This is in full accord with the Lao concept of 
the Karmic Law, however; belief in this doctrine declares that an 
unsatisfactorily status is the result of one's previous non-merit 
actions. And why should one be relieved of punishment? If it is 
avoided now, which it most likely cannot be, it will only come later 
and in a stronger form because of the delay. This law of cause and 
effect is a significant behavioral control factor in Laos.
Expediency. - Lao villagers have a trait of "expediency"— a 
tendency to do something only if its value is apparent, and if it will 
not be boring or require an excessive amount of e n e r g y .56 One can see 
possible tensions between this tendency and certain practices that will 
be required if Laos is to really begin the process of modernization.
For example, a tendency toward expediency will inherently conflict with 
the need for saving. Also, "expediency" can lead to easy compromises 
with nature, and something much more than this is essential for indus­
trial development.
ivuam Muan Xuen. - This characteristic has a very high value 
throughout Laos. In essence, it refers to a sense of pleasure or 
happiness that must be present in either leisure or work. Even a talk 
that is expected to be profitable may be dropped if it does not prove 
to be enjoyable or fun. Many of the rural people seem to think that 
unless activity has a potential for fun, it is not worth doing. Fun
56see also Konrad Kinghill, KUDAENG-The Red Tomb. (Bangkok: 
Bangkok Christian College, 1965), p. 7.
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seems to reflect an attempt on the part of the villagers to lead a 
psychologically integrated life, wherein the time and energy one gives 
to an activity is rewarded immediately and directly with pleasure.
This concept will undoubtedly create tensions when confronted with the 
essential efficiencies of modernity, because muan is an unforced, 
uncalculated, spontaneous theme which the planned used of resources, 
time, and efficiency will challenge.
Happiness seems to be the apex and sum of the other Lao 
qualities, values, and behaviors. It is descriptive of the non-compul­
sive enjoyment of life which is the ideal of the Laotian. It is in 
agreement with Buddhist teachings, in the sense that most people are 
still so far from nirvana so that when some happiness is achieved, one's 
Karma must not be too bad. But life is not ideal, and tensions do 
appear to be unavoidable in many instances. And when these confront the 
individual and all alternatives have negative values for him, he may 
simply escape the situation by leaving without a word.
Sometimes, when the situation becomes too tense, one may brood 
for a time behind socially acceptable devices. (The time span will 
depend upon the degree of involvement.) Following this, however, 
internal pressures may result in direct or indirect socially unacceptable 
behavior. This may take the form of verbalization, or the acting out of 
displeasure against some inanimate object or perhaps an animal, owned 
by and within a perceptual distance of his closest superior. In some 
cases the individual may even be moved to sudden and violent action, 
such as the killing of those deemed responsible for his problem. 
Realization that repressed emotions may erupt in violence may be an 
important factor in the reluctance of employers to directly "fire" or
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dismiss employees or subordinates. At the very least, it helps to 
account for the indirect method of expressing displeasure, and it helps 
to explain what appears to many foreigners to be an extraordinary 
veneer of politeness that makes Laos "the land of the smile."
Buddhism Values and Attitudes Toward Authority
The Laotian seems to accept authority with much less obvious 
tension than do many Americans. Deference, courtesy, proper status, and 
respect are always formally expressed toward those in authority, and 
normally the wisdom or competence and efficiency of the authority 
figure is not openly questioned. However, if the authority figure does 
not provide the expected reciprocal relationship, the oppressed 
individual may simply quietly cease to follow direction— although this 
will be done without rudeness, discourteousness, or any public display 
of indignation.
Passivity with regard to authority seems to be an acceptable 
course to the Laotian, who accepts the concept of power as a by-product 
of virtue, or Buddhist merit. The higher the individual's status is 
within the Lao social hierarchy, the greater his piety and wisdom are 
t hou^t to be. liven when misuse of power occurs, the Laotian with 
faith in cosmic retribution is supposed to remain undisturbed— after 
all, tyrants can be reborn as dogs, while those who are abused by 
tyranny are not really martyrs. Instead, they are persons who must 
work out their karma because of misdeeds of their previous existences. 
And since power comes from an unknown source, its effectiveness is the 
major criterion for judging its magnitude.
The Lao peasant or hill tribe member is largely concerned with 
his immediate world, and not too concerned about events beyond the
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horizon. Moreover, he tends to Ignore or not question matters that are 
beyond his ability to influence or control.
Political L e g i t i m a c y ^ 7
It is a basic concept that the person who has accrued much 
merit in this and previous lives will be a success, and most probably 
achieve some important position in the social hierarchy. This concept 
serves as a source of political legitimacy in Laos, and is perhaps more 
important there than the legal sources of legitimacy which underwrite 
political power in the West. Politicians who move to assume political 
positions through something other than the electoral process can 
always justify themselves, by playing upon the traditional belief that 
politicians and top bureaucrats are those who have compiled enough 
merit that they can be trusted, and are therefore legitimate to rule.
Summary
The value system has been assumed to be made up of six major 
value orientations— man-nature, human nature, space, activity, and 
human relations. Laotians tend to believe that man should live in 
harmony with nature, and that he is inherently good but corruptible.
They tend to look to the past, to stay with their father's lands and 
village, and to value group goals and any activity that can maintain and 
reinforce human goodness.
By political legitimacy, we mean the degree to which the exist­
ing political institutions are justified as right arid proper and are 
considered as the most appropriate ones for the society. For a brief 
explanation of the concept of legitimacy consult Seymour Martin Lipset, 
Political Man (Garden City; Doubleday & Co., 1960), pp. 46, 77. See 
also Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 28-32; and Harry Eckstein and Ted Robert 
Gurr, Patterns of Authority (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975),
pp. 19-21.
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Buddhist values pervade every sphere of Laotian life. Buddhist 
doctrines control all three channels of behavior (i.e., body, speech, 
and mind) and foster equanimity. Merit-making is a main psychological 
goal of the entire society. Buddhism enhances particular characteris­
tics of the Lao culture-and-personality, e.g., those of individualism, 
non-agrandizement, pacificism, gentleness, love of fun and enjoyment, 
respect for superiors, status consciousness, formalism, conformity, and 
piety. As members of the society, elites may be expected to be per­
vaded by some or all of these characteristics in varying degrees of 
intensity.
CHAPTER V
THE LAOTIAN ELITE'S PERSONALITY
Thus far, we have made a general surveys of the basic needs, 
values, and culture of the Laotians. Through interviews with members 
of the elite, we shall in this Chapter attempt to identify sets of 
general value systems; furthermore, we shall attempt to classify the 
elites into some "modal personality types.
We have stated that culture is to society as personality is to 
the individual. In other words, the personality of the elite is relative 
to the general configuration of the Lao culture they have been taught.
The theoretical assumptions of culture-and-personality suggest that 
culture is composed of psychological structures by means of which indivi­
duals or groups of individuals guide their behavior, that culture is
located in the minds and hearts of men, and that culture is a result of
2the congregation of many diverse personalities.
In this Chapter, we shall examine several elite personality traits 
that seem to be outstanding— especially authoritarianism and dogmatism.
The subsequent chapters will explore other areas, such as society, econo­
mics, and politics. A summing up of these traits will be presented in 
Chapter VIII.
"Modal personality types" is derived from the "mode" as the 
term is used in statistics. The mode is the item that occurs most fre­
quently in a distribution of scores. Thus, the modal personality type is 
the one that occurs most frequently among the elite and best represents 
the "typical" personality of the elite.




The personality of the elite Is assumed to be closely related to 
their styles of behavior. These styles concern leader-follower relatlon-
3ships that constitute a democratic or authoritarian system. Such frame­
works are used In an Important series of studies by R. White and R.
4Llppltt. They Isolate three leadership styles:
1. Authoritarian. All policy Is determined by the leader; 
steps In activities are dictated one by one so that future 
steps are uncertain; the leader dictates tasks to be 
worked on workers; the leader personality praises and 
criticizes members but remains aloof from active group 
participation.
2. Lalssez-falre. Policy Is determined completely by the 
Individual members of the group with minimum leader 
participation. The leader supplies materials and Informa­
tion when asked but neither praises nor criticizes group 
members.
3. Democratic. All policy Is a matter of group discussion 
and decision with the active participation of the leader; 
procedures are outlined and alternatives suggested by the 
leader; members are free to work with whomever they choose; 
the leader Is "objective" or "fact-minded" In his praise 
and criticism; and tries to be a group member In spirit 
without doing too much of work.^
Generally, the different styles of leadership found In White and 
Llppltt's study produce quite marked differences In member behavior.
For example, boys In the authoritarian group stuck to their assigned tasks, 
which were operations In the manufacturer of a model airplane, but were 
either sullenly apathetic or (In other groups) clearly aggressively 
hostile toward each other. While they did not work as hard or continuously
3
Sidney Verba, Small Groups and Political Behavior: A Study of
Leadership (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).
4R. K. White and R. Llppltt, Autocracy and Democracy: An Experi­
mental Study (New York: Harper & Row, 1960).
^Ibld., pp. 26-27.
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as the authoritarian group members, the boys in the democratic group 
atmosphere produced superior products. Also, there was much greater 
unity and "we feeling" in the democratic groups. Boys in laissez-faire 
groups produced few tanjgible products. Most of their time was spent in 
play.
Authoritarian and democratic group organization in the roles of 
the leader was also described by White and Lippitt. In the authoritarian 
m'iel, direction comes from the leader, who oversees all activities of 
the group members and who may even dictate the interpersonal relationships 
possible in the group. Democratic group organization, on the other hand, 
provides for member participation in the decision-making process. While 
the democratic leader may make suggestions and give guidance, he is 
receptive to feedback from individuals in the group. But a number of 
factors other than the behavior of the leader influences group atmosphere. 
Also important to group atmosphere are the structure of the group and the 
nature of the task facing the group. The purpose of this study, however, 
is not only to describe the style of leadership but also to determine the 
degree of authoritarianism in the Laotian elite as a decision-making group.
Orientations Toward Others
Modern social psychology is replete with attempts to describe 
differences among people in their willingness to accept direction from 
others. David Riesman suggested a historically changing system of 
orientation toward others, from "traditional" to "inner" direction to 
"other" direction.^ American society, he felt, had evolved through the
^David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1950).
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first two stages and was In the process of transition from inner to 
other direction. Riesman felt that most people could be thought of as 
ranging between two polar types. The, first type is the inner-directed 
person whose behavior is self-directed. This person is autonomous from 
the point of view of contemporary influences, although his behavior is 
in accordance with internalized norms and values. The second type is the 
other-directed person whose behavioral direction is determined by his 
current milieu. His antennae are constantly set to receive the expectations 
of others; he is very responsive to situational pressures and current fads.^ 
A somewhat different perspective, which developed in the 1930s, 
stems from the concern of social scientists over the rise of Nazism in 
Germany. In particular, some social scientists began to take the position 
that there is present in some people a deep-seated need not only to obey, 
but to adore and to offer complete submission to an all-powerful leader.
An early publication of the Institute of Social Research in Germany on 
authority and family suggested the concept of the authoritarian personality 
as a link between psychological dispositions and political leanings. In
g
Escape from Freedom, Erich Fromm furthered the notion of authoritarian 
character structure as a basic foundation of Fascism'.
Research conducted during the 1950s and early 1960s supported 
the notion that people could be meaningfully arranged along the inner- 
other continuum, see W. W. Kassarjian, "A Study of Riesman's Theory of 
Social Character," Sociometry, 25 (1962), 213-230. Further evidence of 
the concern with autonomy versus acceptance of the influence of other 
people is the vast literature on conformity; see E. P. Hollander and R.
H. Willis, "Some Current Issues in the Psychology of Conformity and Non­
conformity," PsYçhologi^alJB^^ 68 (1967), 62-76.




Fromm's thesis Is that man, freed from primary group ties by the
historical developments associated with the rise of capitalism, found
himself alone, helpless, and Isolated. The sense of anxiety over aloneness
Is experienced by everyone growing up In modern culture as an aspect of
the development of selfhood. These unbearable feelings of Isolation and
powerlessness can be overcome by developing a loving relationship with one's
fellow man and through development of one's capacity for productive work.
Too often, however, man seeks to escape from the freedom that accompanies
the attainment of Individualism. This escape can be manifested by the
use of any of a number of psychic mechanisms, Including authoritarianism,
destructiveness, and conformity.
According to Fromm, authoritarianism arises from
the tendency to give up the Independence of one's own Individual 
self and to fuse one's self with somebody or something outside 
of oneself In order to acquire the strength which the Individual 
self Is lacking. Or, to put It In different words, to seek for 
new, "secondary bonds" as a substitute for the primary bonds 
which have been lost.9
These tendencies are based on a deep-seated personality dynamic that 
developed, Fromm believed, from a desire for preservation and for related­
ness to the world outside oneself. The particular personality dynamics 
Involved In the authoritarian character are sadistic and masochistic 
strivings. That Is, the authoritarian wants to hurt and dominate others, 
while at the same time he wants to be hurt and dominated. These tendencies 
represent the Individual's reactions to feelings of Inferiority, powerless­
ness, and Individual Insignificance. Fromm preferred to talk In terms of 
sado-masochlstlc character structure, rather than simple power striving.
*Ibld., p. 163.
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since he felt that the latter terminology as represented in Alfred Adler's 
t h o u g h t ,n eg lected  unconscious personality dynamics.
Sadistic and masochistic impulses are present in everyone in some 
degree. Even though some people exhibit one of these tendencies to a 
marked extent, its opposite is always prevalent. The individual, then, 
harbors both desires— to dominate and to be dominated. Fromm observed 
that these two tendencies may be complementary between persons. Symbiotic 
attachments attachments are often formed between two people, for example, 
in which each, the sadist as well as the masochist, is profoundly depen­
dent upon the other. Fromm also suggested that a person whose personality 
is dominated by sadistic and masochistic traits may be, but is not 
necessarily, neurotic. He believed that certain cultural patterns could 
result in whole classes of people in whom the sado-masochistic character 
was typical, though the people involved were "normal." To designate this 
character type, Fromm suggested the term "authoritarian character":
This terminology is justified because the sado-masochistic person 
is always characterized by his attitude toward authority. He 
admires authority and tends to submit to it, but at the same 
time he wants to be authority himself and have others submit 
to him. There is an additional reason for choosing this term.
The Fascist systems call themselves authoritarian because of 
the domination of authority in their social and political 
structure.
Fromm went much further in describing the authoritarian character structure, 
which is rooted in the basic feeling of powerlessness and characterized 
by a worship of power and power relations, together with a lack of love 
and human tenderness. We now turn to a famous empirical study that was
1964).
11
^^See Alfred Adler, Social Interest (New York: Capricon Books,
Fromm, op. cit., p. 186.
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in part stimulated by Fromm’s theory as set forth in The Authoritarian 
12Personality. The study is an important work for political scientists, 
because for the first time, an attempt was made to establish on a broad 
scale an empirical link between political ideology and personality.
Toward the end of World War II a group of researchers in 
psychology and sociology who were concerned by the Nazi atrocities began 
a study of the psychological factors underlying Fascism and Anti-Semitism.
The authors, through clinical and attitudinal approaches, constructed, 
validated, and tested scales of anti-Semitism, ethnocentrism, politico- 
economic conservatism, and authoritarianism on hundreds of normal subjects.
In addition, the investigators used projective tests and clinical inter­
views with smaller samples in their attempt to assess the underlying 
personality dynamics of Fascism-prone subjects.
Among the number of techniques used in the study of authorita­
rianism, our focus will be on only one instrument, the F scale, which 
was borrowed for use in our study. This scale was designed to measure 
the personality characteristics which underlie the acceptance of Fascist 
ideology and leadership. The justification for emphasizing the F scale 
is that all the other techniques (attitudinal scales, projective tests, 
and clinical interviews) converged in the formation of this one device.
Central to the research effort on authoritarianism is the concep­
tion of a particular personality type that is prone to accept Fascist ideology
12T. W. Adorno, et al.. The Authoritarian Personality (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1950). The study has fueled controversy for over two 
decades. The controversy has yet to be resolved to the satisfaction of 
many social scientists. However, critics have questioned the validity 
of the findings because of the deficiencies, which will be discussed in 
a subsequent section.
173
and propaganda. The F scale is the instrument defining the core
personality dispositions that lead to the acceptance of such antidemocratic
attitudes. The F scale we used reflects the suppositions regarding the
manifest beliefs of the authoritarian personality. "Conventionalism,
authoritarian aggression, anti-intraception, superstition and stereotype
thinking, admiration of power and toughness, destructive and cynical
13attitudes, and projection of fears, aggression, and sexual urges" are 
characteristics derived from psychoanalytic theories. The character 
structure was thought to stem from childhood experiences, especially 
from subjection to harsh, inflexible discipline, together with a rather 
cold emotional climate in the home.
The Elite's Responses
The section which follows is an investigation of the extent to 
which an authoritarian personality structure is found among the Laotian 
elite. The number in parentheses is the item number in the questionnaire. 
The intensity of each element in the structure is represented by the 
absolute score followed by the heading of the characteristic and each 
statement. The degree of intensity ranges from +1 through 0 to -1, repre­
senting the highest to lowest degree of authoritarianism.
l^ibid., pp. 255-257.
174
1. Conventionalism; Rigid adherence to conventional, middle-class 
values. Composite Score +.65.
(1) The monk and the teacher are probably more important to Lao 
society than the businessperson and the manufacturer.
Strongly Dis- Strongly
Agree Agree agree Disagree Total Score
59.7 % 25.8 % 11.3 % 1.6 % 98.4 % +.65
2. Authoritarian Submission: Submissive, uncritical attitude toward
idealized moral authorities of the ingroup. Composite Score +.55.
(2) The findings of science may someday show that many of our 
most deeply-held beliefs are wrong.
56.5 % 32.3 % 4.8 % 6.5 % 100.1 % +.64
(8) Bosses should say just what is to be done and exactly how to 
do it if they expect us to do a good job.
82.3 % 1.6 % 9.7 % 6.5 % 100.1 % +.72
(10) Everything can really be predicted by astrology.
11.3 % 69.4 % 6.5 % 12.9 % 100.1 % +.30
3. Authoritarian ABKtession: Tendency to be on the lookout for, and 
to condemn, reject, and punish people who violate conventional 
values. Composite Score +.56.
(5) What young people need most of all is strict discipline by 
their parents.
61.3 % 19.4 % 8.1 % 11.3 % 100.1 % +.56
(7) Sex criminals deserve more than prison; they should be 
whipped in public or worse.
48.4 % 17.7 % 24.2 % 9.7 % 100.0 % +.36
(9) An insult to one's honor should always be punished.
72.6 % 19.4 % 8.1 % 0.0 % 100.1 % +.78
^^Percent is more or less than 100 because of rounding and "No 
Opinion" responses have been excluded.
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4. Anti-Intraception; Opposition to the subjective, the imaginative
the tender-minded. Composite Score +.43.
Strongly Dis- Strongly
Agree Agree agree Disagree Total Score
(1) Repeated +.65
(II) It is not good to think too much.
45.2 % 11.3 % 27.4 % 16.1 % 100.0 % +.21
5. Superstition and Stereotypy: The beliefs in mystical determinants
of the individual's fate; the disposition to think in rigid
categories. Composite Score +.50.
(2) Repeated +.64
(10) Repeated +.30
(13) People can be divided into two classes: the strong and the
weak.
51.6 % 29.0 % 17.7 % 1.6 % 99.9 % +.56
6. Power and "Toughness": Preoccupation with the dominance-submission,
strong-weak, leader-follower dimension; identification with power 
figures; overemphasis upon the conventionalized attributes of the ego; 
exaggerated assertion of strength and toughness. Composite Score 
+.62.
(5) Repeated +.56
(6) Most people who do not get ahead just do not have enough 
will power.
58.1 % 19.4 % 22.6 % 0.0 % 100.1 % +.57
(9) Repeated +.78
(13) Repeated +.56
7. Destructiveness and Cynicism: Generalized hostility, vilification 
of the human. Composite Score +.51.
(3) Human nature being what it is, there must be war and conflict.
62.9 % 9.7 % 21.0 % 6.5 % 100.1 % +.51
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8. Pro.iectivlty: The disposition to believe that wild and dangerous 
things go on in the world; the projection outwards of unconscious 
emotional impulses. Composite Score +.66.
Strongly Dis- Strongly
Agree Agree agree Disagree Total Score
(14) There are so many evil people nowadays that it is dangerous 
to go out alone.
72.6 % 8.1 % 17.7 % 1.6 % 100.0 % +.66
9. Sex: Exaggerated concern with sexual "goings-on." Composite 
Score +.36.
(7) Repeated +.36
The levels of authoritarianism may be understood by Freud's 
conception that "id-ego-superego" form the structure of personality.^^ 
Given that the primal impulses of the id are at first dominant and 
unchecked in the infant period, the process of development is one of 
developing controls over the satisfaction of these urges. Through 
socialization, our Laotian elites have developed— like other people—  
two control mechanisms for satisfaction and suppression of the sexual
and aggressive impulses of the id: the ego and superego.
The ego is the structure of personality whose job is to deal 
rationally with society and to maximize the satisfaction of id impulses
within the restrictions of the society. The superego contains the
standards that specify which gratifications are permissible and which
Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and Analysis of Ego (New York: 
Liveright Publishing Corp., 1951); see also Ross Stager, Psychology of 
Personality, 4th ed. (New York; McGraw-Hill, 1974), pp. 263-273. A 
useful discussion of ego psychology elucidating the difference between 
defensive and coping behavior can be found in T. C. Kroeber, The Study 
of Lives (New York: Atherton Press, 1963 ), pp. 178-199.
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must be prohibited in the elite's home and their culture. The superego 
is developed through simple learning processes and operates to a large 
degree without the elite's awareness. Therefore, the ego is often in a 
position of mediating between id demands and superego prohibition, in 
addition to its dealings with the outside world.
Freud believed that the authoritarian character is typified by a 
harsh, punitive superego and a weak, or incompetent, ego. Because of 
harsh treatment at a young age, internal mechanisms are not developed for 
direct satisfaction of id impulses. Instead impulses are denied and they 
are expressed through mechanisms that operate unconsciously. Nevitt 
Sanfordadditionally explains that the authoritarian personality stems 
from an attempt on the part of an individual to overcome a basic fear of 
personal weakness. A complex configuration of psychological factors in 
the raising of the child (chief among these factors is the failure to 
achieve adequate solution to the Oedipal complex) lies behind this fear 
of weakness. In turn, the fear of being or seeming weak leads the 
individual— by means of psychological mechanisms of overcompensation, dis­
placement, projection, and identification— to strive for power and status, 
to conceal or deny signs of weakness or dependency, and to assign respon­
sibility for any failing in himself to the operation of powers beyond his 
control. He, thus, is psychologically ready to believe that persons who 
are in some respect dissimilar to him are untrustworthy, weak, inferior in 
character, resentful, envious, and, therefore, dangerous.
^^Nevitt Sanford, "The Approach of the Authoritarian Personality," 




The authoritarian level of the Laotian elite was found to be in 
the medium high range with a score of +.50 in the possible range of -1 
to +1. This level of authoritarianism seems to reflect the characteris­
tics of the Lao political system because of the close interpenetration 
of the elites' roles and political roles. However, one should be careful 
about the circumstance that the relationship between personality and 
the political system is sometimes ambigous. The fact is that an authori­
tarian, for one, is presented with a much wider range of opportunities 
to express his personality needs. As Fred Greenstein has pointed out, 
people with similar psychological characteristics may entertain different 
political beliefs or may express their needs in different ways.^^ In 
addition to this point, some of the Laotian elites' political beliefs 
will be presented in Chapter VII.
The particular characteristics of the elite's authoritarianism 
should also be observed. (See Figure 3). The extent of their rigid 
adherence to "conventional," middle-class values— as those values have 
been defined for Lao society in Chapter IV— was found to be very high, 
+.65. They strongly supported the statement that "the monk and the tea­
cher are probably more important to Lao society than the businessperson 
and the manufacturer." Such a value seems to be congruent with the Lao­
tian values in business indicated earlier. Adorno and associates point
Fred I. Greenstein, "Personality and Political Socialization; 
The Theories of the Authoritarian and Democratic Character," The Annals 
of American Academy of Political and Social Science, 361 (1965), 81-95; 
and also Neil J. Smelser, "Personality and the Explanation of Political 
Phenomena at the Social System Level: A Methodological Statement,"





















































out that the high scorer on conventionalism is created largely by
18internalization of parental authority rather than independent values.
The same explanation as that for the conventionalism applies to
the elite's "submission to authority." Since the superego inhibits
aggressive authority, and since the elite inevitably harbors aggressive
feelings, the elite "displace" their hostility onto other targets. This
seems similar to "scapegoating," in which the elite in a frustrating
and uncertain situation turns against some plausible source of its
difficulties. As the score indicates (+.55) submissive or uncritical
attitudes towards idealized moral authorities of the elites themselves does
not appear very high. However, responses to a single statement, "bosses
should say just what is to be done and exactly how to do it if they
expect us to do a good job," runs high at +.72. Such a finding might
19.reflect the aristocratic origins of our respondents.
The authoritarian person, however, is "compelled" to attack people
who are different. "Authoritarian aggression" results from deep-seated
personality needs: the authoritarian must, out of an inner necessity,
20turn his aggression against outgroups. The tendency to condemn, reject, 
and punish people who violate Lao values of the elite is indicated to be 
medium high with a score of +.56. The response to the statement "an insult 
to one's honor should always be punished" scored as high as +.78. Such a 
score would also indicate, in addition to aggressiveness, the dominance 
which is anticipated to be high among elites in general.
18Adorno, et al., op. cit.
19For a description of the characteristics of aristocracy, see 
John H. Kautsky, The Political Consequences of Modernization (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1972), pp. 28-29.
20Adorno, et al., op. cit., p. 233.
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Because the authoritarian character structure requires denial, 
rather than acknowledgement, of impulses, various mechanisms are employed 
in the service of self-deception. "Anti-intraception," for example, 
is an attitude of opposition to any close examination of one's own feelings. 
Consequently, the Laotian elite score of +.43 characterizes them as a 
denial-minded, non-imaginative, and non-subjective group. It indicates 
their closed mindedness which will be further observed in the next section.
A belief in mystical determinants cause the superstition and 
stereotypy which likewise reduces the need for self-examination was indi­
cated to be moderately high among the elite (score +.50). Such charac­
teristics— derived from Brahmanism and animism— are observed among the 
Laotian masses as well. This characteristic also signals a lack of confi­
dence in reason and its allies, science and technology, and a reversion 
to more primitive, animistic ways of understanding, the closet ally of 
which in Lao culture is superstition.
The Laotian elite also emphasized power and identified themselves 
as power figures who asserted strength and toughness. This characteristic 
can also be seen as a form of denial— in this case the denial of the elite's 
lack of ego control.
In a society such as Laos where the elites have had experience 
in war and conflict throughout their lives, the score for "destructiveness" 
is not unusual at a high of +.51. "Projection" (that is, the tendency to 
project one's acknowledged desires onto other people) permeates all of 
the ideas mentioned above. Statement 14, "there are so many evil people 
nowadays that it is dangerous to go out alone," scored +.66. Thus, the 
elite projected their emotional impulses to their environment and
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situation. They were slightly less concerned with sexual matters, only 
implying projection of repressed sexual impulses.
Implications of Authoritarianism
There are many empirical correlations of authoritarianism as the
hundreds of studies that have employed the F scale since 1950 demonstrate.
For example, authoritarian attitudes have been shown to relate to specific
policy preferences that are consistent with "psudo-conservatism." The
Americans who scored high in authoritarianism disagreed with the state-
21ment that "MacArthur should have been dismissed." In the same study,
C. Williams found that highly authoritarian American students overwhelmingly
supported hawkish military operations against Cuba in the case of the
22hijacking of an airplane in 1961. Such an example would indicate that
high scorers in authoritarianism are likely to support policies of
aggression or harsh punishment.
For other examples, Eysenck has also shown that both communists
23and fascists score high in authoritarianism. A- Elms and S. Milgram 
have shown that those who scored high on the F scale showed significantly 
more obedience to authority than those who scored low.^^ In terras of
21P. V. Gump, "Anti-Democratic Trends and Student Reaction to 
President Truman's Dismissal of General MacArthur," Journal of Social 
Psychology, 38 (1953), 131-135.
22C. D. Williams, "Authoritarianism and Student Reaction to Air­
plane Hijacking," Journal of Social Psychology, 60 (1963), 289-291.
23H. J. Eysenck, The Psychology of Politics (London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1954); and H. J. Eysenck, "The Psychology of Politics and 
the Personality Similarities Between Fascists and Communists," Psycho­
logical Bulletin. 53 (1956), 431-438.
^^A. C. Elms and S. Milgram, "Personality Characteristics Associated 
with Obedience and Defiance toward Authoritative Command," Journal of 
Experimental Research in Personality,2 (1966), 282-289.
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leader preference, W. Haythorne and associates found that authoritarians
25tended to prefer leaders who were friendly and less directive. M. Shaw
found performance and satisfaction of group members to be related to their
degree of authoritarianism and the structure of the g r o u p . A n o t h e r
important relationship to political phenomena was described by Gordon
Allport. According to him, the higher the degree of nationalism, the
27higher the authoritarian score. We could reasonably hypothesize such 
phenomena among the Laotian elite, too. This speculation could be useful 
in forming hypotheses for testing in further studies of Laos or for 
comparative study of the elites in other developing countries. We might 
also speculate that a slightly pessimistic view of human nature would 
spill over into other related values in the political lives of the elites. 
Such correlations will be observed in subsequent sections.
Controversies About the Authoritarian Personality Studies
The publication of The Authoritarian Personality set off a wave
28of discussion, replication, and reanalysis. One of its active contro­
versies concerned the "response-set" factor which had been found to 
influence the results of the F scale answer. The items were all stated
25W. Haythorne, et al., "The Effects of Varying Combinations of 
Authoritarian and Equalitarian Leaders and Followers," Journal of Abnormal 
and Social Psychology, 53 (1956), 210-219.
26M. E. Shaw, "Acceptance of Authority, Group Structure and the 
Effectiveness of Small Groups," Journal of Personality, 27 (1959), 29.
27Gordon Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Garden City: Double­
day & Co., 1954), p. 381.
28Formost among this was the collection of critiques edited by 
Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda, Studies in Scope and Method of "The 
Authoritarian Personality" (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1967).
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so that agreement was scored as authoritarianism. A person who tended
toward agreement, for example, one whose verbal ability was poor, would
likely be found In the authoritarian group.
The Improvement and analysis of research techniques did not stop
here. It has been suggested, for example, that Individuals who are
"yea-sayers" In pencil and paper tests differ In personality characterIs-
29tics from those who are "nay-sayers." With this criticism In mind,
which has also been shown to apply to Milton Rokeach's study of dogmatism,
a new F scale was constructed which reversed Items to correct for this 
30weak point. But the debate goes on not only over measures, but also
pointing out further difficulties. For example. It has been hypothesized
that extreme scorers, on either end of the scale, will differ In personality
characteristics from Individuals who mark a more central choice In a
31Llkert-type scale.
32Irving Sarnoff and Daniel Katz, In discussion these difficulties, 
question what Is being measured. They suggest that the F scale may not
29See A. Couch and K. Kenlston, "Yeasayers and Naysayers: Agreeing
Response-Set as a Psychological Variable," Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, 60 (1960), 151-174; Lester W. Mllbrath, "Latent Origins of 
Llberallsm-Conservatlsm and Party Identification: A Research Note," Jour­
nal of Politics, 24 (1969), 679-688; and, L. C. Rorer, "The Great Response- 
Style Myth," Psychological Bulletin, 63 (1965), 129-156.
30E. Lichtenstein, R. P. Quinn, and G. L. Hover, "Dogmatism and 
Acquiescent Response Set," Journal of Social Psychology, 63 (1961), 636- 
638.
31I. A. Berg, "Response Bias and Personality: The Deviation Hypo­
thesis," Journal of Psychology, 40 (1955), 61-72; and, 0. G. Brim and D. 
Hoff, "Individual and Situational Differences In Desire for Certainty," 
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 52 (1957), 225-229.
32Irving Sarnoff and Daniel Katz, "The Motivational Bases of 
Attitude Change," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 49 (1954), 
115-124.
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be purely a personality measure "since the authoritarian values it
measures may well reflect the individual's values rather than other basic
personality characteristics." Further, some of the basic assumptions of
its authors have been questioned. Kecshemeti, for the another, has
shown that the F scale primarily measures "right" authoritarianism because
of the content of its items, and does not discriminate equally intolerant,
dogmatic individuals who hold beliefs which could be termed "left," or 
33"center." Dogmatism, which we shall discuss next, is seen as referring 
to the structure of a belief system, the individual's central ideas 
about the world, and the attitude that he has toward authority— not to 
any particular type of intolerance which is dogmatically espoused.
Dogmatism
"Dogmatism," according to Rokeach,^^ is the state of what he 
calls "closedness" of belief systems. At the opposite end of the conti­
nuum, which is called "openness," a person's belief system is open if 
"the person can receive, evaluate, and act on relevant information 
received from the outside on its own intrinsic merits, unencumbered
by irrelevant factors in the situation arising from within the person
35or from the outside."
A system is defined to be closed to the extent that there is a 
high magnitude of rejection of all disbelief subsystems, an isolation 
of beliefs, a high discrepancy in degree of differentiation between
33P. Kecshemeti, "The Study of Man; Prejudice in the Catastrophic 
Perspective," Commentary, 2 (March, 1951), 286-292.




belief and disbelief systems, and little differentiation within the 
disbelief system. The more closed the system, the higher is the likeli­
hood that a particular belief is dependent on irrelevant internal drives 
and on arbitrary reinforcements from external authority. The relation 
among beliefs should depend on such irrelevant considerations rather 
than on considerations of logical consistency. On the other hand, the 
more open the system, the more should the person address himself to 
objective structural requirements— that is, logical relationships— and 
the more should he resist irrelevant motivational or reinforcement pres­
sure. In this way, isolation is shown to be the defining characteristic 
of openness-closedness.
Rokeach's study derived from his dissatisfaction with the incon­
sistent relationship between scores on the authoritarian personality 
scales and specific beliefs and attitudes. He argues that the authori­
tarian is distinctive in how he holds beliefs but not in specific content 
of those beliefs. The social situation or references such as peer group 
opinion can act as a constraint on whether or not the authoritarian 
personality expresses his views in the predicted style.
Rokeach has devised a measure of his general authoritarian 
style which he labels "dogmatism." The distinguishing characteristics of 
this style include rigidity, inflexibility, and intolerance of ambiguity. 
The basic distinction is in terms of whether an individual's belief 
system is open or closed. The belief system consists of all beliefs, 
hypotheses, and explanations that the individual accepts as true. The 
converse, his disbelief system, consists of all beliefs, hypotheses, and
^̂ Ibid.
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37explanations he accepts as false. Three dimensions are presented in 
the belief system: the belief-disbelief, the central-peripheral, and
the time perspective dimensions. The central-peripheral dimension has 
three components: (1) the central region which encompasses basic beliefs 
about the nature of the physical world, the self, and others; (2) an 
intermediate region which contains beliefs about authority and persons 
exercising authority over others; and, (3) a peripheral region, represen­
ting beliefs about the past, present, and future. This dimension is 
characterized as varying from narrow to broad, with a narrow time perspec­
tive representing a focus on one time period and a broad perspective 
incorporating all three. The belief-disbelief dimension refers to two
interdependent parts, with varying degrees of similarity possible between
38beliefs that are accepted and beliefs that are rejected (disbeliefs'^.
One can evaluate belief-disbelief systems in terms of the degree 
of isolation among different beliefs. Indicators of this are the "coexis­
tence of logically contradictory beliefs" in a person's belief or disbe­
lief system and the extent to which differences are emphasized and 
similarities are minimized in comparing belief-disbelief systems. This 
can be judged by the degree of knowledge an individual possesses about
39
his beliefs and disbeliefs, and the degree of similarity about disbeliefs. 
For example, what amount of knowledge underlies an individual's beliefs 
and disbeliefs about the Soviet Union and communist China? Secondly, 
does he believe that communism in the Soviet Union is the same as in 
communist China? A third measure of the belief-disbelief system is the
^^Ibid., p. 33. 
^^Ibid., p. 34.
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degree of comprehensiveness of the system. Thus, we would evaluate the 
number of disbelief systems within a person's total belief-disbelief 
system.
The open-versus-closed minded distinction is based on more than 
the degree to which an individual relies on authority in restructuring 
his belief system. Yielding to others and resistance to acculturation 
(acceptance of the predominant culture) as well as reliance on authority 
all have a common cognitive basis, according to Rokeach. That basis is 
the extent to which an individual distinguishes between the substance 
of the communication and the character of or information about the source. 40
as follows:




1. The magnitude of rejection of 
disbelief subsystems is relatively 
low at each point along the 
continuum.
2. There is communication of 
parts within and between belief 
and disbelief systems.
3. There is relatively little 
discrepancy in the degree of 
differentiation between belief 
and disbelif systems.
4. There is relatively high 
differentiation within the 
disbelief system.
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I k M * »  P* 34.
40Ibid.. pp. 36-39. 
^ ^Ibid.. pp. 55-56.
1. The magnitude of rejection of 
disbelief subsystems is relatively 
high at each point along the 
continuum.
2. There is isolation of parts 
within and between belief and 
disbelief systems.
3. There is relatively great 
discrepancy in the degree of 
differentiation between belief 
and disbelief systems.
4. There is relatively little 





1. The specific content of 
primitive beliefs (central region) 
is to the effect that the world 
one lives in, or the situation 
one is in at a particular moment, 
is a friendly one.
2. The formal content of beliefs 
about authority and about people 
who hold to systems of authority 
(intermediate region) is to the 
effect that authority is not 
absolute and that people are not 
to be evaluated (if they are to 
be evaluated at all) according to 
their agreement or disagreement 
with such authority.
3. The structure of beliefs and 
disbeliefs perceived to emanate 
from authority (peripheral region) 
is such that its substructures are 
in relative communication with 
each other.
Closed
1. The specific content of primitive 
beliefs (central region) is to be the 
effect that the world one lives in, 
or the situation one is in at a 
particular moment, is a threatening 
one.
2. The formal content of beliefs 
about authority and about people who 
hold to systems of authority (inter­
mediate region) to the effect that 
authority is absolute and that people 
are to be accepted or rejected accord­
ing to their agreement or disgreement 
with such authority.
3. The structure of beliefs and dis­
beliefs perceived to emanate from 
authority (peripheral region) is 
such that its substructures are in 
relative isolation from each other.
Time Perspective Dimension
1. Relative broad time perspec­
tive .
1. Relative narrow, future oriented 
time perspective.
Rokeack's study has prompted several critiques. Many scholars 
have argued that his data do not support the assertion that there is a 
left wing authoritarianism. Certainly the survey studies of samples of 
the American voting age population do not provide this kind of evidence. 
Rokeach administered his dogmatism scale and the F scale to samples of 
English Communists and adherents of other English political parties. The 
Communists ranked lowest on the F scale and higher on the dogmatism scale, 
but on the latter the differences were not large enough to be considered 
statistically significant. The problem may be that the dogmatism scale
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(which is designed to measure the openness or closedness of a belief
system) and the opinionation scale— which is designed to measure the
extent to which people are rejected or accepted because of the beliefs
they hold, the leftness or the rightness of opinionation, and liberalism-
conservatism (opinionation is not included in this study)— do not
42measure that which they purport to measure.
However, they key to the character of an authoritarian is that
he has a closed belief system, changing his beliefs only when authorities
to whom he is highly responsive advocate policies or perceptions at
variance with his own beliefs. Non-authoritarians would require a
different kind of stimulus before they would change their beliefs; the
stimulus would be awareness of the logical inconsistency between their
43preferred values and professed beliefs.
An assumption in the study was that if an elite strongly agrees 
with each statement it would indicate that he possesses one extreme 
of the particular characteristic being tapped, and if he strongly dis­
agrees, that he possesses the opposite extreme. Some verbal statements 
from the Rokeach's form which he designed for the "average age person" 
were changed to be suitable for our samples, the political-bureaucratic 
elite, but the content was left unchanged. Each statement in the scale 
had to be designed to transcend specific ideological positions in order 
to penetrate to the formal and structural characteristics at all positions. 
We hope that this scale will show a clearer picture of the elite’s per­
sonality. The scale diverges equally to each end of a continuum;
42Ibid., pp. 80-87, 114.
43Roger Brown, Social Psychology (New York: The Free Press, 1965),
pp. 541-543.
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therefore, it can measure dogmatic capitalists or communists, Buddhists 
or non-Buddhists, "Westerners" or "non-Westerners," etc.
The Responses
The definitions of characteristics and the questionnaire which 
follow are borrowed from Rokeach's study. The number in parenthesis in 
front of each statement refers to the sequential number of the item in 
the questionnaire. The response is presented in a percentage. The few 
"No Opinion" scores in the response are ignored. The intensity of each 
statement in the structure is represented by the absolute score followed 
by each character heading and each statement. The degree of intensity 
ranges from +1 through 0 to -1, representing the highest (closedness) to 
the lowest (openness) degree of dogmatism.
I. Statements Involving the Belief-Disbelief Dimension. Composite Score 
+.52
I .1. Isolation within and between belief and disbelief systems. 
Composite Score +.31.
Isolation refers to the degree of segregation or lack of inter­
communication between neighboring regions or subregions. It 
is assumed that the more closed the system the greater the 
isolation between and within the belief and the disbelief 
systems.
I .1.a . Accentuation of differences between the belief
and the disbelief systems. Composite Score +.08.
(78) Nations which have opposing ideologies have 
nothing at all in common with one another.
Strongly Dis- Strongly
Agree Agree agree Disagree Total Score
37.1 %, 9.7 % 35.5 % 16.1 % 98.4 % +.08
44Percent is more or less than 100 because of rounding and "No 
Opinion" responses have been excluded.
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1.1.b. The coexistence of contradictions within the 
belief system. Composite Score +.54.
(96) The highest form of government is a democracy, 
and the highest form of democracy is a government 
run by those who are most intelligent.
Strongly Dis- Strongly
Agree Agree agree Disagree Total Score
75.8 % 11.3 % 4.8 % 4.8 % 96.7 % +.74
(101) Even though freedom of speech for all groups 
is a good goal, it is unfortunately necessary to 
restrict the freedom of certain political groups.
43.5 % 21.0 % 24.2 % 8.1 % 96.8 % +.34
1.2. Relative degree of differentiation of the belief and the 
disbelief systems. Composite Score +.72.
The belief system is assumed to be generally more differentiated 
than the disbelief system. It is further assumed that with an 
increase in closedness there will be less differentiation of 
disbelief subsystems with respect to each other; that is, 
different subsystems will be perceived as "the same."
1.2.a. Relative amount of knowledge possessed. Composite 
Score +.72.
(100) It is only natural that a person would have 
a much better knowledge of the ideas he believes in 
than ideas which he opposes.
54.8 % 38.7 % 4.8 % 0.0 % 98.3 % +.72
II. Statements Involving the Central-Peripheral Dimension. Composite 
Score +.50.
II.1. Specific content of primitive beliefs. Composite Score +.58.
The central region is composed of a constellation of "pre- 
ideological" primitive beliefs, for the most part unverbalized, 
that historically are prior to the rest of the beliefs in the 
system. These primitive beliefs are concerned with whether the 
world we live in is friendly or hostile, what the future has in 
store for us, the adequacy of the self, and what must be done to 
alleviate feelings of inadequacy. It is assumed that the more 
closed the system, the more will the content of such beliefs to be 
the effect that we live alone, isolated and helpless in a friendless 
world ; that we live in a world where the future is uncertain ; that 
the self is fundamentally unworthy and inadequate to cope alone with 
this friendless world; and that the way to overcome such feelings
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is by a self-aggrandizing and self-righteous identification with 
a cause, a concern with power and status, and by a compulsive 
self-proselytization about the justness of such a cause.
11.1.a. Beliefs regarding the aloneness, isolation, and 
helplessness of man. Composite Score +.15.
(83) I would like it if I would find someone 
who would tell me how to solve my personal 
problems.
Strongly Dis- Strongly
Agree Agree agree Disagree Total Score
77.4 % 12.9 % 6.5 % 0.0 % 96.8 % +.81
(77) Most people just do not give a "damn" for
others.
38.7 % 9.7 % 32.3 % 16.1 % 96.8 % +.11
(95) Man by himself is a helpless and miserable
creature.
30.6 % 3.2 % 43.5 % 22.6 % 99.9 % -.12
11.1.b. Beliefs regarding the uncertainty of the future. 
Composite Score +.47.
Fear of the future.
(79) It is only natural for a person to be rather 
fearful for the future.
51.6 % 35.5 % 11.3 % 0.0 % 98.4 % +.64
A feeling of urgency.
(90) There is so much to be done and so little time
in which to do it.
61.3 % 24.2 % 11.3 % 1.6 % 98.4 % +.66
Compulsive repetition of ideas and arguments (self- 
proselytization) .
(80) Once I get involved in a heated discussion,
I just cannot stop.
24.2 % 11.3 % 50.0 % 14.5 % 100.0 % -.10
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(88) In a discussion I often find it necessary to 
repeat myself several times to make sure I am being 
understood.
Strongly Dis- Strongly
Agree Agree agree Disagree Total Score
66.1 % 22.6 % 6.5 % 4.8 % 100.0 % +.69
(81) In a heated discussion, I generally become so 
involved in what I am going to say that I forget to 
listen to what others are saying.
12.9 % 9.7 % 51.6 % 22.6 % 96.8 % -.31
11.1.e. Beliefs about self-adequacy and inadequacy. Composite 
Score +.79.
Need for martyrdom.
(82) It is a better to be a dead hero than to be 
a live coward.
80.6 % 6.5 % 9.7 % 0.0 % 96.8 % +.79
11.1.d. Self-aggrandizement as a defense against self-inade­
quacy. Composite Score +.73.
Concern with power and status.
(84) Even though I do not like to admit this even 
to myself, my secret ambition is to become a great- 
man like Gandhi.
67.7 % 6.5 % 24.2 % 0.0 % 98.4 % +.59
(86) The main thing in life is for a person to want
to do something important.
72.6 % 19.4 % 6.5 % 1.6 % 100.1 % +.77
(89) If given the chance, I would do something of 
great benefit to the world.
72.6 % 24.2 % 1.6 % 0.0 % 98.47 % +.84
II.2. Formal content of intermediate belief region. Composite Score 
+.35.
In the intermediate region we have represented beliefs about 
the nature of positive and negative authority, ranging from 
rational at one extreme to arbitrary at the other, and beliefs
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about people, having to do with the extent to which people 
are accepted and rejected according to the positive and 
negative authorities they line up with. The more closed 
the belief-disbelief system, the more will authority be 
seen as absolute and the more will people be accepted and 
rejected because they agree or disagree with one's 
belief-disbelief system.
II.2.a. Authoritarianism. Composite Score +.27.
Beliefs in positive and negative authority.
(91) In the history of mankind, there have probably 
been just a very small number of really great thinkers.
Strongly Dis- Strongly
Agree Agree agree Disagree Total Score
58.1 % 21.0 % 17.7 % 0.0 % 96.8 % +.60
(92) There are a number of people I have come to 
hate because of things they stand for or believe in.
30.6 % 16.1 % 46.8 % 6.5 % 100.0 % +.09
Beliefs in the cause.
(97) A person who gets enthusiastic about too many 
causes is likely to be a "wishy-washy" or indecisive 
sort of person.
40.3 % 21.0 % 17.7 % 17.7 % 96.7 % +.24
(98) To compromise with our political opponents
is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal 
of our own side.
21.0 % 4.8 % 61.3 % 11.3 % 98.4 % -.19
(99) In times like these, a person must be pretty 
selfish if he considers primarily his own happiness.
53.2 % 17.7 % 22.6 % 4.8 % 98.3 % +.46
(102) Of all the different philosophies which exist 
in the world, there is probably only one which is 
correct.
25.8 % 3.2 % 53.2 % 16.1 % 98.3 % -.15
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(108) It is only when a person devotes himself 
to an idea or cause that life becomes meaningful.
Strongly Dis- Strongly
Agree Agree agree Disagree Total Score
61.3 % 24.2 % 14.5 % 0.0 % 100.0 % +.66
II.2.b. Intolerance. Composite Score +.42.
Toward the renegade ( persons adhering to disbelief
subsystems most similar to one's own belief 
systems— factional or renegade systems— are often 
likely to be perceived as especially threatening 
to validity of the belief system. We assure that 
this will become increasingly the case the more 
closed the system).
(103) A group which tolerate too many differences 
of opinion among its own members cannot exist for 
very long.
64.5 % 22.6 % 8.1 % 1.6 % 96.8 % +.70
(107) The worst crime a person could commit is to 
publicly attack the people who believe in the same 
thing as he does.
50.0 % 14.5 % 22.6 % 11.3 % 98.3 % +.35
Toward the disbeliever.
(85) A person who thinks primarily of his own 
happiness should be hated and despised.
72.6 % 12.9 % 12.9 % 1.6 % 100.0 % +.71
(87) There are two kinds of people in this world: 
Those who are for the truth and those who are 
against the truth.
61.3 % 17.7 % 17.7 % 3.2 % 99.9 % +.58
(104) Most ideas which get printed nowadays are 
not worth the paper they are printed on.
8.1 % 8.1 % 61.3 % 19.4 % 96.9 % -.38
II.3. Interrelations among primitive, intermediate, and peripheral 
beliefs. Composite Score +.57.
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The more closed the system, the more will a change in a 
particular peripheral belief be determined by a prior 
change in the intermediate (authority) region. Further, 
the primitive and intermediate regions are assumed to 
control not only what will be represented in the peripheral 
region but also what will not be represented.
II.3.a. Tendency to make a party-line change (referring
to a change in peripheral beliefs following a 
a change in intermediate beliefs. Composite 
Score +.58.
(106) It is often desirable to reserve judgment 
about what is going on until one has had a 
chance to hear the opinions of those one respects.
Strongly Dis- Strongly
Agree Agree agree Disagree Total Score
59.7 % 17.7 % 21.0 % 0.0 % 98.4 % +.58
Il.l.b. Narrowing (referring to the selective avoidance 
of contact with facts, events, etc., incongruent
with one's belief-disbelief system). Composite
Score +.54.
(105) In the long run, the best way to live is
choose friends and associates whose preferences
and beliefs are the same as one's own.
56.5 % 22.6 % 9.7 % 8.1 % 96.9 % +.55
III. Statements Involving the Time-Perspective Dimension. Composite Score 
+ .37.
It is assumed that the more closed the belief-disbelief system, the 
more will its organization be future or past oriented, and the more 
will the present be rejected as important in its own right. Expres­
sions of such a time perspective are to be found in one's attitude 
toward the past, present, and future, in the extent to which one feels 
able to appraise accurately or to understand the future, and in one' 
attitude toward the use of force as a way of revising the present.
III.l. Attitude toward the past, present, and future. Composite 
Score +.41.
(109) The present is all too often full of unhappiness; it 
only the future which counts.
54.8 % 14.5 % 12.9 % 14.5 % 96.7 % +.41
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III.2. Knowing the future. Composite Score +.33
(94) Unfortunately many people with whom I have discussed 
important social and moral problems do not really under­
stand what is going on.
Strongly Dis- Strongly
Agree Agree agree Disagree Total Score
58.1 % 11.3 % 22.6 % 6.5 % 98.5 % +.46
(110) Most people just do not know what is good for them.
33.9 % 24.2 % 21.0 % 16.1 % 95.2 % +.19
The Findings
The Laotian elite scored rather high (+.38) in dogmatism. This 
degree of intensity means that their basic beliefs are relatively closed.
As Rokeach r e l a t e s , t h e  more closed the belief system the more difficult 
for the elite to distinguish between information received about the world 
and information received about the source. What the external sources 
say is true about the world, becomes all mixed up with what the external 
source wants the elite to believe is true and what it wants the elite do 
about it. The elite finds it difficult to distinguish the two kinds of 
information received from the source, they have a limited capacity to 
receive, evaluate, and act on information in terms of inner experience.
Conversely, the elites have little ability to evaluate or act on 
information and proceed in accord with the inner structural requirements 
of the situation. They are governed in their actions less by internal 
self-actualizing forces than by irrational inner forces. One important 
implication here is that the elites have little strength to resist externally 
imposed reinforcements or rewards and punishments.
^^Rokeach, op. cit., p. 58.
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In looking at the three dimensions of dogmatism, there are some 
variations among them. For the first dimension, the belief-disbelief 
continuum, the absolute score is +.51, which is relatively high and higher 
than the total score of the Laotian elites on dogmatism. Based upon this 
finding, one would expect the elites to depend on irrelevant internal 
drives and on arbitrary reinforcement from external authority. The relation 
among their beliefs, according to dogmatism theory, depended on such 
irrelevant considerations rather than on considerations of logical consis­
tency. The isolation between parts is believed to reflect a tendency not 
to relate beliefs to the inner requirements of logical consistency. For 
example, they agreed overwhelmingly (score +.74) with the statement that 
"the highest form of government is a democracy and the highest form of 
democracy is a government run by those who are most intelligent." The 
response to this statement also indicates, beside dogmatism, that the 
Laotian elites expressed their favor of "authoritarian democracy." They 
are unlikely to believe that the masses are able to make wise decision for 
running the country.
On the central-peripheral dimension, the response indicates that 
the elites' sense of "self-aggrandizement," as anticipated, is the highest 
scoring item. In particular, the secret ambition to be a great man (like 
Gandhi or other heroes) was found to be +.59; their intention of doing 
something important in their lives was found to be +.77; and the highest 
score on the dogmatism scale was reached on the statement which said that 
if given a chance they would do a great thing for the world (score +.84). 
Another high score was that on martyrdom (score +.79). They feel an 
urgency to do things (+.66) and feared the unpredictable situation in Laos, 
+.64. The elites disgreed with the statements that contended that this
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world is a lonesome place and that man is helpless creature. They seemed 
to believe that the printed ideas nowadays are worthwhile in one way 
or another, and their minds were open to the existing theories in the 
world today.
Considering the time-perspective dimension, the Laotian elite were 
mostly oriented to the present and only slightly oriented to the future.
This means that they are slightly less able to appraise or to understand 
the future. They generally disagreed with the statement that "most people 
do not know what is good for them."
The psychological trait of dogmatism has been shown to affect the 
quality of the elite's political activity. The trait theoretically refers 
to the structure, as opposed to the content, of the elite's belief system.
We are likely to conclude that they have some difficulty in assimilating 
new information. Consequently, they are likely to reject information out­
right if it conflicts with their belief or they may perceptually distort 
the information so that they can accept it (for instance, they can support 
Prince Souphanouvong as leader because he is a prince, the same as Prince 
Souvanna Phouma). They may accept— but not necessary Integrate— the new 
information if it comes from a valued authority; or if the change in beliefs 
required by information from a positive authority is too great, they may 
devalue the authority. For example, the elite may think that the monarchy 
needs to be abolished, or the "people's democracy" is much better than 
the "idealistic imperialist democracy." It is evident that a member of 
the elite can change his support for the Lao monarchy and join the move­
ment toward a people's democracy— accepting wholly, as a matter of faith, 
dogma stemming from a positively valued authority.
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Jeanne Knutson cites the usefulness of the dogmatism study as 
follows: "we have been able to discuss psychodynamics without needing
to take up the more difficult problem of psychogenesis." For a better 
illumination of the elite's personality, we shall go on to observe some 
other traits in the following section.
Other-Directedness
The concept of externalized superego implies the operation of 
some external sources to serve the functions of discouraging socially 
disapproved behavior. Aside from supernatural authority, these sanctions 
operate through persons who evaluate and then either sanction or condemn.
As appropriate roles for different situations are learned, however, a 
kind of pre-censorship takes place so that sanctioned behavior is normally 
produced. A person's social antennae sense what others expect and, thus, 
he avoids ridicule and condemnation. This is the "radar" system to which 
David Riesman refers in explaining the concept of "other-directedness 
Cultures in which the superego is modally externalized are "other-directed" 
cultures since "others" perform the function of the superego.
To be more specific about the "other" in "other-diectedness," the 
elite may be "directed" toward colleagues, superiors (if any), or inferiors 
in terms of their status rankings and may be directed toward editorial mass- 
media and other sources from their environment. Among the other-directed- 
ness of "those who are changing," Leonard Doob observes that "in comparison 
with those who remain unchanged or those who have changed, people changing
46Jeanne N. Knutson, Handbook of Political Psychology (San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1973), p. 48.
47Riesman, op. cit., p. 22.
203
from old to new ways are likely to be generally sensitive to other people.
He feels that this "sensitivity" is heightened since one is continually 
testing to see if his behavior is appropriate to the new group or situa­
tion. Riesman writes:
What is common to all other-directedness is that their contem­
poraries are the source of direction for the individual . . . .
The goals for which the other-directed person strives may shift 
. . .  it is only the process of striving itself and the process 
of paying close attention to the signals from others that remain 
unaltered throughout life.49
Other-directedness, when looked at from a slightly different analy­
tical perspective, as James Scott has suggested, is similar to "role- 
adaptability,"^^ The other-directed man is able to adjust to new situa­
tions so that his belief and behavior "fit in" the new social environment.
It is observed by social scientists that in the most transitional societies 
other-directedness is also "upper-" directedness.
As the data in Table 6 indicate, other-directedness was found 
in avery low degree of intensity among the Laotian elite (score -.42, see 
Appendix A for details). This intensity indicates that the elite's minds 
are slightly "closed" to external pressures such as we found in the dog­
matism score. This characteristic might result from the circumstance that 
they are already at the top of the ladder and have no other "upper" to 
direct them. From the other viewpoint, we may think that they are "non-other- 
directed" because of dominance in their character.
48Leonard W. Doob, Becoming More Civilized: A Psychological
Exploration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), p. 135.
49Riesman, op. cit.
James C. Scott, Political Ideology in Malaysia (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1968), p. 144.
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53. One should not become a close friend of 
someone who does not pay any attention to 
the common social customs of the group. 58.1 14.5 12.9 14.5 0.0 100.0 - .44
54. A person should strive to be successful 
even if it means he will be unpopular and 
others will be jealous of him. 77.4 14.5 6.5 1.6 0.0 100.0 — . 80
55. It is important not to dress or act very 
differently from other people or else 
you will lose their respect. 58.1 22.6 17.7 0.0 1.6 100.0 -.61
56. My opinion is almost never swayed at all 
by editorials in the newspapers. 37.1 12.9 33.9 16.1 0.0 100.0 -.11
57. As long as I do what I think is right, 
it does not matter at all what my 
family, friend, and community think 
of me. 33.9 17.7 37.1 9.7 1.6 100.0 -.15
Average 52.9 16.5 21.6 8.4 0.6 100.0 -.42
Note : Scores are presented in percentages.
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Aaxlety
One characteristic that seems to affect individual behavior in 
every sphere is anxiety. Gordon Allport defines anxiety as "a diffuse, 
irrational fear, not directed at an appropriate target and not controlled 
by self-insight."^^ He adds that "like a grease spot, it has spread
52throughout the life and stains the individual's social relationships."
In this disorder, the individual suffers from an irrational 
sense of distress arising from an unconscious source, the feeling that 
something terrible is going to happen, and displaces this feeling onto 
specific objects or situations. Anxiety reactions are responses to 
danger which the individual feels but does not recognize. These responses 
are out of proportion to any apparent cause; this is because they arise 
from situations touching sensitive areas deep within the personality 
(unresolved conflicts, forbidden impulses, disturbing memories) which threaten
self-esteem and well-being. Anxiety occurs when all devices and defense 
mechanisms which are commonly used to ward off anxiety, such as compensa­
tion, protection, or rationalization, have failed or have never been uti­
lized. Such situations occur in persons motivated by unfulfilled basic 
53needs. As anxiety develops, it becomes increasingly introverted, con­
scientious , and usually creates unrealistically high standards that lay a 
person open to feelings or failure and guilt.
^^Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Garden City: 
Doubleday & Co., 1954), p. 364.
^̂ Ibid.
53Maslow, Motivation and Personality. For a comprehensive study 
of the basic needs and politics, see Jeanne Knutson, The Human Basis 
of the Polity (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1972), chapter 2.
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There are number of schools in psychology which use the concept
of anxiety in roughly the same sense. Although there is a general
agreement about what anxiety is and its significance as an important
personality characteristic, there are substantive controversies. For
example, Eysenck regards anxiety as a product of the two more fundamental
54personality traits of neurotism and introvertism, while Cattell and 
Scheier break it down into the five subfactors of guilt, ergic tension, 
poor-ego strength, suspiciousness, and poorly developed self-sentiment.^^ 
Other-psychologists, Gellhorn and Loofbourrow, for example, think of 
anxiety as a unity trait dependent largely on the dominance of the sym­
pathetic nervous system.
Anxiety, as used in our study is conceptualized as a personality 
trait or dimension, measurable both by psychological tests, such as 
questionnaires, and psychological tests of the reactivity of the systematic 
nervous system. Various measurements of anxiety which have been employed 
in questionnaire forms have been developed by many scholars, for example, 
by G. Welsh, I. Sarason, I. Janis, R. Lane, and J. Taylor.
J. Eysenck, The Biological Basis of Personality (Springfield: 
Charles C. Thomas, 1967).
^^Raymond B. Cattell and I. H. Cheier, Measurement of Neuroticism 
and Anxiety (New York: Ronald Press, 1961).
^^E. Gellhorn and G. N. Loofbourrow, Emotions and Emotional 
Disorders (New York: Harper & Row, 1963). For more details of the
literature on anxiety, see R. Lynn, Personality and National Character 
(Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1971), pp. 19-23.
^^G. S. Welsh, "An Anxiety Index and an Internationalization Ratio 
for the MMPI," Journal of Consulting Psychology, 16 (February, 1952), 
65-72; I. G. Sarason, "Empirical Findings and Theoretical Problems in 
the Use of Anxiety Scales," Psychological Bulletin, 57 (September, 1960), 
403-415; Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology (New York: The Free Press
of Glencoe, 1962); Lane employed a 24 item anxiety scale developed by 
Sarason and I. Janis and revised for that particular occasion by David
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In our study, as the responses that be shown in Table 7, 
we found that the Laotian elites scored at the center between low and 
high (+.01 in social anxiety and +.04 in neurotic anxiety). At this 
level we can speculate that they are emotionally stable and seem to be 
in no danger from serious worry and nervous tension.
In its middle range, anxiety manifests itself as nervous energy 
or "strained or solicitions desire," and it is here that it is used in 
the sense of the person being anxious to achieve something. This usage 
has a slight connotation of worry, but the chief implication is one of 
strong motivation. It is only when anxiety becomes intense that it 
becomes a neurotic condition which both induces unhappiness and interferes 
with endeavor. It is probably advantageous to have a moderate level of 
anxiety such that it manifests itself as strong motivation, although 
it is disadvantageous for the anxiety to be so high that it turns into 
neurosis. The anxiety can be either useful or otherwise, depending on 
its degree of intensity.
The specific influences for individual or group differences in
anxiety present an intriguing problem. Each individual or group has its
own particular pattern, experiences, environments, and hereditary, and
58may have a different level of anxiety. In this study we will not be 
concerned with the sources of the influences but the level.
Sears (this is the scale we have adapted for this study); and J. A. Taylor 
"A Personality Scale of Manifest Anxiety," Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, 48 (January, 1953), 285-290.
58For example, Lynn’s study found that national anxiety levels 
were significant influenced by affluence, degree of urbanization, political 
instability, the strength of religious conviction, the speed of economic 

















20. How nervous are you when you have to talk 
in front of a group of several people? 11.3 32.3 33.9 19.4 3.2 100.1 -.09
21. When you are doing a job, how much does 
the fear that you might not be doing too 
well keep you from doing your best? 14.5 27.4 38.7 14.5 4.8 99.9 -.06
22. How much do you worry when your superior 
tells you to come to see him without 
telling you why he wants to see you? 19.4 29.0 25.8 22.6 3.2 100.0 -.02
23. How much do you worry about how well 
you get along with people? 9.7 30.6 33.9 21.0 4.8 100.0 -.13
24. When you have been in a situation in 
which you have done poorly or made some 
mistake, how do you keep on worrying 
about it? 25.8 46.8 24.2 1.6 1.6 100.0 +. 36
Average 16.1 33.2 31.3 15.8 3.5 100.0 +.01
TABLE 7 (Continued)
A Good A Not No Absolute
Statements A lot Deal Little At All Opinion Total Score
NEUROTIC ANXIETY
25. How afraid are you when you hear thunder 
or see lightening? 11.3 38.7 41.9 8.1 0.0 100.0 +.02
26. When you go to a dentist, how much do 
you find yourself worrying about the
pain you will feel? 14.5 22.6 48.4 14.5 0.0 100.0 -.13
27. How often do you have trouble going to 
sleep because you are worrying about 
something that has happened to you or
some thought you have had? 19.4 27.4 46.8 4.8 1.6 100.0 +.05oVO
28. How often do you feel restless on 
holidays, when you have nothing in
particular to do ? 19.4 25.8 48.4 6.5 0.0 100.1 +.02
29. When you are in a high place, how
frightened are you when you look down? 4.8 24.2 64.5 6.5 0.0 100.0 -.22
30. How often do you feel uneasy or uncom­
fortable without knowing why you are
feeling that way? 9.7 12.9 67.7 9.7 0.0 100.0 -.27
31. In comparison to other people you know, 
how much do you worry about your














32. When you go to the doctor (or when he 
comes to you) because you do not feel well, 
how worried are you about what the doctor 
will say is wrong with you? 22.6 61.3 12.9 1.6 1.6 100.0 +.45
33. How often in the past year have you had 
nightmares or dreams from which you have 
awakened feeling nervous or frightened? 19.4 54.8 21.0 3.2 1.6 100.0 +.33
34. How much do you worry about your mental 
health, in comparison to other people you 
know? 14.5 35.5 35.5 11.3 3.2 100.0 +.03
35. How often do you find it hard to pay atten­
tion to your work because disturbing or 
frightening thoughts come in to your mind? 46.8 6.5 45.2 0.0 1.6 100.1 +.28
36. In comparison with other people of your age, 
how nervous do you feel about fighting with 
someone? 41.9 25.8 17.7 12.9 1.6 99.9 +.33
37. How often do you find yourself worrying 
about a particular person, situation or 
happening, even though you know that there 













38. How afraid of drowning are you when you 
are near a body of water, in swimming, 
or in a boat? 16.1 25.8 43.5 14.5 0.0 99.9 -.07
Average 19.2 30.0 40.2 9.7 1.0 100.1 +.04
Note: Scores are presented in percentages. Total is more or less than 100 because of rounding.
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After a detailed review of the literature, Sarason offers some 
general conclusions that high scorers on anxiety have been found to be 
more self-deprecatory, more self-preoccupied, and generally have less 
control over themselves and the lower scorers in the distribution of 
anxiety senses. These differences are most likely to be seen in the 
subject's ability to cope with various situations, thus, differences 
in behavior and attitude may appear in stress situations. In other 
words, subjects can be differentiated in the response tendencies 
activated by personality threatening conditions with interest in, effort 
on, and attention to the task at hand. High scorers respond to threats 
with self-oriented, personalized responses. In conditiond requiring 
an automatic responses, those high on anxiety do better; in more 
complex situations, the situation is reversed. Knutson also concludes 
that it is possible to use the anxiety scale to measure the way in which
psychologically deprived individuals cope with deep-seated personality
. 59needs.
The results of these previous studies indicate that anxiety is 
a useful dimension in studying political behavior on both the macro-level 
and the micro-level— such as in the decision-making processes in some 
particular situation^^ Our findings were not in agreement with Rokeach's 
statement that "dogmatism and anxiety are clearly shown to emerge together 
as part of a single psychological factor In this case we found that 
there is no significant correlation between them (r = -.11, p.<C.05 for
59Knutson, op. cit., p. 139.
^^See the study of the effects of anxiety in politics in 
F. Neumann, "Anxiety in Politics," in Identity and Anxiety, ed. by M. R. 
Stein, A. J. Vidich, and D. M. White (New York: The Free Press, 1960),
pp. 269-290.
Rokeach, op. cit., p. 349.
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social anxiety, and r = -.03 for neurotic anxiety). However, we found 
a significant relationship between authoritarianism and social anxiety 
(r = -.40, p.<.05). (See Ititercorrelation Matrix of Elite Traits in 
Appendix A.)
In the literature of political anxiety, a constant theme has 
been the crippling effects of anxiety. It has been suggested that each 
of the psychologically deprived groups will, for different reasons, have 
anxieties that will interfere with the way in which they handle the pro­
blems which the world presents to them. Anxiety will color their inter­
personal relation as well. Erikson states as his first clinical postulate
that there is no anxiety without somatic tension seems 
immediately obvious; but we must also learn that there is no 
individual anxiety which does not reflect a latent concern 
common to the intermediate and extended group. An individual 
feels isolated and barred from the sources of collective 
strength when he (even though only secretly) takes on a 
role considered especially evil, be it that of a drunkard 
or a killer, a sissy or a sucker, or whatever colloquial 
designation of inferiority may be used in this g r o u p .
While Lasswell^^ postulates the non-existence of "anxiety free personali­
ties" in modern society, it has been frequently demonstrated that 
Individuals do differ in the amount of their latent and their manifest 
anxiety.
Summary
In the personality domain we have found in the Laotian elite 
moderately high degrees of authoritarian and dogmatism, with a somewhat
62Erik Erikson, Childhood and Society, rev. ed. (New York: W. W.
Norton & Co., 1963), p. 35.
^^Harold D. Lasswell, "Political Constitution and Character," 
Psychoanalysis and Psychoanalytic Review, 46 (Winter, 1956), 3-18).
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higher degree of "own-directedness." Their characteristics of social
and neurotic anxiety are found to be at the normal level.
It should be mentioned here that personality alone is not
synonymous with behavior. Yet neither is there a one-to-one relationship
between cultural or situational factors and elites’ actions. While the
concern of this chapter is general personality factors, a knowledge
of their influences will only be of value in studying political behavior
when they are considered in relation to cultural and situational factors.
64These are considered in the following chapter.
See R. R. Sears, "Social Behavior and Personality Development," 
in Toward a General Theory of Action, ed. by Talcott Parsons and Neil 
Smelser (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 465-478.
Sears notes that "to describe a person as having ’high emotionality’ or 
’low sensitivity’ or ’diffuse anxiety’ is acceptable only if other 
variables are added that will, together with these personal properties, 
signify what kind of behavior can be expected from him under some 
specific circumstances." (p. 477).
CHAPTER VI
SOCIO-ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES
In the previous chapters, we have discussed a great deal of 
the background of Lao society and several aspects of the personality of 
the Laotian elite. Such study is a part of exploring the basic beliefs 
and value orientations which, as mentioned, constitute the core of the 
elite's consciousness about political behavior.
According to Florence Kluckhohn and Fred Strodtbeck,! (1) all 
societies face a limited number of common human problems, which must 
be solved; (2) the range of possible solutions is limited, neither 
random nor limitless; and (3) some solutions to problems are differ­
entially preferred. Based on these assumptions, they single out the 
modes of value orientations that were presented in Chapter IV. In this 
framework every group of persons is believed to have a rank order of 
value orientations, and these values, taken together, constitute the 
"personality" of that society. According to this theory, the nature 
of the rank order is considerably influenced by the culture into which 
one was b o m .  This chapter is intended to present the elite's value 
orientations concerning human nature, Lao and global society, and 
economics. Viewing the elite with regard to these values will present 
a clear picture of their political culture and personality.
^Florence Kluckhohn and Fred Strodtbeck, Variations in Value 
Orientations (Evanston; Row, Peterson and Company, 1961), pp. 10-12.
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The Elite's Values of Human Nature
It would be difficult to overstate the importance of a man's 
estimate of human nature in influencing the construction of his politi­
cal beliefs. Seeing human nature as good, neutral, or evil has an 
effect on how one views the nature of others and whether cooperation 
with others for common ends is considered possible. Specifically, in 
Lao society, conceptions of good or evil in people are based on merit—  
the accumulation of doing good.
Tliere are several reasons for expecting some conceptions of 
human nature to be reflected in political behavior. First, political 
beliefs often contain implicit assumptions about human nature. For 
example, the democratic doctrine assumes that most citizens are suf­
ficiently rational to govern themselves. Such an assumption takes for 
granted a certain minimum level of reasonableness and concern for 
others as fundamental to human nature. Secondly, since a political 
system basically involves people in action, the individual's view of 
human nature is likely to be linked to his evaluation of how well the 
system actually works. Thirdly, the individual's stand on certain 
specific political questions may be influenced by his assumptions 
about the nature of man, e.g., the belief that men are fundamentally 
selfish may induce the individual to socialism because it stresses 
economic equality as a means of overcoming individual selfishness. 
Public policies made by the elite are usually based on assunctions 
about people, or, more to the point, the value orientation of the 
elite toward human nature.
217
Levels of Faith-in-People
Some scepticism and even cynicism about human nature is proba­
bly not absent from any culture. A measure of scepticism is common in 
every society, but its degree will vary from culture to culture.% The 
degree of scepticism is crucial as it determines what the dominant 
orientation is toward the human nature of the elite.
Our findings indicate that the Laotian elites are likely to 
view the people as good but corruptible (absolute score -.07). For 
the sake of clarity a cross-cultural comparison is attempted here.
Using the same questionnaire, as that employed here,3 Gabriel Almond 
and Sidney Verba measured the level of faith-in-people in their study 
of political culture in five nations.^ The same questionnaire was also 
used by James Scott in his study of political ideology of a Malaysian 
elite.5 Table 8 below shows the con^arison. Since the Laotian elite 
study contains 62 respondents, while Almond and Verba's figures are 
for an "N" of roughly 1,000, the comparison can only be suggestive. 
However, Scott's Malaysian scores are based on only 17 subjects, so 
comparison may not be useless. Both our own and Scott's subjects are 
the political-bureaucratic elite which provides an initial basis for 
comparative study.
%Ibid.. chapter 1.
^Ihe questionnaire is borrowed from Morris Rosenberg, "Misan­
thropy and Political Ideology," American Journal of Sociology, 21 
(1956), 690-695.
^Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, Tlie Civic Culture (Boston; 
Little, Brown and Company, 1965).
5James C. Scott, Political Ideology in Malaysia (New Haven: 
ïale University Press, 1968).
TABLE 8
LAOTIAN ELITES' PERCEPTIONS OF SOCIAL TRUST, 
COMPARED WITH PERCEPTIONS REPORTED IN OTHER 
NATIONAL SURVEYS
Percentage who agree




17. If you do not watch yourself, people will 
take advantage of you. 65 75 81 73 94 100 100
18. No one is going to care much what happens 
to you, when you get right down to it.
Trust:
38 45 72 61 78 76 79
15. Most people can be trusted. 55 49 19 7 30 18 40
16. Most people are inclined to help 
others. 31 28 15 5 15 12 79
19. Human nature is fundamentally cooperative. " 80 84 58 85 82 88 82
N 970 963 955 955 1,007 17 62
N5
Source ; Data for United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Mexico are taken from Gabriel Almond 
and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1965), p. 213. Data 
for Malaysia are taken from James C. Scott, The Political Ideology in Malaysia (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1968).
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The responses to Items 17 and 18 show the high degree of pessi­
mism among the elite, higher than any other country for which data are 
available. About the same level of trust-to-people exists in Laos as 
in other nations in the table as indicated by the response to the 
statement; "human nature is fundamentally cooperative." Exceptions 
to this finding are Germany and Italy, whose scores are far below the 
others. The Laotian elite believe that "most people are inclined to 
help others"; 79 percent of the respondents agree with this statement, 
which is remarkably higher than the level in the other nations. Even 
though the Laotian elite appears to believe such help is the inclina­
tion of human nature, they also believe living in the world today 
requires that one must watch oneself in order that evil people do not 
take advantage of a person. This is shown by the 100 percent agreement 
with statement 17. Here is evidence of the cultural skepticism alluded 
to earlier.
The responses of the Laotian elites seemed conflicting. While 
they agree in the magnitude of 79 percent with the faith-in-people 
item which contends that "most people are inclined to help others," 
they express their distrust very strongly on the statement that "if you 
do not watch yourself, people will take advantage of you." It can, 
therefore, be hypothesized that the distrust the Laotians are exhibiting 
in the latter case might be attitudes reflecting what they believe to 
be major problems in the world; (1) a scarcity of goods, which leads 
to a struggle for advantage in the face of such a scarcity; and (2) a 
feeling that the present Lao society is a normless or anomic one in 
which people seek to rid themselves of each other to achieve relative
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advantage. We shall consider the former case in the section following 
and the latter in the subsequent one.
Constant-Pie Orientation
Scott, in his study of the Malaysian elite's ideology, found
that more than 60 percent of the sample believed in a concept of a fixed
social product. He also found that the impact of the concept was upon
the distribution of justice, the fragility of political cooperation,
and some other political implications. Scott labels such a conception
as "constant-pie," to mean "an orientation which assumes a fixed
scarcity of desired material g o o d s . H e  explains;
The "pie" cannot be enlarged that all might have larger 
"slices" but is constant, so that much of political and 
economic life is seen as constituting a struggle of one 
individual, family, group, or nation to expand its slice 
at the expense of the other individuals, families, groups, 
or nations.^
Such an orientation is believed to be a basic cause of war, both inter­
national and domestic, because there is not enough to go around.
Asking for reactions to the statement "Even in a rich country, 
if population grows rapidly, there is great danger that there will 
soon not be enough to go around," should tap attitudes about the con­
cept of "fixed goods." The Laotian elites agreement is to be found at 
the lower range of the scale for this statement. The agreement is
51.6 percent (absolute score of +.11). This figure may be compared 
to the Malaysian score of 60 percent agreement, which reflects greater 
concern over the issue among Malaysian respondents. Tlie Lao elite
Gibid.. p. 94. 
h b l d .
TABLE 9
LAOTIAN ELITES' ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CONSTANT-PIE 









58. Even in a rich country, if population 
grows rapidly, there is great danger 
that there will soon not be enough to 
go around. 30.6 21.0 37.1 11.3 0.0 100.0 + .11
59. Those who get ahead get ahead usually 
at the expense of others. 11.3 9.7 66.1 11.3 1.6 100.0 -.28
60. When an individual or group gains, it 
usually means that another individual 
or group loses. 62.9 16.1 19.4 0.0 1.6 100.0 +. 61
61. Any government that wants to help the 
poor people will have to take something 
away from the rich in order to do it. 53.2 17.7 12.9 16.1 0.0 99.9 + .40
Ave rage 39.5 16.1 33.9 9.7 0.8 100.0 +.21
Note; Scores are presented in percentages. "Total" is more or less than 100 because of rounding. 
The scale is borrowed from James C. Scott, Political Ideology in Malaysia (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1968), p. 284.
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rejected the statement that "those who get ahead get ahead at the 
expense of others," as can be seen by the 66.1 percent disagree response.
The endorsement of the Hobbesian attitude towards political and 
economic life, on the one hand, and the belief in social norms of 
economic equality, on the other, appear in the +.61 score showing over­
whelming agreement with the statement that "when an individual or group 
gains, it usually means that another individual or group loses." Further­
more, our elite subjects agreed that "any government that wants to help 
the poor people will have to take something away from the rich in order 
to do it," (score +.40). The belief in the socialist norm of economic 
equality will also be observed in more specific statements in sub­
sequent sections. Taken together, the statements demonstrate that the 
Laotian elite has a slightly pessimistic attitude about the world.
Comparing the constant-pie orientation scores with three out 
of four scale items used in England by Robert Putnam® and also by 
Scott in Malaysia indicate that the Laotian elites are strikingly 
higher than respondents in either Britain or Malaysia on two of the 
items (see Table 10). Items 60 and 61 yield scores of +.61 and +.40, 
respectively, indicating greater support for the constant-pie thesis.
Turning now to the second component of pessimism, we shall 
discuss whether the Laotian elites see their society as normless 
(anomic) or as a healthy one. The concept of anomie and its study are 
presented in some detail before proceeding to the findings in Laos.
®Robert Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians; The Ideology, Con­
flict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy (New Haven; Yale University 
Press, 1973).
TABLE 10
LAOTIAÎi ELITES’ ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CONSTANT-PIE THEORY 
OF ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION, COMPARED WITH ATTITUDES 









59. Tnose who get ahead usually get ahead at the 
expense of others. -.20 -.26 + .16 -.28
(N=23) (N=85) (N=82) (N=62)
60. When an individual or group gains, it usually 








61. Any government that wants to help the poor 
people will have to take something away from 








Average -.10 -.18 +.15 +.24
1 The scores are presented in absolute scores (with the possible range from +1 through -1).
2 The British data are taken from Robert Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians (Yale University Press, 
1973); the Malaysian data are from Scott, Political Ideology in Malaysia, p. 102.
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Anomia
In recent years, a good deal of behavioral research has included 
an interest of anomie— a state of normlessness in society, character­
ized variously by the breakdown of social cohesion, the use of unapproved 
means to attain socially desirable goals, or the meaninglessness of 
social regulations governing behavior, conflict between belief systems, 
or the disintegration of belief systems. Traditionally, social scientists 
have been concerned with anomie as an objective, sociological reality 
and have dealt with questions involving its socially structured causes.
The relative amount of anomie present in a given society at a particu­
lar time, social groups in which it is likely to be found, and its 
relation to the sociological problems (such as various forms of devi- 
ancy) have been major foci of research into this area. The research 
follows the approach first defined by Durkheim. However, because of 
the difficulty of measuring anomie directly, sociologists have been 
forced to employ measures of individual behavior. Even this approach 
has not been entirely satisfactory though, be^'iuse such acts as 
anomic suicide and withdrawal from social pursuits because of perceived 
meaninglessness may occur in a non-anomic society. Moreover, an 
anomic society may contain many persons who do not display anomic pat­
terns of behavior at all despite being surrounded by such behavior.
Other research, recognizing the differential existence of 
anomie in any given group, has studied anomie from the viewpoint of 
the individual: as a subjective, psychological condition marked by
disaffection of the individual from his social environment. To 
indicate the difference in emphasis, of this research, Leo Srole has 
coined the term "anomia" to distinguish it from the social state of
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"anomie,”^ The condition that he describes is also sometimes referred 
to as "alienation," a psychological and social state which, it is 
maintained by some writers, represents a separate dimension from either 
"anomia" and "anomie." Such a definition leads many writers to use 
anomia and alienation interchangeably. However, it is felt in the 
deepest sense that anomia is alienation although the opposite is not 
always true.
According to Robert K. M e r t o n , t h e  sociological concept of 
anomie clearly refers to objective conditions; "Anomie refers to a 
property of a social system, not to state of mind of this or that 
individual within the system. It refers to a breakdown of social 
standards governing behavior and so also signifies little social 
c o h e s i o n . A n o m i e ,  it is hypothesized by Merton, comes about in the 
United States because while upward mobility is considered an absolute 
value, the differential access to the opportunity structure causes 
appreciable numbers of people to become estranged from a society that 
promises them in principle what they are denied in reality. This 
withdrawal of allegiance from one or another part of prevailing social 
standards is what we mean, in the end, by anomie.1%
9por an excellent discussion of the whole area of anomie, see 
J. M. Yinger, "On Anomie," Journal of Scientific Study of Religion, 3 
(1964), 158-173.
l^See Robert K. Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie," in 
Social Theory and Social Structure, ed. by Robert K. Merton (Glencoe, 
111.: The Free Press, 1949).
f
^^Robert K. Merton, "Anomie, Anomia, and Social Integration: 
Contexts of Deviant Behavior," in Anomie and Deviant Behavior, ed. by 
M. li. Clinard (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p. 226.
IZlbid., p. 218.
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To S. de Grazla as well as Merton, such anomie stems not from 
a lack of rules, but rather, from conflict between the directives of 
two belief systems. De Grazia notes that one belief system, which 
represents the religio-political dimension, is based on familial inclu­
siveness, equality, and solidarity. The other type of belief system 
is economic, representative of m o d e m  capitalism, which stresses com­
petition; its directives conflict with those of the cooperative 
religio-political value system. This, in de Grazia's terminology, is 
"simple anomie" and its symptom is the need for belongingness or 
affection, which m o d e m  life does not s a t i s f y . A c u t e  anomie is then 
defined as the disintegration of the community of beliefs, due to the 
inability or indifference of the rulers. Its typical symptom is 
"anxiety accompanied by the image of a menacing w o r l d . I n  other 
words, anomie arises not simply because some people have no access to 
opportunities for social mobility, but because of (1) the conflict in 
value systems and/or (2) the perceived indifference of the rulers.
Anomie, then, is the condition of denying legitimacy to and 
failing to be guided by official standards and rules. Merton talks 
about anomie in a theory of social deviance that can be explained in 
Marxian terms. When the legal and cultural norms no longer reflect 
the social group's desires, when behavioral expectations are not 
clear, then an anomic condition exists. Perhaps social control, the
13S. de Grazia, The Political Community, A Study of Anomie
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 72, 107.
l^De Grazia discussion, in Gaetano Mosca's terms, of the dif­
ficulties which arise when the ruler and the ruled belong to two
different environments offers some fascinating parallels to, for 
example, modern American ghetto problems.
227
use of authority and power, will bring the society back into line with 
official standards; or, perhaps questioning and deviant individuals 
will act as the antithesis througji which a new synthesis is possible. 
Certainly, it is often an accurate description of social conditions to 
explain the disjunction between official norms and actual behavior in 
such a way; it is also possible to empirically test such a proposition. 
That is, it is possible to measure whether official norms of behavior 
(as taught in schools or religions and as pronounced by government 
officials, etc.) are (1) agreed with verbally and (2) conformed to 
behaviorally. However, neither the existence of anomia nor faulty 
socialization can be equated with a disintegration of social structure.
In view of the great importance in the behavioral literature 
of the concept of anomie-anomia as a means of assessing the possibil­
ities of both social integration and political stability, it behooves 
us to question what light personality measures can throw on the 
subject as well as what inferences can reasonably be made from anomie 
to anomia or vice versa. If, for example, there is a conflict between 
the economic and community beliefs systems, is this conflict differ­
entially perceived? According to Merton, the answer is affirmative: 
those groups whose upward striving is unsuccessful will be those whose 
social bonds will weaken. Merton also mentions that personality 
factors are likely to enter in. It is possible that those who feel 
that the competitive nature of the economy is destroying the coopera­
tive social framework will be those, throughout the social structure, 
whose personality needs lead them to perceive the world as hostile 
and unmanageable.
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Even if the disjunction or disintegration of values is equally 
perceived, will not personality shape individual response? De Grazia 
discusses several factors which determine what an individual's adjust­
ment to anomia will be. A major factor is the "incidence of anomie, 
simple or acute, in the community." "Once the perception that many 
others are in the same miserable state occurs, a greater inclination 
appears toward attempting adjustments in c o n c e r t . B u t  does not the 
desire to attempt "adjustments" also depend upon the individual's 
view of whether or not the sociopolitical world "is adjustable"— that 
is responsive to individual or group action? If action is keyed to 
"the perception" of widespread, deteriorating socioeconomic condi­
tions, does not personality— as well as objective conditions—  
determine the manner in which conditions are perceived? When one is 
concerned with "behavior or perception," personality predispositions 
are again variables that must be considered.
It appears essential to attempt to separate persons who deny 
legitimacy to and fail to be guided by official standards, rules, and 
mores from persons who feel strong ties to the dominant belief system—  
a system which is viable for them— and who nevertheless feel personal 
despair about their own life chances. In other words, it appears 
possible to separate individua1-to-society alienation from alienation 
of individual-to-himself. It is possible that a person can perceive 
his social world as meaningful and purposeful in general, but feel that 
his own life lacks meaning. In sum, it is necessary to distinguish 
anomia from anomie and to consider separately the sociopolitical 
importance of each.
^^De Grazia, op. cit., pp. 131-132.
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It is possible, at least theoretically, that persons who 
despair about the responsiveness, manipulability, and orderliness of 
their world would nevertheless agree on sociocultural values and give 
them at least passive support until a weakened social structure gave 
these persons opportunity to act out their hostilities and anxieties, 
li. K. Maccoby, J. P, Johnson and R. li. C h u r c h , i n  their study of 
delinquency in Cambridge, Massachusetts found that when the respondents 
were questioned about seven different kinds of deviant activity, their 
ratings on the questions indicated a similarity to what they considered 
to be serious acts. In other words, the respondents revealed their 
social values.
Because of the proclivity of sociologists to consider anomic 
persons as indicative of the state of a society, one additional point 
can be made. One must be aware that in measuring feelings one is mea­
suring predispositions, not actual behavior. Moreover, these pre­
dispositions of various social groups are probably not equally likely 
to affect social conditions throughout the society. As Herbert 
McClosky and J. H. Schaar state:
The leap from the subjective feelings expressed by individ­
uals to statements about objective social conditions is a 
perilous one. Miiat people believe about a society may or 
may not be an accurate reflection of its nature: percep­
tions and feelings are never a literal copy of what is "out 
there" but are always powerfully shaped by the needs.
1&E. E. Maccoby, J. P. Johnson, and R. £1. Church, "Community 
Integration and the Social Control of Juvenile Delinquency," Journal 
of Social Issues, 24 (1958), 38-51, reprinted in Human Behavior and 
International Politics, ed. by J. David Singer (Chicago: Rand
McHally, 1965).
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motives, attitudes, and abilities of the observer. Hence, 
we can never confidently assume that because some people 
feel anomic the society is anomic.
Nevertheless, this most definitely does not mean that the existence of
anomic individuals is not of actual and potential sociopolitical
import.
Whether or not Lao society is characterized by anomie (with all 
its political relevance) and whether Laotians can be characterized 
as exhibiting anomia (keeping in mind the meaning this has for the 
political and social structure of Laos) bears directly on our concerns 
here. The measurement and isolation of anomia offers a fruitful avenue 
for those concerned with the "propensity" for social and, hence, 
political change and stability, given specific social conditions. We 
are concerned, not only with what people do today but also with what 
they may do tomorrow; thus, we place major emphasis on the interpre­
tations that people put on the world around them.
The impetus for the recent interest in anomia has been due to 
the work of Leo S r o l e . H i s  thesis is that people can be fitted 
along a "eunomia-anomia" continuum based on R. M. Maclver's definition 
of anomie as the breakdown of the individual's sense of attachment to 
society.19 Specifically, Srole is concerned with testing the
l^Herbert McClosky and J. H. Schaar, "Psychological Dimensions 
of Anomy," American Sociological Review, 31 (February, 1965), 18-19.
l®Leo Srole, "Social Integration and Certain Corollaries. An 
Exploratory Study," American Sociological Review, 21 (December, 1956), 
709-16; and- "A Comment on 'Anomy,'" American Sociological Review, 30 
(October, 1965), 757-62.
19r . m , Maclver, The Ramparts We Guard (New York; The Mac­
Millan Company, 1964), pp. 84-92.
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hypothesis that anomia,— a personal state of "social malintegration,"—  
is positively related to prejudice. He has suggested five dimensions 
to anomia:
1. the individual’s sense that community leaders are detached 
from and indifferent to his needs, reflecting severance of the 
interdependent bond within the social system between leaders 
and those they should represent and serve.
2. the individual's perception of the social order as essen­
tially fickle and unpredictable, i.e., orderless, inducing 
the sense that under such conditions he can accomplish little 
toward realizing future life goals.
3. the individual’s view, beyond abdication of future life 
goals, that he and people like him are retrogressing from 
the goals they have already reached.
4. the reflection or loss of internalized social norms and 
values reflected in extreme form in the individual’s sense 
of the meaninglessness of life itself.
5. the individual’s perception that his framework of the 
immediate personal relationships, the very rock of his social 
existence, was no longer predictive or supportive. . . .20
It is apparent that what Srole is measuring, with the possible exception
of the first dimension, is not directly related to social structure,
but rather is expressive of a personalized view of the world.
Expanding on this point, McClosky and Schaar^l suggest that the
psychological dimension has not received adequate study in research on
anomia. They suggest that the question of concern for current studies
should not be whether or not society is anomic, but rather what groups
are so cut off from "patterns of communication and interaction that
[their position] reduces opportunities to see and understand how society
ZOsrole, op. cit., pp. 712-13. 
2lMcClosky and Schaar, op. cit.
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works, and what its goals and values are."^^ They criticize, in other 
words, current research for treating anomie sociologically, rather 
than psychologically. However, in their discussion of the fact that 
past research efforts have found high anomie scores to be among the 
isolated, low status individuals who occupy positions in the social 
structure that limit patterns of communication, it would seem that 
McClosky and Schaar are still advancing a sociological explanation. In 
doing so, they suggest that anomic feelings are learned through faulty 
socialization and go on to posit at least three factors that are 
involved in this process: (1) "Cognitive factors that influence one’s
ability to le a m  and understand; (2) Emotional factors that tned to 
lower one’s ability to perceive reality correctly; (3) Substantive 
beliefs and attitudes that interfere with successful communication and 
interaction."23
Using their own "anomy scale,"2^ which is similar to the Srole 
scale, they found an inverse relationship between their anomy scale 
and cognitive functioning. In regard to the emotional factors influ­
encing learning, a significant relationship was found between anoiry 
and original scales measuring inflexibility, rigidity, "the employment 
of defense mechanisms," obsessiveness, anxiety, disorganization, 
bewilderment, low ego strenght, hostility, paranoia, intolerance of 
human frailty, and contempt for weakness. In effect, they are
22lbid.
23McClosky and Schaar, op. cit.
2^Xhey prefer the spelling "anomy" for reasons discussed in 
their article.
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measuring a world view which de Grazia and McDill's factor analysis 
would logically lead one to connect with anomia.25
Regarding substantive beliefs, the authors found a relationship 
between anomia and totalitarianism, fascist tendencies, left and right 
wing attitudes, lack of tolerance, lack of faith-in-people, Calvinism, 
elitism, inequalitarianism, and ethnocentrism. Although independent 
assessment cannot be made of the scale items, it would appear that these 
social and political views fall along the same dimension as the emo­
tional factors which were also correlated with anomia.
McClosky and Schaar also found that after controlling for seven 
sociological variables (education, age, size of community, occupational 
status, race, sex, and region), "high anomies continue to differ from 
low anomies on the psychological variables . . . the differences remain 
in every instance large enough to leave no doubt that personality 
factors determine Anomy independently of social i n f l u e n c e . I n  sum, 
they regard "anomy as a by-product of the socialization process— as 
a sign of the failure of socialization and of the means by which 
socialization is achieved, namely, communication, interaction and 
learning . . .," they go on.
Contrary to Srole's claim that anomy reflects mental dis­
turbance only the latter is "severe," and that social 
dysfunction is the independent variable producing anomy 
both with and without psychopathology, we found that per­
sonality factors are correlated with anomy at all levels 
of mental disturbance, and that they function in all edu­
cational categories and in all sectors of society.
^E. L. McDill, "Anomie, Authoritarianism, Prejudice, and 
Socio-Economic Status: An Attempt at Clarification," Social Forces, 7
(September, 1960), 239-45.
^^McClosky and Schaar, op. cit., p. 39.
27ibid.
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The discussion by McClosky and Schaar Is a most worthwhile addition 
to the conceptualization of anomia, but to conclude that such emotional 
and sociopolitical attitudes which the authors found to be correlated 
with anomia stem from faulty socialization Is to use the terms "social­
ization" and "learning" In ways that do not reflect the conclusions 
to which McClosky and Schaar come.
Socialization refers to the manner In which infants learn "to 
adjust to the group by acquiring social behavior of which the group 
a p p r o v e s . "28 McClosky and Schaar, however, are not dealing with social 
behavior. Their concern Is rather with the results of "faulty psychol­
ogical growth"; results which often accompanied by a certain position 
In the social structure, do not uniformly affect individuals in any 
one social position and are found In all status groups as they note. 
Further, these psychological beliefs are, in Rokeach's terms, "central 
beliefs about the world." They are not accepted and adhered to, as 
for example, the belief that democracy Is the best form of government 
In every situation or that the world Is round but instead are simply 
remembered and may change over time given the right stimulus, lliey 
are consciously developed as the individual develops physical skills—  
breathing, crawling— and just as inseparable parts of him. Thus, 
while the contribution of McClosky and Schaar widens our understanding 
of the psychological dimensions of anomia substantially, their con­
clusion has only obscured the unique personality aspects of anomia 
and retarded research in this direction.
28'Hie International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (1968) , 
Vol. 14: 534.
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Gwynn Nettler strikes at the heart of the inadequacies of the 
McClosky-Schaar anomia study. She states that while McClosky and Schaar 
hypothesize that anomic feeling stems from inadequate socialization 
"reflected by an inaccurate view of reality," they "offer no data to 
support their own conception of American model values— nor do they 
test the relative acuity of the anomic eye."29 The problem of a faulty 
view of reality is not sinçly the problem that anomic views may not 
be an accurate reflection of "social" reality, but that such views 
have an autonony all their own; once formed, they will likely be 
maintained regardless of the individual's life situation.
Among the Laotian elite, we found from their responses that 
there is no high intensity state of Lao social malintegration (see 
Table 11). Simply put, they view their society as slightly anomic, 
but still meaningful, orderly, and predictable.
Economic Values
We have discussed so far the elites' attitudes toward their 
society. We have found that there is some tendency toward beliefs in 
socialist norms in the sense of economic equality. This section is 
intended to illuminate the Laotian elites' orientations toward the 
economic world.
Tlie Current Economic Situations
Since gaining independence in 1954, Laos has been in nearly a 
constant state of war, both from within and without. To these man-made
Gwynn Nettler, "A Further Comment on 'Anomy,'" American 
Sociological Review, 30 (October, 1965), 762-763.
TABLE 11










50. A person has to live pretty much for 
today and let tomorrow take care of 
itself. 53.2 4.8 25.8 14.5 1.6 99.9 +.28
51. These days a person really does not 
know who he can make friends with. 32.3 17.7 46.8 3.2 0.0 100.0 + .15
52. The lot of the average man is getting 
worse, not better. 41.9 8.1 37.1 11.3 1.6 100.0 +. 16
Average 42.5 10.2 36.6 9.7 1.1 100.1 + .19
Note; Scores are presented in percentages. ' Total" is more or less than 100 because of rounding.
The scale is borrowed from Leo Srole, "Social Integration and Certain Corollaries: An Exploratoiy
Study," American Sociological Review, 21 (1956), 709-716.
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hazards are added the natural ones of lack of access to seaports, geo­
graphic barriers to transportation and communication, and lack of 
readily accessible natural resources. Altogether, these factors have 
produced a severe economic imbalance which has been reflected in 
recent years as a consistent annual government budget deficit.
After gaining independence, Laos emerged as a country ill- 
prepared to survive economically as a twentieth century state. French 
rule in Laos was far less sophisticated than in Vietnam and Cambodia. 
During the French colonial period, Laos became part of the Indochina 
economic complex. As such, the need for internal development was 
viewed in the context of Indochina as an economic whole. Government 
expenditures always exceeded the revenue which the economy of Laos 
could yield and international payments were always greater than the 
foreign exchange that the economy of Laos could earn. The deficits 
in both instances were met out of the surpluses derived from earnings 
in Vietnam and Cambodia. Development efforts were directed primarily 
toward construction of a road network to facilitate the political and 
military administration of Indochina. There was some investment of 
French private capital, for example, in tin and coffee, both for 
export, but the effect of this on the economy was slight. Sixteen 
years after independence, Laos remained largely undeveloped, with most 
of its natural resources unexploited and even unsurveyed. The many 
years of conflict within its borders have prevented gathering the 
basic data that are needed to identify, plan for, and exploit these
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natural resources.^® This situation is believed to form an intimate 
environment for the elite, which shapes their culture-and-personality.
Elite and Economic Development
Exploring the elites' attitudes toward economic affairs can 
contribute to our knowledge of political culture-and-personality in 
general, and to the idea of economic development in particular. Since 
the elite is the entity which sets policy for the entire society, much 
depends on the basic beliefs and attitudes of the elite toward the 
present-day economic world. Before examining their attitudes, a brief 
glance at the concept of economic development in general will be taken 
as background material.
The search for "first causes" of development started in the 
more limited field of economic development. Economists sought to 
explain how development begins. When economic theories of growth and 
development did not provide complete and satisfacotry answers, they 
began to search for the cause in social, administrative, and political 
institutions, as did other social scientists. This search produced 
a spate of literature on social and cultural obstacles to development 
and attempts to identify the social, political, and other preconditions 
for economic development. In pushing the exploration ever more deeply, 
economic Historians and sociologists identified a range of beliefs, 
attitudes, and values which they believed permitted and encouraged the 
generation of entreprenuers and enterprise. Max Weber's exploration
30por a good discussion of Laos' economics and problems, see 
Asian Regional Team for Employment Promotion, Transition and Develop­
ment; Employment and Income Generation in Laos (Bangkok, 1973). 
(Mimeo)
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of the "Protestant ethic" hypothesis, for example, was a classic state­
ment of the influence of many other scholars searching for the key to 
economic growth.
The inevitable next step was to push the search into the foun­
dations of human behavior and motivation. Psychologists and psychologi­
cally oriented social scientists are now exploring the dependence of 
entrepreneurship and economic development on the emergence of 
innovative personalities or the presence of achievement motivation in 
individuals. For example, Everett E. Hagen, an economist, provocatively 
employs the insights of sociology and psychology to construct a theory 
of social change that attempts to explain how economic growth begins.31 
He inquires into the forces which disrupt the great stability of tra­
ditional society and cause groups to emerge which abandon traditional 
ways and turn their energies to the tasks of modernization. More 
evidence for the psychological perspective is provided in The 
Achieving Society by David M c C l e l l a n d . 32 He discusses the conditions
3l£verett E. Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change (Homewood, 
111.: The Dorsey Press, 1962), chapter 1.
Op
David McClelland, Tlie Achieving Society (Princeton: Van
Nostrand, 1961), p. 84. See also: Alex Inkeles, "Making Men Modem:
On the Causes and Consequences of Individual Change in Six Developing 
Countries," American Journal of Sociology 75 (September, 1969), 208-255; 
Alex Inkeles, "The Modernization of Man," in Modernization: The
Dynamics of Growth, ed. by Myron Weiner (New York: Basic Books, 1966),
chapter X. To McClelland, personality is the independent variable and 
the social structure, or that part of it which is the economy, is the
dependent variable. Changes occur in the mind of men with the result
that economic development is likely to follow. For Inkeles, the 
reverse is true. Inkeles finds that, to a striking degree, the same 
syndrome of attitudes, values, and ways of acting defines the modern 
man in each of six countries he studied. The characteristics of 
modern man include: a disposition to accept new ideas and try new
methods; a readiness to express opinions; a time sense that makes men
more interested in the present and future than the past; a better 
sense of punctuality; a greater concern for planning, organization, and
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and personality traits that lead particular individuals and groups in 
the society to become entrepreneurs— to exploit opportunities, to take 
advantage of favorable trade conditions, and, in general, to shape their 
own destinies. Explanation for such activities is found in changes 
which occur in the minds of men: a personality characteristic becomes
more prevalent in individuals that McClelland designates as a "need 
for A c h i e v e m e n t . W l i e r e  a high need for achievement is found, 
economic development is likely to follow, McClelland argues. He does 
not merely maintain that the achieving society possesses large numbers 
of individuals with a high need of achievement but goes on to contend, 
based on systematic empirical investigations along historical lines, 
that the presence of individuals with high need for achievement is 
"antecedent" to enterpreneurship and economic growth.
McClelland's emphasis on human nature is quite different from 
the Darwinian or Marxist view of man as a creature who "adapts" to 
his environment. It is even different from the Freudian view of 
civilization as the elimination of man's primitive urges. Nor can he 
agree with Arnold J. Toynbee, who recognizes the importance of 
psychological factors as "the very forces which actually decide the
efficiency; a tendency to see the world as calculable; a faith in science 
and technology; and a belief in distributive justice. Admittedly,
these characteristics embrace more than the need for achievement, but 
the modern man, as Inkeles describes him, clearly is achievement-oriented. 
Inkeles finds that elements of social structure change individuals. Edu­
cation is the more powerful factor in making men modem, but occupation 
in large-scale organization, and especially in factory work, makes a 
significant contribution to creating m o d e m  attitudes and teaching 
individuals to act like modern men.
^^IcClelland, op. cit.
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issue when an encounter takes place." Toynbee states that these fac­
tors "inherently are impossible to weigh and measure and therefore to 
estimate scientifically in a d v a n c e , C i v i l i z a t i o n ,  McClelland 
argues, at least in its economic aspects, is neither adaptation nor 
sublimation; it is a positive creation by a people made dynamic by a 
high level of n-Achievement— (the need for achievement), not a desire 
or motive for prestige but the attainment of an inner feeling of
personal'accomplishment.^5
Further questions are what produces the need for achievement 
and how is the need for achievement stimulated? The need for achieve­
ment is seen as resulting from the child rearing practices and early 
socialization. The answer to the second question may be somewhat 
incomplete and tentative, but some psychologists feel that the 
beginnings to an answer are emerging. David McClelland and David 
Winters, for example, report on experimental efforts in developing 
nations as well as in the United States to change motivation so that 
individuals can express their entrepreneurial personalities and 
thereby contribute to economic growth.36
^^Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History (New York; Oxford 
University Press, 1934), p. 35.
S^McClelland, op. cit., p. 84.
^^David C. McClelland and David G. Winters, Motivating Economic 
Development (New York; Tlie Free Press, 1969), especially chapter II. 
They also concluded that it is practicable to run need for achievement 
training courses for businessmen and to compare their yield, at least 
roughly, in terms of an activity level score. There is encouraging 
evidence that the need for achievement courses may actually increase 
the subsequent activity levels of the businessmen who take them.
242
In explaining the origins of development, both Hagen and 
McClelland concentrate on psychological changes occurring within the 
individual. At another level, however, ideology may be a force which 
is equally important in the multiple dimensions of the modernization 
process. Harry Johnson makes a strong case with respect to the 
ideology of economic policy. There are also important similarities 
which permit their being discussed collectively. These similarities 
result from common influences that affect all developing n a t i o n s . 3? 
Johnson identifies such influences as "political nationalism" (which 
has its counterpart in economic nationalism) and economic ideas as 
experiences inherited from the recent history which provides for a 
nation a common interpretation, thought, and policy prescription, as 
well as, a source for an international language of economic develop­
ment. The consequences of this ideology for the economic policies of 
developing nations include policies of economic autarky, concentration 
of industrialization at the expense of agricultural development, a pre­
ference for economic planning and for public control of industry, and 
hostility to large foreign enterprises operating in their countries.
The nationalist elites who make use of ideology are termed 
"assaulted" individuals by Mary Matossian^® because they are caught
^^Harry G. Johnson, "The Ideology of Economic Policy in New 
States," in Economic Nationalism in Old and New Societies, ed. by 
Harry G. Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967),
pp. 124-141.
ODMary Matossian, Ideologies of Delayed Industrialization: 
Some Tensions and Ambiguities," Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, 6 (April, 1958), 217-228, Reprinted in Jason L. Finkle and 
Richard W. Gable, Political Development and Social Change, 2nd ed. 
(New York: John Wiley, 1971), pp. 113-121.
243
between the pressures of traditionalism and modernization. The West 
may be resented, but the intellectuals who begin to implement the 
ideology are partly Westernized. Their desire is to resolve the 
conflict resulting from exposure to the West and to create a sense of 
identity for themselves as individuals and for the nation as a whole. 
They search for true selves to create a national character. The 
ideologies these elites formulate and embrace also reduce the ambi­
guity between the newness of the West and the oldness of the indigen- 
eous culture. The past is turned to many uses, both negative and 
positive. It may be employed as an escape, or it may be used to 
sanction innovation and national self-strengthening.
From !Matossian's analysis it becomes clear why the intelli- 
gensia of developing countries may be sincerely attached to contra­
dictory premises. Their ideologies provide criticism and comfort. 
They stand for class equality and exhort the masses to follow orders 
and accept unequal rewards. While condemning the peasant for his 
backwardness, at the same time they praise him for being a "real" 
representative of his culture.
Entrepreneurial Values of the Laotian Elite
According to David McClelland, an entrepreneur is defined as 
"someone who exercises some control over the means of production and 
produces more than he can consume in order to sell (or exchange) it 
for individual (or household) i n c o m e . F o l l o w i n g  McClelland, we do
^McClelland, op. cit., p. 65. For defining "classes" of the 
people and enemy of the Laotians, see Joseph Zasloff, The Pathet Lao 
(Lexington; Lexington Books Coiq>any, 1973), p. 22.
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not Intend to use the term "entrepreneur" in the sense of "capitalist" 
but rather to divorce the entrepreneur entirely from any connotation 
of ownership. For example, an executive in China's machine production 
program is an entrepreneur under such a definition. The entrepreneur, 
therefore, often collects material resources, organizes a production 
unit to combine the resources into a new product, and sells the 
product. In this study, the meaning of the statements in the question­
naire refer to the ideas of the general business interest in large 
enterprises and their management.
Harry Johnson comments that "each new state has its own par­
ticular economic structure and corresponding economic problems toward 
which its economic policy and ideology are necessarily oriented."40 
We might expect substantive differences, then, between Laos and other 
countries with respect to attitudes toward economic policy.
There are, to begin with, attitudes toward entrepreneurship 
within the elite which can be observed as ideologies revealed 
through economic activities. Tlie Laotian economy has been particular­
ly influenced by French ideas gained during the colonial period. As 
time went on United States influences became more important, but 
currently, socialist approaches seem most important. The war and the 
shortage of a special, talented elite in Laos has colored the elites" 
attitudes toward economic affairs in one way or another.
4®harry G. Johnson, "The Ideology of Economic Policy in the 
New States," in Economic Nationalism in Old and New States, ed. by 
Harry G. Johnson (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 124.
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The responses of the elites to the questionnaire items (see 
Table 12) indicate that they are in the middle range of the degree of 
intensity supporting entrepreneurship; they scored +.27 on the average. 
Looking at segments of the questionnaire, Table 12 shows that the 
elites most strongly accept that "the most important factor in the 
success of a commercial firm is the establishment of a reputation for 
the excellence of its products." This is construed to be a favorable 
comment about commercial firms, because a group of anti-business 
respondents might rather have thought of "profit" as the most impor­
tant factor in gauging commercial success. Next, they were generally 
opposed to using "seniority" as a major factor in giving promotions, 
and this reflects a business management outlook, as opposed to the 
common approach of governmental employers. And finally, these elites 
were somewhat in favor of the use of "incentive pay," which is a 
common practice in industry but is seldom used in government.
From the foregoing, it seems fair to assume that if the sur­
veyed elites had been left alone to plan for the economic development 
of Laos, private enterprise— teamed, perhaps, with a strongly entre­
preneurial public sector— would have been favored by Laotian economic 
policy.
Summary
Throughout this chapter we have explored the elite personality 
with regard to attitudes concerning general human nature, society, and 
economic affairs. Focusing on society, a general, if not deep, sense 
of pessimism was found. The elite seemed to feel that Lao society 
today is slightly normless. Similar findings in the same degree of
TABLE 12










62. An article for sale Is worth what 
people will pay for it. 75.8 9.7 11.3 0.0 3.2 100.0 +.75
63. Seniority should be given greater 
weight than merit in giving pro­
motions . 17.7 4.8 50.0 27.4 0.0 99.9 -.32
64. Incentive pay snould not be used 
because workers will overwork and 
ruin their health or destroy jobs 
for others. 37.1 9.7 46.8 4.8 1.6 100.0 +.14
65. Workers should not be promoted to 
managerial jobs even if they are 
qualified because it would destroy 
the respect for authority which the 
workers must have toward management. 33.9 9.7 35.5 21.0 0.0 100.1 0.00
66. The amount of education a person 
has should be a major factor in 
determining his pay scale. 41.9 19.4 35.5 1.6 1.6 100.0 +.32
67. I approve a career or job outside 
the home for married women. 45.2 41.9 8.1 3.2 1.6 100.0 + .59
68. A good son should try to live near his 
parents even if it means giving up 
a good job in another part of the 
country











69. The most important factor in the 
success of a commercial firm is 
the establishment of a reputa­
tion for the excellence of its 
products. 80.6 9.7 8.1 0.0 1.6 100.0 +.82
70. A man with money cannot really 
le a m  how to behave in polite 
society if he has not had the 
proper unbringing. 72.6 19.4 1.6 6.5 0.0 100.1 +.75
Average 45.3 13.8 29.2 10.4 1.2 99.9 +.27
Note; Scores are presented in percentages. "Total" is more or less than 100 because of rounding.
The scale is borrowed from David C. McClelland, The Achieving Society (Princeton: Van Nostrand,
1961), pp. 284-286.
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Intensity were discovered in the elites' constant-pie orientation. In 
matters of economics, the elite express their general approval of 
entrepreneurship, whether it be found in the public or private sector.
In the following chapter, an investigation will be made to find 
further essential characteristics of the elite. Their attitudes toward 
the statements of liberal democratic thought will be highlighted.
CHAPTER VII
POLITICAL BELIEFS
We have explored the elites’ personality in general and their 
attitudes toward economics and their society. In this chapter, we 
explore the elites' political beliefs. The purpose is to observe what 
they do and do not believe with regard to some general political values.
Belief Concepts
Beliefs organize and give relevance to man’s experiences— they 
are the evaluative function of mind. Without this capacity, man’s 
experiences would be so many chronologically ordered memories; they 
would have no significance. Beliefs depend on abstraction, and the 
belief system of the individual is his abstracted representation of his 
environment. Belief is thus the link between the individual and his 
society and between the group and its environment. At one extreme, it 
represents knowledge, which is belief reinforced by experience. At the 
other extreme is delusion; belief which is in flat contradiction to 
either part of physical reality accessible to man or to the beliefs of 
the individual's society.
So far as we can be determined, no man now living or who has 
lived has been without belief, at least in the sense of conviction of 
the truth of propositions of which he has not or could not have direct 
personal experience. We may consider individual character or individual 
personality as the ensemble of beliefs or the belief system that is basic 
to a given group. The relations between men— trust and distrust, authority
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and rebellion, loyalty and disloyalty— are based on attitudes and
beliefs.
The secular literature on the topic of belief is enormous. Its 
size, and the great extent of contemporary interest in this subject 
matter, is obscured by differences in approach used in various disci­
plines that deal with the subject; sociology, anthropology, psychology, 
philosophy, and political science. The terminology used by all these 
disciplines, too, is vast and confusing at first sight. Mores; ethos, 
myths, norms, conventions, symbols, roles, expectations, perceptions, 
attitudes, opinions, values, all are terms used in one discipline or 
the other. As mentioned at the outset, psychology emphasizes the 
term attitude; sociology and anthropology use values, norms, and roles; 
political science employs opinion and interests. All of these designations 
apply to aspects of the same human phenomena.
We find that the word which best covers the entire category is 
the word "belief." All of the phenomena listed above can be considered 
as aspects of belief, the human ability to become convinced of the 
truth or value of a proposition and to act on that conviction. As 
the term "belief" is used as a segment of the elite's culture-and- 
personality in this study, it covers the entire spectrum of the elite's 
opinion, from conscious transitory opinion whose holder is aware it is 
fragmentary, through knowledge, belief confirmed by experience, and on 
to faith— the unquestioning acceptance of a position without proof and 
in the awareness that no proof may exist.
Individuals are guided in their lives by loose groupings or 
structures of beliefs, variously termed outlook, credo, or belief
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system. The belief system is the individual's currently operative expla­
nation of himself, of the world, and of his position in the world. It 
has been called the cognitive map of the individual. For the purpose of 
convenience, we may consider the beliefs of an individual to be hierarchi­
cally organized, with values representing the most deeply seated beliefs, 
then followed by attitudes and finally by opinion, which can be considered 
consciously or tentative assessments. We may consider these terms to 
represent a spectrum of beliefs held with varying degrees of conviction; 
"values" with the deepest conviction and "opinions" with the least, out 
of other aspects mentioned in Chapter II.
A great deal of effort has been expended by social psychologists 
in the attempt to differentiate between belief, attitude, opinion, sen­
timent, and so forth. Martin Fishbein and Bertram Raven, for example, 
attempt to distinguish between "belief," which they consider a cognitive 
opinion based on probability, and "attitude," which they consider evalua­
tive and emotion-based.^ Jack Brehn and A. R. Cohen consider that 
attitudes are composed of two elements: opinion, which signified rational
knowledge whether something is true or untrue, and evaluation, which
2indicates how one feels about the subject concerned. Theodore Newcomb, 
Ralph Turner, and Philip Converse consider attitudes to be "stored cogni­
tions," with positive and negative associations. They conclude, that 
the attitude concept reflects quite faithfully the primary form in which
1
Martin Fishbein and Bertram Raven, "The A. B. Scale: An Opera­
tional Definition of Belief and Attitude," Human Relations, 15 (February,
1962), 35-44.
2Jack Brehm and A. R. Cohen, Explorations in Cognitive Dissonance 
(New York: Wiley & Sons, 1962), p. 17.
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past experience is summed, stored, and organized in the individual as
he approaches any new situation. The attitude can be described as a
residue, highly organized, of cognized objects to which experience has
3lent affective color or value. Daniel Katz uses a definition of 
attitude which helps to make the concept clearer. For him, an attitude 
is "the specific organization of feelings and beliefs according to 
which a given person evaluates an object or symbol positively or negatively, 
. . .  an attitude is an organization of feelings and beliefs directed to 
a single object or subject."^
In general, we have followed in this study the definition used by 
Milton Rokeach, as presented in Chapter V. Rokeach considers the most 
elementary definition of a belief to be "any simple proposition, conscious 
or unconscious, inferred from what a person says or does capable of being 
preceded by the phrase 'I believe that'."^ According to Rokeach and many 
of his fellow social psychologists, each belief can be considered to have 
three components: (1) a cognitive component, representing a person's
knowledge, held with varying degrees of surety, about what is true or false, 
good or bad; (2) an affective component concerning an object or belief 
or another person, which reflects an emotional like or dislike position 
toward the person or the object, or the belief itself; (3) a behavioral 
component. An attitude, according to Rokeach's definition, is a "relatively
3Theodore Newcomb, Ralph Turner, and Philip Converse, Social 
Psychology (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), pp. 41-42.
^Daniel Katz, "Attitude Formation and Public Opinion," The Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 367 (September, 
1966), 151.
^Milton Rokeach, "Attitude," The International Encyclopedia of 
Social Sciences (New York: The Free Press, 1968), Vol. I, pp. 449-457.
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enduring organization of beliefs around an object or situation predis­
posing one to respond in some preferential manner."^
Rokeach considers the individual's belief system as "the total 
universe of a person's beliefs about the physical world, the social 
world and the self." He defines values as "a type of belief centrally 
located in the belief system about how one ought to or not to behave, or 
about some end state of existence worth or not worth attaining."^ Else­
where Rokeach estimates that an adult may have many thousands of attitudes, 
but only a limited number of values. Here he defines the belief system 
as "a hierarchical mental organization which is in some psychological 
sense internally consistent. Any change in any part of the value-attitude
g
system will affect other parts."
The Elite's Political Consensus 
This section is an effort to explore the degree of political 
beliefs among the elites in terms of their attitudes towards liberal
9
democratic values, by using Herbert McClosky's scale. In his research, 
McClosky assumes that we can codify the central ideas of liberal demo­
cratic thought and present them in a statement form to establish the 
degree of adherence to these norms among subjects. He then constructed 





Milton Rokeach, "The Role of Values in Public Opinion Research," 
Public Opinon Quarterly, 32 (Winter, 1968-1969), 550.
9
Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," 
American Political Science Review, 58 (June, 1964), 361-382.
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1. Rules of the game (mostly due process)
2. Free speech and opinion
3. Specific applications of free speech and procedural rights
4. Political equality
5. Economic equality
6 . Cynicism toward politics
7. Political futility
Rules of the Game
The concept "rules of the game" is intended to tap widely shared 
beliefs of the elite about how the government or political actors ought 
to behave. Indeed, it is essentially normative and procedural. Actually, 
the rules of the game concept overlaps with other concepts used in con­
temporary political science: political culture, norms, ideology, values,
role, and so on. Some of these competing concepts are usually more 
sharply defined. But the concept serves as a central reminder of the 
importance of informal, normative expectations and unwritten rules in 
shaping political behavior.
Previous studies showed that general and specific statements 
about liberal democracy among the American highly educated mass were 
overwhelmingly agreed upon.^^ This finding led the authors, Prothro and 
Grigg, to speculate that the widespread agreement on the rules of the game 
at the elite level may be a precondition for democratic politics, but 
that on the mass level it apparently is not. In a later study, Robert
^^James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles 
of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement," Journal of Politics,
22 (1960), 276-294.
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Dahl^^ confirmed that the same minority of the population that possesses 
the highest levels of political interest, skills, and resources also 
possesses the greatest commitment to the rules of the game of democratic 
politics. The vast majority of the citizenry may not agree with these 
rules, but lack the interest, skills, and resources to do much about it.
McClosky provides data on attitude towards the rules of the game 
of a national sample. It is clear that a sizable minority of American 
citizens do not accept the rules of the game. In the same article,
McClosky reports the interview results that were obtained when his origi­
nal questionnaire was administered to the delegates and alternates to the 
Democratic and Republican national party convention in 1956. Their 
responses (under the label "U.S.Influentials”) indicate far wider agree­
ment with the rules of the game among these political activists than
12among rank-and-file Americans.
Assuming that the United States is a reasonable approximation of a 
liberal political democracy, these studies suggest that agreement about the 
rules of the game on the mass level is less important than either the philoso­
phers or the group theorists assume. Elite agreement on these rules may 
well be a necessary condition for a successful political democracy, but 
only additional research conducted in a variety of political systems will 
tell us whether the hypothesized relationship between the attitudes con­
cerning the rules of the game and political democracy needs merely to be 
revised or whether it must be abandoned altogether.
^^Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American 
City (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).
12McClosky, op. cit., p. 364.
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In his application of McClosky’s questionnaire to Malaysian elites,
James Scott points out that the rules of the game, a concern with due
process, "is as important as freedom of speech but is not nearly as pro-
13minent in the popular mind." He adds that "when democratic beliefs 
tend to be formalistic, it may be due process which is cast aside before 
more celebrated freedoms such as free speech.
As in Table 13, comparing the rules of the game among the groups—  
American as the Western model and Malaysian as the non-Western model, 
the extent of the Laotian elite’s overall support for "democratic" 
rules of the game is far below the American (31.5 percent) but slightly 
above Malaysian civil servants (3.5 percent). If we refer to the 
McClosky 75 percent consensus l e v e l , t h e  absolute levels of democratic 
response among Laotian elites have ominous implications. Only on mass 
electorate issues (Statement 111) do they achieve this figure, while for 
six of the eight items they do not even muster 50 percent support for 
certain rules of the game, dear in mind that the group we are examining 
is presumably the most important political career group. Surely if the 
rules of the game find so little patronage among these educated power 
holders, we can hardly be sanguine about the prospects for liberal 
democracy in a country like Laos.
13James C. Scott, Political Ideology in Malaysia: Reality and
the Beliefs of an Elite (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 187.
^^Ibid., p. 192.
^^The 75 percent consensus level is an entirely arbitrary figure. 
Consensus usually means more than 50 percent agreement but less than 100 
percent.
TABLE 13
LAOTIAN ELITE'S ATTITUDES TOWARD THE POLITICAL "RULES OF THE GAME,"
COMPARED WITH AMERICAN AND MALAYSIAN ATTITUDES
Percent Supporting 
Democratic Rules of the Game 1 
Statements ------------------------------------
U.S. - Malaysian Laotian 
Influentials Elite^ Elite 
(N = 3,020) (N = 17) (N = 62)
111. People ought to be allowed to vote 
even if they cannot do so intelli­
gently. 65.6 78 87
112. I do not mind a politician's 
methods if he manages to get the
right things done. 74.4 29 41
113. It is all right to get around the 
law if you do not actually break
it. 78.8 21 60
114. In dealing with subversives, some­
times you cannot always give them 
all the legal rights which peace­
ful citizens have, otherwise many
will escape the law. 75.3 20 49
115. We might as well make up our minds 
that in order to make the world 
better, a lot of innocent people
will have to suffer. 72.8 59 31
116. Very few politicians have clean 
records, so one should not get 
excited about the mudthrowing
that sometimes takes place. 85.2 21 16
117. There are times when it almost 
seems better for the people to 
take the law into their own hands 
rather than wait for the machinery





Democratic Rules of the Game
U.S. Malaysian Laotian 
Influentials^ Elite^ Elite 
(N = 3,020) (N = 17) (N = 62)
118. To bring about great changes for 
the benefit of mankind requires 
cruelty and even ruthlessness. 80.6 54 36
Mean 77.4 42.5 46
Responses were dichotomized; the small number of "No Opinion" 
responses for each item (see Appendix A for details) was ignored. Agree­
ment with statement III and disagreement with the other statements were 
taken to indicate acceptance of the rules of the game.
2
From Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," 
American Political Science Review. 58 (June, 1964), 365.
3From James C. Scott, Political Ideology in Malaysia (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 190-191.
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Free Speech and Opinion
Daniel P. Moynihan's statement that "there is no nation so poor 
that it cannot afford free speech"^^ seem to be agreed upon among the 
Laotian elite. The picture changes sharply when we turn from the rules 
of the game to items which in a broad, general way express belief in 
freedom of speech and opinions. As can be seen from Table 14, support 
for the values is remarkably high. Comparing support for the free speech 
and opinions among the groups, the Laotian elite's support for the free 
speech and opinions statements is higher than the American in all items 
and Malaysian in five out of six items. Our respondents even endorse the 
rights of atheists and agnostics.
Specific Applications of Free Speech and Procedural Rights
At the center of the democratic creed, as we have approached it here, 
is the idea of democratic restraint. The idea of restraint has several 
components, among them, the notion of judical prohibition. The state and 
its citizens are under the restraint of the law even when dealing with a 
threat to the law. The guarantee of due process, for example, is a 
classic expression of judical prohibition, for it binds the state to 
provide a fair and speedy trial, citizens are presummed innocent until 
found guilty by a duly constituted court; they cannot be convicted on 
evidence obtained illegally; they have a right to avoid self-incrimination, 
and so forth. All people have all of these rights (in principle, but 
unhappily not always in practice). No one ought to lose any of them 
because of his opinions, political convictions, or style of life.
^^"Some Moynihanisms," Times (26 January 1976), 28.
TABLE 14
LAOTIAN ELITES' ATTITUDES TOWARD "FREE SPEECH AND OPINION,"
COMPARED WITH AMERICAN AND MALAYSIAN ATTITUDES
Statements
Percent Supporting 










119. People who hate our way of life 
should still have a chance to 
talk and be heard. 86.9 97 93
120. Nobody has the right to tell 
another person what he should 
and should not read. 81.4 66 92
121. Unless there is freedom for many 
points of view to be presented, 
there is little chance that the 
truth can ever be known. 90.6 91 100
122. No matter what a person's poli­
tical beliefs are, he is entitled 
to the same legal rights and pro­
tections as anyone else. 96.4 91 98
123. Freedom of conscience should mean 
the freedom to not believe in gods 
as well as the freedom to warship 
in religion of one's choice. 87.8 37 98
124. You cannot really be sure whether 
an opinion is true or not unless 
people are free to argue against it 94.9 97 98
Mean 89.7 80 96
Responses were dichotomized; the small number of "No Opinion" 
responses for each item (see Appendix A for details) was ignored.
Agreement with all statements were taken to indicate acceptance of free 
speech and opinion.
2From Herbert McClosky, Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," 
American Political Science Review, 58 (June, 1964), 366.
3
From James C. Scott, Political Ideology in Malaysia (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 188-189.
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The scale is designed to access commitment to judical protection, 
broadly conceived. The items ask, among other things, whether the 
government ought to force the people to do certain things in dangerous 
situations, whether in the investigation of "dangerous subversives" they 
must stick to the rules, and so forth. As we can see in Table 15 showing 
the summary findings for all statements and also comparing them with 
other countries, the elites are asked if they favor free expression for 
people who "don't know what they are talking about," whether due process 
should extend even to "dangerous enemies of the nation," and so on. The 
construction of these statements allows us to see how universal principles 
fare when they are taken from a largely rhetorical context and placed in a 
setting which demands the sacrifice of other valued goals. It is one thing 
for a man to be an "other things being equal" democrat but since, in the 
real world, democracy does imply that other goals are postponed or fore­
gone, these items are a more realistic test of liberal democratic beliefs.
Even more than the rules of the game items. Table 15 indicates 
that Laotian elites fall far below the American group in their support 
for free expression and procedural rights. The average frequency with 
which they elect democratic values is 56.3 percent points below that of 
the American influentials; and fully nine points behind the level of the 
Malaysian sample. Averaging the frequencies of democratic choices on all 
four statements, the Laotian elites fall far below consensus.
These responses offer persuasive evidence that their democratic 
beliefs in free speech and opinions are formalistic. Statements 125 and 
128 deal with specific applications of this freedom and the average sup­
porting is only 38.5 percent, while for the more rhetorical statements of
TABLE 15
LAOTIAN ELITES' ATTITUDES TOWARD "SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS OF
FREE SPEECH AND PROCEDURAL RIGHTS," COMPARED WITH
AMERICAN AND MALAYSIAN ATTITUDES
Percent Supporting ' 
Specific Speech and Rights Issues
Statements -------------------------------------
U.S. Malaysian Laotian 
Influentials^ Elite^ Elite 
(N = 3,020) (N = 17) (N = 62)
125. A book that contains wrong poli­
tical views cannot be a good book 
and does not deserve to be published. 82.1 59 41
126. In dealing with dangerous enemies 
of the nation, we cannot afford to 
depend on the courts, laws, and 
their slow unreliable methods. 92.6 32 24
127. When the country is in great danger, 
we may have to force people to do 
certain things against their will, 
even though it violates their rights. 71.5 14 4
128. A man ought not to be allowed to 
speak if he does not know what he 
is talking about. 82.7 36 36
Mean 82.0 35.3 26.3
Responses were dichotomized; the small number of "No Opinion" 
responses for each item (see Appendix A for details) was ignored. 
Disagreement with all statements were taken to indicate acceptance of 
the specific applications of free speech and procedural rights.
2From Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," 
American Political Science Review. 58 (June, 1964), 367.
3From James C. Scott, Political Ideology in Malaysia (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 198-199.
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Table 14 the figure was extremely high 96 percent. Fifty-seven and a half 
percent of those who muster tropological support for the free speech 
seemed willing to abandon their beliefs when they are asked to make sacri­
fices to defend it. Many of democracy’s defenders desert when the
assault on their position b e g i n s . T h i s  trend was also true in Scott’s
18study on the Malaysian elite.
If the beliefs in free speech were not formalistic, one would 
expect some "carry over" from rhetoric to application. That is, those 
who support the principle of free expression should be more supportive 
of the same principle in difficult circumstances than those who do not 
seem committed to the principle in the first place. In a rough way, we 
can test for a formalism by comparing the performance of the elite for 
the items of Table 14 (freedom of free speech and opinions) with their 
performance on the statements in Table 15. In the case of the Laotian 
elite, we found that percentage of support dropped off sharply from the 
former to the latter, 96 to 26 percent.
Political and Economic Equality
That all men are created politically equal is one of the most 
basic liberal democratic tenets. The aristocratic notion is that some 
men, whether by virtue of wealth, family lineage, or physical prowess, 
are inherently better suited to rule. A belief in equality does not
17Items 126 and 127 concern specific applications of the "rules 
of the game" and the average supportive responses for these items is 14 
percent. This is 32 percent below the average figure for the due 
process statements in Table 13. The difference is due to the drop-off 
from rhetoric to application as mentioned.
18Scott, op. cit., pp. 198-199.
264
imply that all people are biologically equal or that each citizen ought 
to possess exactly the same political influence are every other citizen. 
Political equality refers to the ability to compete on an equal basis. 
Under conditions of equality, decisions generally are made on the basis 
of majority rule— that is, regardless of the physical or social charac­
teristics of individuals. If the Laotian elite concur most strongly 
about liberty in the abstract, they disagree very strongly about politi­
cal equality, but not economic equality.
Political equality. Equalitarian values were tapped through 
statements about the ability of the people to rule themselves, to know 
their best interests in the long run, to understand the issues, or to 
pick their own leaders wisely. Support for these equalitarian features 
is believed to indicate the degree of support for "popular" democracy.
Table 16 summarizes the results of the series of statements about 
political equality. The statements express scepticism about the civic 
qualifications of the electorate and imply elitism or authoritarian as 
the way out. Our results indicate that the Laotian elites are less 
inclined to support the value of political equality than either the U.S. 
influentials or the Malaysian sample. On the average, somewhat more 
than one-fifth of our respondents chose equalitarian responses. It is 
interesting that the highest rate of agreement was with Statement 131, 
which was the most specific of the items, in political terms. Agreeing 
with the statement may have seemed to imply that the process of voting 
was unwise, and over one-third of the respondents disagreed. Neverthe­
less, in toto, about three forths of the elite appear to have little 
faith in the wisdom of the Laotian people to make the choices entrusted
TABLE 16
LAOTIAN ELITES' ATTITUDES TOWARD "POLITICAL EQUALITY,"









(N = 17) (N = 62)
129. The main trouble with democracy 
is that most people don't really 
know what's best for them. 59.2 22 14
130. It will always be necessary to 
have a few strong, capable people 
actually running everything. 51.5 39 24
131. Political "issues" and arguments 
are beyond the understanding of 
most of the voters. 62.5 26 36
132. Few people really know what is in 
their own best interest in the 
long run. 57.4 32 13
Mean 61.1 29.8 21.8
^Responses were dichotomized; the small number of "No Opinion II
responses for each item (see Appendix A for details) was ignored 
Disagreement with all statements were taken to indicate acceptance of 
political equality.
2
From Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," 
American Political Science Review, 58 (June, 1964), 369.
3
From James C. Scott, Political Ideology in Malaysia (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1968), p. 193.
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to it by popular government (thus, the country's new official name, 
"People's Democratic Republic of Laos," have a confused meaning to much 
of the elite). The pessimism recorded above probably has a basis of 
reality, since it indicates that our respondents have no illusions 
about the handicaps which a largely illiterate and low income and low 
educated electorate impose on a democracy. Nonetheless, this does not 
alter the fact that the Laotian elites are more willing to entrust the 
political system to "a few strong, capable people" than either American 
or Malaysian groups.
Some of the scepticism about equality found here may bring us 
back to the evaluations of human nature discussed above. Items 129 
and 132 imply that democracy is crippled by people's penchant to pursue 
their own short-run interests at the expense of the community, and this 
is exactly the dominant view of human nature among the 62 members of 
the elite. This orientation may predispose them to hold a low opinion 
of the possibilities for a "civic culture" in their nation.
Economic equality. While democratic norms show little penetra­
tive power, the socialist norm of economic equality among the Laotian 
elites is extremely high,according to the data in Table 17. On all four 
items dealing with the possibility of eliminating poverty and with the 
responsibility of the state for standard of living, jobs, and housing, 
the Laotian elite score remarkably higher than either the American or 
the Malaysian groups. Their degree of support is almost two-thirds higher 
than the Malaysian elite. One can speculate that "people's democratic" 
may have real meaning with reference to economic equality, but not, as
TABLE .17
LAOTIAN ELITES’ ATTITUDES TOWARD "ECONOMIC EQUALITY,"









(N = 17) (N = 62)
133. The government ought to make sure 
that everyone has a good standard 
of living. 34.4 92 97
134. I think the government should 
give a person work if he cannot 
find another job. 23.5 66 98
135. There will always be poverty, so 
people might as well get used to 
the fact. 59.6 31 89
136. Every person should have a good 
house, even if the government 
has to build for him. 14.9 58 80
Mean 33.1 61.8 91.0
Responses were dichotomized; the small number of "No Opinion" 
responses for each item (see Appendix A for details) was ignored. 
Disagreement with all statements were taken to indicate acceptance 
of economic equality.
2From Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," 
American Political Science Review, 58 (June, 1964), 369.
3
From James C. Scott, Political Ideology in Malaysia (New Haven;
Yale University Press, 1968), p. 195.
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we have seen, with reference to abstract concepts of citizens' potential 
for democratic decision making.
Cynicism Toward Politics and Political Futility
We are interested in the degree of feelings of cynicism toward 
politics and political futility— the fruits of a social negativism that 
narrow the scope of efficacious political conduct. A number of writers 
have explored these matters in Western countries, but relatively less
attention has been paid to them in Eastern countries. Political cynicism
and futility are, of course, negative qualities, rather than positive 
ones like the other traits we have mentioned so far. The purpose of
this analysis is to explore the extent of the traits rather than their
causes and consequences.
Some observers have suggested that after a number of years in 
office, the elites become increasingly cynical sbout politics and their 
colleagues. Others suspect that some of the elites are "dependents," or 
"careerists," who are disdainful of politics and apathetic. Still others 
think that some elites distrust their colleagues because they feel intel­
lectually superior to them; thus these people may feel that only bad luck 
has kept them from reaching the very highest positions. Others may believe 
politics and government are generally corrupt and evil. Such beliefs 
would be indicative of a general attitude toward "human nature;" Webster's 
Collegiate Dictionary (fifth edition) defines cynical people as those 
who are "contemptuously distrustful of human nature."
Political cynicism. Robert Agger, Marshall Goldstein, and Stanley 
Pearl, in their study of political cynicism among the American masses, 
found that the acquisition of formal education tends to produce political
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trust (non-cynicism), regardless of social class background; political
cynicism levels tend to remain tentatively constant for people with
different levels of education regardless of how much money they make; and,
19aging tends to produce more political cynicism.
In our study, the Laotian elites— a homogeneous, high income, and 
educated group— were found to have higher degree of political cynicism 
(by 23.9 percent) than the U.S. influentials, but a lesser degree (by 8.4 
percent) than the Malaysian elite. Furthermore, their absolute score 
was -.08 (the scale ranges from -1 to +1; see Appendix A). This finding 
seems to mean that the elites see themselves or their group as relatively 
average or normal; or they feel that their group is comprised of good and 
evil persons like the general population. They have confidence that "the 
government will do what is right," but they do not believe that the 
politicians "really mean what they say." They have achieved consensus in 
one our of five statements, according to McClosky's definition (see Table 18)
Feelings of futility. Feelings of futility or purposelessness are
quintessential elements in the classic notion of alienation or anomie as
20formulated by Durkheim. But the notion of futility extends beyond a 
sense of purposelessness; it also involves a sense of powerlessness.
One of the items in Table 19 taps the elite's belief that politi­
cal parties are too complex, which persons with low self-regard are much
19Robert Agger, Marshall Goldstein, and Stanley Pearl, "Political 
Cynicism; Measurement and Meaning," Journal of Politics, 23 (1961), 477- 
506.
20Dwight G. Dean, "Alienation: Its Meaning and Measurement,"
American Sociological Review, 26 (1961), 753-757. See also Elizabeth 
Douvan and Alan Walker, "The Sense of Effectiveness in Public Affairs," 
Psychological Monographs, General and Applied. 70 (1956), 1-19.
TABLE 18
LAOTIAN ELITES' ATTITUDES TOWARD "POLITICAL CYNICISM,"




U.S. Malaysian Laotian 
Influentials^ Elite^ Elite 
(N = 3,020) (N = 17) (N = 62)
137. There is practically no connection 
between what a politician says and 
what he will do once he get elected. 21.4 56 89
138. I usually have confidence that the 
government will do what is right. 18.4 23 22
139. To me, most politicians don't seem 
to really mean what they say. 24.7 69 14
140. No matter what people think, a few 
people will always run things 
anyway. 30.0 83 72
141. Most politicians can be trusted 
to do what they think is best for 
the country. 22.9 49 39
Mean 23.5 56.0 47.2
Responses were dichotomized; the small number of "No Opinion” 
responses for each item (see Appendix A for details) was ignored.
Agreement with statements 137 and 140, and disagreement with the 
other statements were taken to indicate political cynicism.
2From Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," 
American Political Science Review, 58 (June, 1964), 370.
3From James C. Scott, Political Ideology in Malaysia (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1968), p. 210.
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more likely to confess. According to this criterion, the Laotian elites 
are slightly lower in their degree of political futility than the U.S. 
influentials (2.3 percent) and much lower than the U.S. electorate (33.9 
percent). The Laotian elites are even lower in degree of futility in the 
sense of powerlessness. They perceive of themselves as important in 
Laos, seeing themselves as "a giant cogs in a hugh machine" (see Item 
142). They have very nearly achieved consensus in this sense (74.2 
percent), but the score of the American "influentials" on this item was 
even higher.
Edgar Litt points out that feelings of political cynicism and
futility are nurtured and sustained by a cluster of personality and social
factors. He mentions that "the origins of political cynicism may be
21traced to community as well as to personality roots." In other words,
he sees these feelings in terms of human nature or, in Florence Kluckhohn
and Fred Strodtbeck's framework, the man-other man value orientation, as
mentioned in Chapter IV.
Individuals who think poorly of themselves tend to think poorly
of others. They lack confidence in the honesty and amiability of others,
and their suspicion, coupled with hostility, invites a deep cynicism about
government. For example, Morris Rosenberg has shown that persons with
low self-esteem (of human basic needs) are less likely to have faith
22in their fellow men than those with high self-esteem. A lack of self-
21 Edgar Litt, "Political Cynicism and Political Futility," Journal 
of Politics. 2 (May, 1963), 319.
22Morris Rosenberg, Society and Adolescent Self-Image (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 181-182; "Misanthropy and Political 
Ideology," American Sociological Review, 21 (1956), 690-695; and, "Misan­
thropy and Attitudes Toward International Affairs," Journal of Conflict 
Resolution. 1 (1957), 340-345.
TABLE 19
LAOTIAN ELITES' ATTITUDES TOWARD "POLITICAL FUTILITY,"













142. Nothing I ever do seems to have 
any real effect on what happens 
in politics. 8.4 61.5 25.8
143. Political parties are so big 
that the average member has 
not got much to say about what 
goes on. 37.8 67.5 35.5
Mean 23.1 64.5 30.7
Responses were dichotomized; the small number of "No Opinion" 
responses for each item (see Appendix A for details) was ignored.
Agreement with all statements were taken to indicate political futility. 
American data are taken from Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology 




approval ought to incline an individual to the view that most people 
lack the understanding and temperament to participate responsibly in 
the political process, that the important issues of the day are beyond 
the grasp of most citizens, and that their choices of candidates for 
public affairs are unlikely to be either informed or sensible. The per­
son who thinks little of himself probably will think little of those in 
public life. This cynicism is likely to extend from the people in 
politics to the political institutions themselves. The man with little 
faith in his fellow citizens and the candidates they elect to office 
are not likely to have much faith in elections as a way to determine 
public policy. Thus, they tend to feel unable to influence the political 
process, and may attribute the same inefficacy to others. A natural 
consequence of such a feeling of futility in the belief that the political 
process is unresponsive: politicians don't care what the citizens want
and most citizens are in no position to make their voice heard, let alone 
secure the benefits they desire. We have found that there is no such 
negativism or indication of inefficacy among the Laotian elites.
Summary
In exploring the Laotian elite's political beliefs through 
searching for the presence or absence of liberal democratic values, we 
have found a low degree of endorsement of the general norms of liberal 
democratic thought (except in the response to abstract statements about 
free speech and opinions; on this matter consensus has been achieved). 
Nonetheless, the elites expressed their support of the socialist value 
of economic equality; 91 percent agreement was reached on this value 
(this score was about three times higher than that of the American
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Influentials, and two-thirds higher than the Malaysian elite's score). 
Our Laotian respondents' attitudes about the rules of the game are about 
at the center, implying that they are moderates. Our findings which 
deal with political cynicism and futility indicate that feelings of 
inefficacy are not widespread.
CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION AND CONJECTURES
Our concern throughout this paper has been to explore the 
Laotian elites' political culture-and-personality. In the preceding 
chapters, details of measurement have been the center of attention. Now 
we would like to consider, on the one hand, some of the broader impli­
cations of the specific findings, for we believe these findings suggest 
certain marginal notes about larger questions in the study of person­
ality and culture as these relate to politics. On the other hand, we 
also need a "good map"l to aid us in keeping "the whole Elephant" in 
view. With the elites' personality traits at hand, the time has come 
for an integrated analysis of their beliefs in terms that are both 
broader (to include traits or a single personality syndrome) and 
deeper (to include a study of predispositions to various types of 
political behavior), so that the elites' traits can be seen as inte­
grated manifestations of deep-seated psycho-cultural states. The 
"conclusions" in the following sections are appropriately modest and 
are merely conjectures, which are too tenuous to be called firm 
conclusions.
I'i'he term is suggested by M. Brewster Smith, "A Map for Analysis 
of Personality and Politics," Journal of Social Issues, 24 (July, 1968), 
15-28; and, M. Brewster Smith, ed., Social Psychology of Human Values 
(Chicago; Aldine Publishing, 1969), pp. 14-32.
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The Idea of Political Culture-and-Personallty
As we noted in Chapter I, the concept of political culture-and- 
personality begins with or, at least must include, a knowledge of 
people's basic needs and motives and involves values to which people 
are oriented by the cultural elements of their society. These needs 
and motives are the cause of striving for achievement, and values 
determine areas of gratification if the striving is successful or of 
frustration if it is not. The values also affect people's patterns of 
recognition, acceptance, approval, esteem, and occupational choices.
And since culture dictates norms and standards of behavior, it also 
serves to make one's behavior more intelligible and predictable for 
others.
In another respect, political culture-and-personality consists 
of both political consciousness and political unconsciousness.^ To be 
politically conscious is to be aware of political consequences and to 
know what one is doing and what will happen because of it. Total con­
sciousness in any area is perhaps in^ossible, but one can at least 
achieve a sophisticated awareness of the issues of time, place, self 
and others, value choices, cause and effect, and abundance and scarcity 
in the environment. The unconsciousness part lies in the arena of 
personality. It is largely in the unconscious (or subconscious) that 
one is aware of one's own identity and of one's social milieu and group 
reference, partly because they are conceptually and psychologically 
interrelated, as is evidenced in the concept of "social identity," or
^These terms are given comprehensive treatment by Robert E. Lane, 
Political Thinking and Consciousness; The Private Life of the Political 
Mind (Chicago; Markham Publishing Co., 1969).
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culture. In addition, a consciousness of identity answers the question 
"who am I?" And as an outgrowth of this, a person's political identity 
is that feature of his self-image which becomes relevant when he thinks 
about political matters.
Political culture-and-personality involves one's knowledge of 
the nature and the meaning of concepts employed in analyzing the nature 
of meaning of political ideas. It refers to the "self-in-politics," 
both in action and in thought, as well as containing inferences for 
one's approach to problem-solving in politics.
In this vein, Gordon Allport has said, "as soon as an individual's 
philosophy of life is known, his personal activities, which taken by 
themselves are meaningless, become understood."3 But to ask the elites 
about their philosophical and operational belief system is like asking 
them to tell us of their autonomic nervous systems. Many of these 
beliefs and values orientations just are; they are given. One's 
political culture-and-personality, then, comes into being through an 
eclectic absorption of defined ideas and beliefs, and serves as one's 
model for political behavior.
Tlie Political Culture-and-Personality of Laos 
The political culture-and-personality of Laos is complex. It 
has been shaped by Laotian history, geography, economic resources and 
development, the colonial experience, and postindependence problems.
To understand Lao culture-and-personality, one must comprehend such 
environments and experiences.
^Gordon Allport, Becoming (New Haven; Yale University Press, 
1960), cited by Lane, ibid.
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In Laos, the political legacy of the colonial era was limited, 
and the training experience for the elite in governing the country 
became one-dimensional. The elite would act the same whether working 
through an autocratic or a democratic political institution. Self­
doubt manifested itself in various ways after independence. Laos has 
a long history and related identity that preceded the period of French 
rule. It is not just institutionally, however, that the precolonial 
past has seemed to exercise a lasting influence over the "elite's mind" 
and the society. Both the regal and mystical elements of traditional 
Lao culture shape the basic laws and authority of the elite.
Like other countries in Southeast Asia, Laos is rooted and still 
is very much in the mold of "plural society"— that is, one with more 
than two societies and cultures, existing within the structure of the 
state. This problem poses the question then, "is Laos really a nation?"
The postcolonial "new state" of Laos, as other colonial countries, 
was explicitly expected to adopt democratic political institutions and 
to follow democratic "political rules" so that the Lao people selected 
their leaders and otherwise governed themselves. Moreover, the 
Laotian elites wanted their country to be ruled democratically. Their 
own "identity" and "self-confidence" crises required them to prove that 
they were not inferiors by managing the country as democratically as the 
peoples of the West manage their own. But, democratic political 
institutions proved to be too foreign to the tradition, experience, and, 
possibly, the needs of Laos. Experimentation with democratic institu­
tions left a strong inçrint on the political environment of Laos in 
the 1960-70’s. Beginning with the second half of the 1970's, a new 
political institution arose stressing "economic equality"; the so-called
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"people's democracy" (following the Chinese model) has been applied to 
Laos. It is reasonable, at least, as Philippines Foreign Minister 
Carlos Romulo has said, that developing countries have discarded 
"Westem-style democracy" for "a military or an authoritarian regime" 
for the purpose of survival.^
There were, and still are, several aspects of the economic 
environment of major importance to the nature and functioning of the 
national political system of Laos. The preponderance of population 
consists of peasants and mountain minority groups of very modest means. 
Tne economy within which they function, moreover, is mainly agricultural 
and extractive. Politically, these circumstances have meant two 
things in particular: (1) that there is an enormous gap between the
wealthy ruling class and most of the people, and (2) that most of the 
ruling elite have had as one of their leading policy goals the moderni­
zation of their country’s economy. The elite has sought modernization 
both for its own sake and to lessen the continuing "neocolonial" 
dependence of their economy on the more developed nations.
Throughout modern history, Laos has been a subordinate area in 
international politics; the object, indeed, the victim, of the foreign 
policies of more formidable powers. This international setting has 
Influenced and also shaped the elites’ political culture-and-personality 
into a unique configuration.
The political situation threatened the Laotian elite in the 
1960s. Growing consciousness of the Lao society and culture posed many 
difficulties to the elite regarding how to rule Laos in order to be
^Carlos Romulo, Speaking at the Manila Rotary Club, Manila, 
13 December 1975.
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congruent with Lao culture-and-personality and the values of moderni­
zation. Furthermore, at least, a small group of the elite has selected 
the socialist way to be the total answer or to be the best path to 
modernization.5 It is difficult to predict the future of socialism in 
Laos, but it seems that a political system must be designed to meet 
the needs and nature of man.
Governments in Southeast Asia have generally been ones of men, 
not of institutions, as evidenced under Sukarno in Indonesia, U Nu in 
Burma, and more recently under the Marcos regime in the Philippines. 
Even where "legislatures" or "elections" exist, they are largely forms, 
not effective elements in these highly personalized political systems. 
In Laos too, it is probable that the fate of the nation is dependent 
upon the quality of the men who rule the country rather than the 
institutions.
Conclusions About the Laotian Elites' Characteristics 
The political nature of the elite is, as pointed out by Gordon 
Allport,G merely one aspect of the whole personality, and the person­
ality as a whole is not the sum total of specific reactions but rather 
a congruent system of attitudes, each element of which is intelligible 
only in the light of the total pattern. "A man's political values 
reflect the characteristic modes of his adjustment to political life."^
^On this point, see Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of 
Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967).
^Gordon W. Allport, "The Composition of Political Attitudes," 
The American Journal of Sociology. 35 (1930), 220-228.
?Ibid.. p. 228.
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Having explored in parts the three interlocked components of the 
elites' attitudes— affective, cognitive, and behavioral— we found their 
psycho-cultural characteristics are not very far from the "middle-way" 
of Laotian life. Figure 5 represents the summary of their character­
istics. The absolute scores for elite characteristics are in general 
at about the center, or midpoint, of the scale. Some of the more 
skewed characteristics will now be summarized.
Support of Free Speech and Opinions
Strangely enough, the findings reveal that the Laotian political- 
bureaucratic elite is a group of people who highly believe in and 
support the free speech and opinion doctrines. Such doctrines are 
perhaps the best known of the elements of liberal democratic ideology.
In the same vein, James Scott has also found that such doctrines appear 
to have significantly penetrated the belief system of Malaysian 
administrators. 8 While the elite eulogizes freedom of speech and 
opinions, they do not believe in specific application of free speech 
and procedural rights. This is a persuasive indication that the 
democratic beliefs of the Laotian elite, like those of most of the 
political elites in other developing countries,^ are formalistic and 
tend to crumble under pressure.
^James C. Scott, Political Ideology in Malaysia (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 187-197.
^The Indian government appears to conform to the same pattern, 
see Myron Weidner, Political Scarcity: Public Pressure and Political





















































Sup. for Freedom of 
Speech & Opinions
3
Rules of the Game
3 Economic Equality
COr4 EntrepreneurialAttitude
3 Constant-Pie Orientafi nn


























Stress on Economic Equality
The second striking characteristic of the Laotian elite Is that 
they have accepted the socialist norms of economic equality. They 
believe that It Is the responsibility of the state to provide a decent 
job, a decent house, and an adequate Income to the Laotian people.
This finding suggests that the chronic economic distress of Laos at the 
present time may be highly upsetting to the elites.
Medium High Levels of Risk-Taking In Decisions, Dogmatism, and 
Authoritarianism
The elite appears to be approximately In the mlddle-range for 
risk-taking In decisions, dogmatism, and authoritarianism. According 
to the Interpretations of previous studies, our findings that the 
Laotian elite scores at the mlddle-range on the dogmatism scale, may 
Indicate that they will be able to make only moderately effective 
political leaders because their central or primitive beliefs allow 
them little flexibility In assimilating new Information or In opening 
up their perception of reality. They only function at a moderate level 
of effectiveness In changing or challenging situations that are 
ambiguous. While It Is undoubtedly correct that dogmatic, authori­
tarian groups can serve useful political ends at times when political 
conditions are Inherently In a state of flux, It Is hypothesized here
Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York; Basic 
Books, 1960), p. 211. Rokeach has found that In new and different 
situations, persons with closed minds, because of their anxieties, simply 
cannot function effectively. Further, this Inability to function Is 
due to their perception of the world as threatening, rather than their 
Intellectual ability. For a replication of Rokeach's work (In a study 
which analyzed all the range of scores, not just the extremes), see 
Samuel Flllenbaum and Arnold Jackson, "Dogmatism and Anxiety In Relation 
to Problem Solving: An extension of Rodeach's Results," Journal of
Abnormal and Social Psychology. 63 (1960), 212-214.
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that, sooner or later, a dogmatic individual will be self-defeating as 
a political leader. That is to say, his actions will be dysfunctional 
in terms of his political goals.
Concerning the political relevance of the types of cognitive 
functioning, Rokeach suggests many observations: 1) Dogmatic individuals
are susceptible to appeal from authorities that to them are positive—  
appeals that they may act on without a n a l y s i s 2) Problem solving 
proceeds more smoothly in closed-minded persons when new beliefs are 
presented all at once rather than when presented g r a d u a l l y b y  pre­
senting completed sets of ideas (an ideology) as a whole, resistance 
is lowered as the ideas can now be accepted without being analyzed 
(providing the authority from which they came is positive).^3 3)
They will by virtue of having relatively great isolation within their 
belief systems, find it difficult to see logical contradictions 
between b e l i e f s . 14 Equally important: "in the language of politics,
isolation within a belief system may be thought of as the structural 
basis for party-line thinking, and, also, of the inability to defect 
from an inherently contradictory s y s t e m . "15 Thus, persons with closed 
belief systems, because of the isolation between their beliefs, may
llRokeach, op. cit., p. 225.
IZjbid.
13por some more details see F. Restle, M. Andrews, and M.
Rokeach, "Differences Between Open- and Closed-Mind Subjects on Learning- 
Set and Oddity Problems," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 68 
(1964), 648-654.
l^Rokeach, op. cit., p. 245.
ISlbid.. p. 288.
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sustain contradictory ideas, become "trapped within impossible systems
without knowing it" and struggle for unobtainable solutions. 4) The
elites not only tend to be extreme in ideology (and perhaps skewed
toward the conservative end), they have also been shown to tend to
conform "without question" to the opinions of authorities that, for
them, are possible. Just as the authoritarian person grants positive
authority to individuals who have the outward appearance of positive
authority and to individuals who have the outward symbols of status
and power, there are some suggestions that dogmatic persons evidence
a similar phenomenon.
Several case studies of dogmatism (for example of Presidents
Hoover, Wilson, and politician Schumacher) remind us that the dogmatic
leader tends to be an ineffective and dysfunctional leader in relation
to the person's avowed political goals. However, Jeanne Knutson remarks:
The prime importance of a positive authority— an authority 
which speaks to personality needs, and not to the logic of 
the situation, in determining how a dogmatic person will 
assess the new information that the world in which he lives 
and breathes and has his being constantly presents him— and 
on which he must find a basis for opinions and action.
Concerning authoritarianism, political elites generally are
likely to hold some degree of authoritarianism in their personality
structure. Politics, according to Lasswell, can be conceptualized as a
study of power relationships, the political personality can be considered
R, N, Vidulich and I. P. Kaimon, "The Effect of Information 
Source Status and Dogmatism upon Conformity Behavior," Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 63 (1961), 639-642.
17Jeanne N. Knutson, The Human Basis of the Polity (New York: 
Aldine Publishing, 1973), p. 105.
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1 Ras a particular type in which the need for power is the dominant value. °
He later comments:
The authoritarian type is the one most closely approximating 
the "perfect" politician in the sense of one whose primary 
goal value is power, whose preferred base value is also power 
(threat or use of extreme deprivations in any sphere), and 
whose basic expectations are that the most important human 
relations are matters of power.
The Laotian elite, with an absolute score on authoritariansim 
of +.31, fairly well fits Lasswell's definition of the "perfect politi­
cians." However, this is an assunçtion rather than documented 
empirical fact. D. Spitz quotes Lasswell's suggestion that "all top 
leaders in democratic or totalitarian regimes . . . tend to be recruited 
from fundamental personality patterns that are not primarily oriented to 
power."20 Such an assumption could be another study in the case of 
Laos.
More specifically, the Laotian elite is fairly rigidly directed 
toward a mastery of the environment. Because of their stereotyped 
conception, they hardly do justice to all the possible aspects of 
reality.21 In this sense, they may be a slight danger to free society.
^®Harold D. Lasswell, "Personality, Prejudice, and Politics," 
World Politics, 3 (April, 1951), 340.
l^Harold D. Lasswell, Power and Personality (New York: Viking
Press, 1948), p. 17.
2 % ,  Spitz, "Power and Personality: The Appeal to the 'Right
Man' in Democratic States," American Political Science Review, 52 
(March, 1958), 90.
2lElve Frenkel-Brunswik, "Environmental Controls and the 
Impoverishment of Thought," in Totalitarianism, ed. by Carl J. Friedrich 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 187.
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Spitz has stated that "an authoritarian individual can act democrati­
cally in times of a permissive, open, anxiety-free situation."2% It is 
also realized that, in times of stress, because of the authoritarian 
personality's anxieties, the elite will be led to project their hos­
tilities in situations involving choice of political activities in ways 
which are slightly harmful to the maintenance of an open society and 
equalitarian interpersonal relationships.
In addition to these characteristics, the authoritarian person­
ality type of the elite suggests that "sympathy for the weak cannot 
develop where there is ingrained fear of weakness and where the weak 
furnishes the only practical target of aggression."^3 In other words, 
they hold their basic authoritarian bias.
The Rejection of Liberal Democratic Doctrines
On the negative end of continuum, the elites show their low 
belief in the political equality conponent of liberal democratic 
ideology. Their attitudes toward specific applications of free speech 
and opinions, for example, is low at -.54.
Equality has been one of the keystones of democracy since 
antiquity. Today's proponents of "participatory democracy" draw from 
a long tradition of speculation about how to make man effectively the 
political equal of his fellows. Throughout the long history of the 
concept of equality, the controversy over its definition has spilled 
beyond the bounds of political institutions to involve broader social 
and economic issues.
22spitz, op. cit.
2^Frenkel-Brunswik, op. cit., p. 195.
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Classical democracy implies the most egalitarian distribution 
of influence, whereas authoritarian democracy seems to imply a narrowly 
restricted pattern, in which citizens are subject to manifold duties 
and controls. Polyarchal democrats attribute a moderately passive role 
to ordinary citizens, while liberal democrats appear to support a 
distribution of influence less egalitarian than that endorsed by 
classical democrats, but more egalitarian than that supported by the 
polyarchal democrats.
The evidence from the questionnaire, as summarized in Figure 5, 
confirms that the Laotian elite falls in the category of moderate 
authoritarian democracy. While they approved freedom of speech and 
opinions in general terms, they seem to despise specific applications 
of it and interpreted it narrowly. However, they emphasize economic 
equality as a substitute for democratic values.
A factor analytic examination of the relationship of the elite's 
values concerning political equality to other values also supports these 
conclusions. The examination indicates that the elite's belief in 
political equality is significantly related to economic equality, speci­
fic applications of free speech, dogmatism, entrepreneurial attitudes, 
and faith-in-people. (See Interrelation Matrix of Elite's Traits in 
Appendix A.) They believe that political matters cannot be influenced 
by ordinary people as indicated in the correlation of the political 
equality variable with the cynicism toward politics variable.
(r » .38, p,<,05). They look at the country as having limited goods to 
distribute to the people and then place heavy stress on their belief 
in economic equality.
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Indeed, political equality is a value that can be variously 
interpreted and applied. An elites' orientation to this value must be 
studied within the context of its orientation toward many other values, 
and most especially within the context of the total economic environ­
ment of the nation being studied. For example, the Laotian elite is
quite apt to argue for a "political equality" that will help all the 
people to share equally in the benefits governmental activity, while 
the well-intentioned elite of England is more apt to be concerned with 
equality of inputs, e.g., voting rights. The difference is in the 
economic environment, because the Laotian elite knows that the current 
primary concern of the average citizen of Laos must be with the
finding of food (rice) for his cooking pot.
A Closing Note
Unlike other animals that appear to act and react according 
to instinct or training, man is required to reason in order to formu­
late behavioral patterns consistent with his belief-value systems.
Human behavior is never haphazard since it is always in harmony with 
unconscious or even conscious value systems exposed in man's culture- 
and-personality. It is the author's earnest hope, before terminating, 
that this kind of study of the identity of the "men-at-the-top" in one 
small part of the world may contribute, in some measure, to cause more 
understanding among mankind and to good international relationships.
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Dissertation
As mentioned at the outset of the study, this paper is neces­
sarily exploratory and descriptive because it was formulated at a high 
level of generality, it deals with the highest possible unit of analysis.
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it concerns sensitive areas of field research, and it encompasses find­
ings and orientations from a number of academic disciplines.
In bur study of political culture-and-personality we have been 
concerned with two distinct areas that have as yet only tenuous links 
between them. On the one hand we have a generalization about Laotian 
national culture, which blends eventually into history, economics, 
and cultural anthropology. On the other hand, we study the psychologi­
cal characteristics of the elite. The mixing of the two areas needs 
more work by social scientists.
J. Milton Singer has pointed out that neither psychological 
nor socio-cultural theories by themselves focus chiefly on behavior. 
The primary concern of personality theorists is "the inner tendency 
system of the individual and how it is produced" while sociologists 
place major emphasis on "socio-cultural systems and how they are pro­
d u c e d . The variables or psycho-cultural traits isolated by either 
group are of predictive and heuristic value in the study of behavior 
only in stable situations; they may be much less useful in ambiguous 
or highly fluid situations.
Similarly, Psychologist Raymond Cattell, a distinguished 
psychological trait specialist, commented recently that:
It has irritated many a student of social sciences that 
social psychological and sociological theories often mix 
no better than oil and water. The sociologist and the 
cultural anthropologist virtually ignore personality and 
seek explanations in laws of the larger organism: the
group and its culture. When they come to the molecule 
level— that of individual behavior— they tend to argue
24J. Milton Yinger, "Research Implications of a Field View of 
Personality," American Journal of Sociology. 68 (March, 1963), 580; 
see also J. Milton Yinger, Toward a Field Theory of Behavior (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Company, 1965).
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that differences of role and custom account for the 
observed pattern of behavior, whereas the psychologist 
sees the differences between groups in their performances 
and certainly the many events of history as fully appli­
cable only by individual personalities . . . .  The 
sociologist points to behavior in driving along the street 
in terms of traffic lights and car signals that virtually 
obey; the psychologist accounts for accidents and impor­
tant differences in speed and control in terms of
personality.25
Yet, there is really no contradiction; instead, the approaches comple­
ment each other. A formal model in the multivariate tradition needs 
to be developed to bring them t o g e t h e r , 26 This is true because the 
individual or the elite modes of action are largely expressions of the 
personality and dynamic structural factors, which are by nature multi­
variate.
It is evident that the choice of personality variables for 
inclusion in recent studies is ordinarily not made on the basis of a 
systematic framework of personality theory. Each investigator 
selects a few variables in which he is particularly interested or 
for which quantitative measures are available. The need remains for 
a more inclusive, standardized, and theoretically comprehensive 
analytic scheme in terms of which culture-and-personality can be 
described and conçared cross-culturally.27
25Raymond B. Cattell, Personality and Mood by Questionnaire 
(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1973), p. 465.
2&See R. J. Rummel, Applied Factor Analysis (Evanston: North­
western University Press, 1970).
27por a discussion of the same ideas, see, Alex Inkeles and 
R. A. Levinson, "National Character: The Study of Model Personality
and Socio-Cultural Systems," in The Handbook of Social Psychology,
Vol. IV, 2nd ed., ed. by Gardner Linzey and Elliot Aronson (Reading, 
Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1969), pp. 442-460.
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The theory and data concerned here are more, or less selective, 
and some hypotheses are based more on impressionistic observations 
than on empirical evidence. In certain respects, this somewhat grandi­
ose model may be compared with a spaceship that can be used to explore 
other planets but would run the risk of disintegrating upon descending 
to the earth. For this reason, the reader is advised to be equipped 
with a parachute like a spaceship pilot, and to consider what has been 
said in this paper as highly speculative and at best hypothetical.
Suggestions for Further Research
Given the suggested qualities and defects of this paper,
further research may refine the model by making it more dynamic through
systematic gathering of data. For example, systematic selection of
attitudinal or psycho-cultural scales by factor analytical methods and
multidimensional correlations may be needed. Further, a more thorough
study of the characteristics of both eastern and western elites,
(especially in developing areas) may shed more light on elite theory,
on the basis of comparisons in comparative politics, and on tne impact
of foreign policy-making and international relationships as a whole.
To bring the paper to an end, Lasswell's words are particularly
appropriate and encouraging:
Elite studies are the heart of research into the world 
revolution of our time. Since an essential criterion of 
revolution is change in elite structure. The hypothesis 
that a world revolution is underway during our epoch can 
only be verified when basic information enables us to 
estimate the depth and extent of elite changes throughout
the globe.28
28Harold D. Lasswell, Danial L e m e r  and C. E, Rothwell, The 
Comparative Study of Elites; An Introduction and Bibliography (Stanford: 
Standard University Press, 1952), p. 13.
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important to Lao aoeiety than the bualneaa- 
pcraon and Che namifacturer. 59.7 25.a 11.3 l.b 1.0 1.5161 0.7775 + .u5
2. The findinpn of ncieacc may aoneday ahou that 
many of our moat deeply-held bellefa are wrong. 5b. 5 32.3 4.8 0.3 0.0 1.6929 0.8492 +.o4
3. Human nature being what it is. there muat 
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have enough will power. 58.1 19.4 22.6 0.Ü 0.0 1.6452 0.8250 + .37
7. Sex criminals deserve more than prison; they 
should be whipped in public or worse. 48.4 17.7 24.2 9.7 0.0 1.9516 1.03 38 +.36
8. Bosses should say just what is to be done 
exactly how to do it if they expect us to do 
a good job. 82.3 1.6 9.7 6.3 0.0 1.4032 0.9062 +.72
9. An insult to one's honor should always he 
punished. 72.6 19.4 8.1 0,0 0.0 1.3548 0.6247 +.78
10. Everything can really he predicted by astro­
logy. 11.3 ' 69.4 6.5 12.9 0.0 2.2097 0.8060 +.30
11. It it not good to think too lauch. 45.2 11.3 27.4 16.1 0.0 2.1452 1.1619 +.21
12. Nowadays the courts give more punishment to 
lawbreakers than they ought to give. 14.5 50.0 19.4 16.J 0.0 2.3710 0.9199 +.14
13. People een be divided into two classes: the 
stroiag and the weak. 51.6 29.0 17.7 1.6 0.0 1.6935 0.8150 + .56
14. There are eo many evil people nowadays that 
it is dangerous to go out alone. 72.6 8.1 17.7 1.6 0.0 1.4839 0.8375 +.66














15. Host people can ba trusted. 14.5 25.8 46.8 12.9 0.0 2.5806 0.8899 -.09
16. Host people are inclined to help others. 45.2 32.3 9.7 11.3 1.6 1.8387 1.0191 + .45
*17. If you do not watch yourself, people will 
take advantage of you. 66.1 30.6 0.0 0.0 3.2 1.2742 0.5134 -.81
*18. No one is going to care much what happens 
to you, when you get ill-fated and poverty- 
stricken. 59.7 19.4 11.3 9.7 0.0 1.7097 1.0062 -.54
19. Husuin nature is fundamentally cooperative. 71.Ü 11.3 11.3 6.5 0.0 1.5323 0.9284 + .65
Avaragc -.07
NOTE: AsCcrlik (*) la negative direction item.
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TRAIT III. lUKlAL ANXim
Itcn













20. Hou ncrvouH aro you wlicn yuu liuvc to talk 
In front of a group of acvoral people? 11.3 32. J 33.9 19.4 3.2 2.5484 1.021)7 -.09
21. Whan you are doing a job, how much does the 
fear that you might not bo doing too well 
keep you from doing your boat? 14.3 27.4 38.7 14.5 4.8 2.2742 1.0344 -.06
22. How much do you worry when your superior 
tells you to come to see him without tell­
ing you why he wants to see you? 19.4 29.d 25.8 22.6 3.2 2.451U 1.1313 -.02
23. How much do you worry about how well you get 
along with people? 9.7 30.6 33.9 21.0 4.8 2.5645 1.0719 -.13
24. When you have been In a situation la which 
you have done poorly or made some mistake, 
how do you keep on worrying about It? 25.8 46.8 24.2 1.6 1.6 1.9839 0.7930 + .36
Average 16.1 33.2 31.3 15.8 3.5 2.3645 1.0115 + .1)1
TRAIT IV. NEUROTIC ANXIETY
Itan













25. How afraid are you when you hear thunder 
or see lightening? 11.3 38.7 41.9 8.1 0.0 2.4677 0.7975 +.02
26. When you go to a dentist, how much do you 
find yourself worrying about the pain you 
will feel? 14.5 22.6 48.4 14.5 0.0 2.6290 0.9022 -.13
27. How often do you have trouble going to 
sleep because you are worrying about some­
thing that has happened to you or some 
thought you have had? • 19.4 27.4 46.8 4.8 1.6 2.3387 0.8970 +.05
28. How often do you feel restless on holidays, 
whan you have nothing In particular to do? 19.4 25.8 48.4 6.5 0.0 2.4194 0.8716 +.02
29. When you are In a high piece, how frightened 
are you when you look down? 4.8 24.2 64.5 6.5 0.0 2.7258 0.6518 -.22
30. How often do you feel uneasy or uncomfortable 
without knowing why you are feeling that way? 9.7 12.9 67.7 9.7 0.0 2.7742 0.7496 -.27
31. In comparison to other people you know, how 
much do you worry about your physical health? 19.4 29.0 30.6 19.4 1.6 2.4677 1.0583 .00
32. When you go to the doctor (or when he comes 
to you) because you do not feel well, how 
worried are you about what the doctor will 
say is wrong with you? 22,6 61.3 12.9 1.6 1.6 3.0000 0.7620 + .45
33. Ho" ultan In the past year have you had 
nightmares or dreams from which you have 
awakened feeling nervous or frightened? 19.4 54.6 21.0 3.2 1.6 2.8548 0.8200 +.33
34. How much do you worry about your mental 
health. In comparison to other people you 
know? 14.5 35.5 35.5 11.3 3.2 2.3710 0.9711 + .03
33. Ho"v often do you find It hard to pay atten­
tion to your work because disturbing or 
frightening thoughts come Into your mind? 46.8 6.5 45.2 0.0 1.6 1.9516 0.9907 + .28
35. In comparison with other people of your age, 
how nervous do you feel about fighting with 
somoone? 41.9 25.8 17.7 12.9 1.6 1.9839 1.0850 + .33
37. How often do you find yourself worrying 
about a particular person, situation or 
happonlng, even though you know that Chore 
Ij little reason for worrying? 9.7 29.0 38.7 22.6 0.0 2.7419 0.9147 -.18
38. How afrsld of drowning are you when you are 
noer a bod/ of water. In swlmilng, or In a 
boat? 16.1 25.8 43.5 14.5 0.0 2.5645 0.9267 -.07














*J9. I try to aoe what other» think before I 
take a at.md, 54.8 25.8 14.3 4.8 0.0 1.0935 0.89Du -.37
40. In a group, I take rcHponelblllty for get­
ting people Introduced. 59.7 22.6 12.9 4.8 0.0 l.o290 0.8842 ■f.ull
*41. I have to atop and think beforo I act, 
even In trifling matter». 72.6 27.4 0.3 0.0 0.0 1.2742 0.4461 -.So
*42. I am emborraeaed with people I do not 
know well. 24.2 51.6 19.4 4.8 0.0 2.8710 0.8129 -.3u
*43. I would rather not have very much reapon- 
elblllty for other people. 50.0 37.1 a.i'v 4.8 0.0 1.6774 0.8186 -.00
*44. When In a group of people I have trouble 
thinking of right thlnga to talk about. 19.4 35.5 45.2 0.0 0.0 2.2581 0.7606 -.15
45. I have a natural talent for Influencing 
people. 38.7 37.1 22.6 1.6 0.0 1.8713 0.8129 +.44
46. There are tlmea when I act like a coward. 6.5 21.0 61.3 9.7 1.6 2.1613 0.7447 -.23
*47. I hate to tell othere tdut to do. 24.2 24.2 43.5 8.1 0.0 2.3548 0.9349 -.07
48. I like to give ordere and get thing» 
moving. 67.7 21.0 8.1 1.6 1.6 1.4032 0.7287 +.73
49. I rafuae luny thlnga which I regret after­















50. A peraon baa to live pretty much for today 
and let tomorrow take care of itaelf. 53.2 4.8 25.8 14.5 1.6 1.9839 1.1980 +.23
51. Ihaae day» a peraon really doea not know 
who he can make friande with. 32.3 17.7 46.8 3.2 0.0 2.2097 0.9356 +.15
52. The lot of the average nan ia getting 
worae, not batter. 41.9 8.1 37.1- 11.3 1.6 2.1452 1.1337 +.16
Average 42.5 10.2 36.6 9.7 1.0 2.1129 1.0891 +.19













*53. One ahould not become a cloae friend of 
aooeone who doea not pay any attention to 
the ecaraon aocial cuatoma of the group. 58.1 14.5 12.9 14.5 0.0 1.8387 1.1244 -.44
*54. A peraon ahould arrive to ba aucceaaful 
even if It mean» he will be unpopular and 
others will be jealoua of him. 77.4 14.5 6.5 1.6 0.0 1.3226 0.6666 -.80
*55. It la Important not to droaa or act very 
differently from other people or elaa you 
will loae their respect. 58.1 22.6 17.7 0.0 1.6 1.5645 0.7956 -.61
*56. My opinion 1» elmoat never swayed at all 
by editorials In the newapapera. 37.1 12.9 33.9 16.1 0.0 2.7097 1.1272 -.11
*57. Ae long as I do what I think la right. It 
doea not amtter at all what my‘family, 
friends, and coonunity think of me. 33.9 17.7 37.1 9.7 1.0 2.7258 1.08Ü2 -.15
Average 52,9 16.4 21.6 8.4 0.6 2.0323 0.8383 -.42
NOTE* Aatfflmk (*) mark ia nexaclve direction Item.













38. Evan In a rich country, if population 
grows rapidly, thora la great dangar that 
thare will soon not be enough wealth to 
go around. 30.6 21.0 37.1 11.3 0.0 2.2903 1.0221 +.11
39. Those who get ahead get ahead at the ex­
panse of others. 11.3 9.7 66.1 11.3 1.6 2.7419 0.8608 -.28
60. Whan an Individual or group gains. It 
usually awans that another Individual 
or group loses. 62.9 16.1 19.4 0.0 1.6 1.3323 0.8173 +.61
61. Any govamnant that wants to help the poor 
people will have to take something away 
from the rich In order to do It. 53.2 17.7 12.9 16.1 0.0 1.9194 1.1402 +.40
Avc7<ga 39.5 16.1 33.9 9.7 0.8 2.1209 0.9602 +.21













62. An article for sale Is worth what people 
will pay for It. 73.8 9.7 11.3 0.0 3.2 1.2903 0.7045 +.75
63. Seniority should bs given greater weight 
than merit In giving promotions. 17.7 4.8 30.0 27.4 0.0 2.8710 1.0078 -.32
64. Incentive pay should not ba used because 
workers will ovsrwork and ruin thalr 
health or destroy jobs for others. 37.1 9.7 46.8 4.8 1.6 2.1613 1.0348 +.13
63. Horksrs should not ba promoted to managerial 
jobs even If they are qualified because It 
would destroy the respect for authority which 
the workers must have toward management. 33.9 9.7 35.3 . 21.0 0.0 2.4339 1.1587 .00
66. The amount of education a person has should 
be a major factor In detarmlnlng his pay 
scale. 41.9 19.4 33.3 1.6 1.6 1.9355 0.9482 +.32
67. I approve of a career of job outside the 
home for married women. 45.2 41.9 8.1 3.2 1.6 1.6613 0.7817 +.59
68. A good son should try to live near his 
parents even If It means giving up a good 
job In another part of the country. 3.2 0.0 66.1 29.0 1.6 3.1774 0.7301 -.39
69. The most Important factor In the success of 
a cosmerclal firm Is the establishment of a 
reputation for the excellence of Ite products. 80.6 9.7 8.1 0.0 1.6 1.2419 0.6140 +.82
70. A man with money cannot really learn how to 
behave In polite society If he has not had 
the proper upbringing. 72.6 19.4 1.6 6.5 0.0 1.4194 0.8142 + .75
Average 45.3 13.8 29.2 . 10.3 1.2 2.2016 0.8660 +.27













71. In an Important decision, you should not 
wait until everyone Is agreed. It Is 
batter to make a few people angry than 
to delay the decision until It Is 
unanimous. 46.8 33.9 8.1 9.7 1.6 1.7742 0.9742 + .50
Avtratl* + .50













72. Planning only makes a person unlmppy, 
since your plans hardly ever work out 
anyway. 37.1 11.3 27.4 24.2 0.0 2.3871 1.2016 + .05
73. When a man is born, the success he is going 
to have is already In the stars, so he 
might as well accept it and not fight against 
it. 40.3 6,j 32.3 21.1 0.0 2.3387 1.2041 + .06
Average 38.7 a.y 29.3 22.b Ü.0 2.3Û29 1.2Uo9 1-.Ü6
TRAIT XII. SUPERIOR AS VINDICTIVE AND THREATENING
Itea
Ho. Steeeaenta
Strongly Strongly No Standard Absolute
Agree Agree Dleegree Disagree Opinion Mean Deviation Score
74. A subordinate who questions his superior's 
decisions will usually find that his 
superior will hold a grudge against him 
thereafter. 24.2 14.5 40.3 16.1 4.8 2.3971 1.1550 -.05
73. Most subordinates are soasuhat afraid of 
thair superiors. 19.4 27.4 35.5 12.9 4.8 2.3226 1.0742 +.03
76. Onea a peraon gets authority over others, 
ha is apt to use it to boss around others 
and to show what a big man he ia. 51.6 19.4 22.6 3.2 3.2 1.7079 0.9569 +.47




Strongly Strongly No Standard Absolute
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Opinion Mean Deviation Score
77. Most people just do not give a "damn" 
for others.
78. Nations which have opposing ideologies 
have nothing at all in coenon with one 
another.
79. It is only a natural for a person to be 
rather fearful for the future.
80. Once I get involved in a heated discus­
sion, I just cannot stop.
81. In a heated discussion, I generally 
become so involved in Uhat I am going 
to say that I forget to listen to what 
others are saying.
82. It is better to ba a dead hero than to 
be a live coward.
83. I would like it if I would find someone 
who would tell me how to solve my 
persons problems.
84. Even though I do not like to admit this 
even to myself, my secret ambition is 
to become e greet man like Genthi.
85. A person who thinks primarily of his own 
happiness should be hatod and despised.
86. • The main thing in life is for e person
to want to do something important.
87. There ere two kinds of people in thie 
world I Those wtio ere for the truth end 
those who ere against the truth.
88. In a discussion I often find it necessary 
to repeat myself several time* to make 
sure I am being understood.
89. If given the chance, I would do something 








16.1 3.2 2.1935 1.2027 +.11
16.1 1.6 2.2742 1.1663 +.08
0.0 1.6 1.5645 0.7099 +.64
14.5 0.0 2.5484 1.0109 -.10
12.9 9.7 51.6 22.6 3-2 2.7742 1.0383 -.31
80.6 6.5 9.7 0.0 3.2 1.2258 0.6579 +.79
77.4 12.9 6.5 0.0 3.2 1.2258 0.6069 +.81
67.7 6.5 24.2 0.0 1.6 1.5323 0.8747 +.59
72.6 12.9 12.9 1.6 0.0 1.4355 0.7750 +.71
72.6 19.4 0.5 1.6 0.0 1.3710 0.6776 +.77
01.3 17.7 17.7 3.2 0.0 l.o290 0.8842 +.58
66.1 22.6 0.5 4.8 0.0 1.5000 0 . 8181 +.09














90. Tliore ts KO miicli Co bo done nnd no Ittclo 
elno In whleli Co do 1C. 61.3 24.2 11.3 1.6 l.u 1.5000 0.7777 +.66
91. In Che hlnCory of iminklnd. Chore hove pro­
bably been June a very small number of 
really yreac Chliikern. 58.1 21.0 17.7 0.0 3.2 1.5 323 0.8175 + .uO
92. There are a number of people 1 liavo come Co 
hace because of Che Chlngs chey stand for 
or believe In. 30.6 16.1 46.8 6.5 0.0 2.29 0 3 0.9736 + .09
93. Fundamentally, cho world we live In Is a 
pretty lonesome place. 21.0 8.1 31.6 19.4 0.0 2.6935 1.0095 -.20
94. Unfortunately many people with whom I have 
discussed Important social and moral prob­
lems do not really understand what is 
going on. 58.1 11.3 22.6 6.5 1.6 1.7419 1.Ü3J7 +.46
95. Man by himself is a helpless and miserable 
creature. 30.6 3.2 43.5 22.6 0.0 2.5806 1.1437 -.12
96. The highest form of govammenc is a demo­
cracy and Che highest form of democracy is 
a govammenc run by chose who are most 
intalliganc. 75.8 11.3 4.8 4.8 3.2 1.3226 0.8186 +.74
97. A parson who gets enthusiastic about Coo 
many causes Is likely to be a "wlshy- 
weehy" or Indecisive sort of parson. 40.3 21.0 17.7 17.7 3.2 2.3645 1.1896 +.24
98. To comproed.se with our political opponents 
is dangerous because it usually leads to Che 
betrayal of our own side. 21.0 4.8 61.3 11.3 1.6 2.5968 0.9912 -.19
99. In times like these, a person must be pretty 
selfish if he considers primarily his own 
happiness. 53.2 17.7 22.6 4.8 1.6 1.7581 3.9786 +.46
100. It is only natural that a person would have 
a cuch better knowledge of the ideas ha 
believes in then with ideas which he opposes. 54.8 38.7 4.8 0.0 1.6 1.4677 0.6148 +.72
101. Even though freedom of speech for all groups 
is a good goal, it is unfortunately nec­
essary to restrict the freedom of certain 
political groups. 43.5 21.0 24.2 8.1 3.2 1.9032 1.0581 + .34
102. Of ell the different philosophies which 
exist In the world, there is probably only 
one which is correct. 25.8 3.2 . 53.2 16.1 1.6 2.5645 1.0869 -.15
103. A group which tolerates too many differ­
ences of opinion among its own members 
cannot exist for very loag. 64.5 22.6 8.1 1.6 3.2 1.4032 0.7505 +.70
104. Host ideas which get printed nowadays are 
not worth the paper they are printed on. 8.1 8.1 61.3 19.4 3.2 2.8548 0.9306 -.38
105. In the long run, the best way to live is to 
choose friends and associates whose pre­
ferences end beliefs are the same as one's 
own. ' 56.5 22.6 9.7 8.1 3.2 1.6290 0.9876 +.55
106. It is often desirable to reserve judgment 
about what is going on until one has had a 
chance to hear the opinions of those one 
respects. 59.7 17.7 21.0 0.0 1.6 1.5806 0.8337 +.58
107. The worst crime a person could commit is to 
publicly attack the people who believe in 
the same thing as he doss. 50.0 14.5 22.6 11.3 1.6 1.9194 1.1115 + .35
108. It is only when e person devotes himself to 
an ideal or cause that life becomes mean­
ingful. 61.3 24.2 14.5 0.0 0.0 1.5323 0.7344 +.6b
109. The present is fll too full of unhappiness, 
it is only the future which counts. 54.8 14.5 12.9 14.5 3.2 1.8063 1.1617 + .41
110. Most people just do not know what is good 
for them. 33.9 24.2 21.0 16.1 4.8 2.0468 1.1738 +.19
Average 49.9 16.1 24.1 8.0 1.9 1.8329 0.9293 + . 38













lU. People miKht to be allowed to vote won if 
they cannot do so Intelllxcntly. 58.1 ZV.J 0.0 11.3 1.6 1.7U'J7 I.U962 K,(il
'HZ. I do not nlnd'a politician's methods if he 
manages to get the right things done. 33.V 21.0 25.0 14.5 4.8 2.1129 1.1654 -.17
'U3. It is alright to get around the law if you 
so not actually break it. 37.1 9.7 32.3 17.7 3.2 2.2419 1.2140 -.03
'114. In dealing with subversives, sometimes you 
cannot always give them all the legal rights 
which peaceful citizens have, otherwise 
many will escape the law. 30.6 17.7 17.7 30.6 3.2 2.4194 1.2895 .00
115. Vs might es well make up our minds that in 
order to make the world better a lot of 
innocent people will have to suffer. 40.3 25.8 29.0 1.6 3.2 1.8548 0.9306 -.37
116. Very few politicians have clean records, so 
one should not get excited about the mud- 
throwing that sometimes takes place. 61.3 21.0 16.1 0.0 1.6 1.5161 0.7775 -.64
117. Thera are times when it almost seems better 
for the people to take the law into their 
own hende rether than wait for the machinery 
of government to set. 29.0 21.0 32.3 16.1 1.6 2.3226 1.1039 -.07
118. To bring about great changes for the bene­
fit of mankind often requires cruelty and 
even ruthlaeenesa. 53.2 6.5 25.8 9.7 4.8 1.8226 1.1574 -.34
Average -.13













119. People who hate our way of life should 
still heve a chance to talk and be heard. 66.1 27.4 3.2 0.0 3.2 1.3065 0.5844 +. 78
120. Nobody has a right to tell another person 
what he should and should not read. 77.4 14.5 1.6 6.5 0.0 1.3710 0.8079 +.77
121. Unless there is freedom for many points of 
view to be presented, there is little chance 
that the truth can even be known. 74.2 25.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2581 0.4376 +.87
122. No matter what a person's political beliefs 
are, he is entitled to the same legal rights 
and protections as anyone else. 74.2 24.2 0.0 1.6 0.0 1.2903 0.5503 +.85
123. Freedom of conscience should mean the freedom 
not to believe in any gods as well as the 
freedom to worship In the religion of one's 
choice. 69.4 29.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 3.6452 0.6500 +.84
124. You cannot really ba sure whether an opinion 
is true or not unless the people are free to 
argue against it. 51.3 37.1 0.0 1.6 0.0 3.5806 0.5833 +.78
Average 70.4 26.3 0.8 1.6 0.8 2.0732 -.6023 +.81
NOTEi Attarlik (*} aatk la nagatlva direction Itea.
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'125. A book that contains wrong political 
Views cannot be a good book and does 
not doacrvc to bo publlalicd. Jl.6 S.l 38.7 1.6 O.d 1.9032 0.97'JO -.35
'l26. In dealing with dangerous enemies oC the 
nation, we cannot a 1lord to depend on 
the courts, laws, and tholr alow unreli­
able methods. 74.2 8.1 Ib.l 1.6 a.u 1.451b 0.8167 -.u9
127. When the country Is In groat dangar, wc 
may have to force people to do certain 
thlnga against their will, even though It 
violates their rights. 69.4 27.4 1.6 1.6 0.0 1.3548 0.4983 -.31
128. A man ought not to be allowed to apeak If 
he does not know what he la talking about. 43.5 ' 21.Ü 25.8 9.7 0.0 2.0161 1.0394 -.31
Average 59.7 16.2 20.6 3.6 0.0 1.68X4 0.8584 -.54
TRAIT m i .  POLITICAL EQUALITY
lean
Ho. Statements
Strongly Strongly No Standard Absolute
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Opinion Mean Deviation Score
129. The main trouble with democracy la that
moat people do not really know what la best 
for them. 56.5 29.0 8.1 6.5 d.O 1.6452 0.8817 -.60
130. It will alVaya be necessary to have a few 
strong, capable people actually running 
everything. 53.2 22.6 24.2 0.0 0.0 1.7097 0.8306 -.52
131. Political "Issues" and arguments are beyond 
the understanding of moat of the voters. 51.6 12.9 22.6 12.9 0.0 1.9677 1.1212 -.32
132. Pew people really know what la In their own 
beet Interasta In the long run. 64.5 21.0 11.3 1.6 1.6 1.4677 0.7770 -.68
Average 56.4 21.5 16.5 5.2 0.4 1.6976 0.6526 -.53
TRAIT m i l .  ECONOMIC EQUALITY
Item
No. Statements
Strongly Strongly No Standard Absolute
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Opinion Mean Deviation Score
133. The government ought to laeke sure that 
everyone hea a good standard of living. 75.8 21.0 1.6 1.6 0.0 1.2903 0.5789 +.84
134. I think the government should give a 
person work If he cannot find another job. 71.0 27.4 1.6 0.0 0.0 1.3065 0.4948 +.84
135. There will always be poverty, so people 
might as wall get used to the fact. 83.9 4.8 11.3 0.0 0.0 1.2742 0.6518 +.61
136. Every person should have a good house, 
even If the govemmant has to build it 
for him. 61.3 19.4 14.5 4.3 0.0 1.6290 0.9022 +.59
Average 73.0 18.2 7.2 1.6 0.0 1.3750
\
0.6569 +.77
NOTKi Asterisk (*) mark la negative direction Item.
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137. There la pcacClcully no connccclon hecwcen 
yhac a politician anyo and «hat ho will do 
once he get* elected. 67.7 21.0 1.0 9.7 0.0 1.5323 0.9284 + .u8
'138. I uaually have confidence that the govern­
ment will do what la right. S8.1 19.4 19.4 1.6 1.6 1.6129 0.8680 -.57
'139. To me, moat polltlclana do not aeem to 
really mean what they aay. 45.2 40.3 1.6 12.9 0.0 1.8226 0.9759 -.52
140. No matter what people think, a few people 
will alwaya run things anyway. 41.9 29.0 8.1 19.4 1.6 2.0161 1.1569 +.33
'141. Moat polltlclana can ba trusted to do what 
they think la bast for the country. 41.9 19.4 29.0 6.5 3.2 1.9 355 1.0453 -.31
Average -.08













142. Nothing I aver do aasos to hava any real 
affect on what happena In politics. 4.8 19.4 53.2 21.0 1.6 2.8226 0.8711 -.33
143. Political parties are so big that the aver­
age meadiar has not got much to aay about 
what, gosa on. 16.1 19.4 37.1 27.4 0.0 2.8065 1.0134 -.20
Average 10.5 19.4 45.1 24.2 0.8 2.8146 0.9323 -.27
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TRAIT GROUPING BY FACTOR ANALYSIS
FACTOR





.248 .236 .614 .784
.216 -.292 .626 .518
-.029 .287 .632 .865
-.037 .424 .713 .664
.152 .341 .478 .599
-.058 -.048 .734 .929
-.205 .089 .546 .840
.014 .384 .807 .637
.396 .001 .789 .557
.173 -.225 .637 .484
.797 .063 .751 .845
-.736 .210 .767 .707
20 Political Futility 1.3374
4 Neurotic Anxiety 0.8432
8 Constant-Pie-Orientation 1.6296
9 Entrepreneurial Attitudes 1.3049
12 Superior as Vindictive 0.7503
16 Applications of Free Speech 2.5991
19 Cynicism toward Politics 1.2520
18 Economic Equality 1.4759
17 Political Equality 1.1831
3 Social Anxiety 0.5793
2 Faith-in-People 2.1787




























5 7 0 ther-Directedness 2.0582 .006 .106 -.085 .094 .786 .645 .958
10 Risk-Taking in Decisions 1.6708 -.138 .071 .045 -.068 .745 .585 .948
5 Dominance 1.5922 -.083 .276 .126 .090 .734 .646 .834
11 Control over Future 1.0104 .298 .338 .179 -.226 .621 .672 .574
1 Authoritarianism 1.0199 .182 .186 .380' -.378 .623 .743 .523
14 Rules of the Game 1.3722 .375 .377 .392 -.125 .700 .942 .520
6 Anomie 0.7047 -.483 .342 -.006 -.158 .517 .642 .416
13 Dogmatism 0.8775 -.052 .573 .440 -.018 .581 .863 .391
Total .0876 .1415 .1548 .0899 .2178 .6916
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I. Members of the Provisional Government of National Union.
(June, 1974)
1. Prince Souvanna Phouma. Prime Minister.
2. Phouml Vongvichit, Phagna. Vice Prime Minister and Minister
of Foreign Affairs.
3. Luem Insixiengmay, Phagna. Vice Prime Minister and Minister
of Education.
4. Pheng Phongsawan, Phagna. Minister of Interior and Social
Welfare.
5. Ngon Sananikone, Phagna. Minister of Finance.
6 . Souk Vongsak, Tiao. Minister of Information and Tourist.
7. Sesouk Na Champassak, Chao. Minister of Defense and Veteran
Services.
8. Singkapo Chounramany. Minister of Public Works and Transportation.
9. Khamsing Souvanlasy, Phagna. Minister of Justice.
10. Sot Phethrasy. Minister of Economics and Plans.
11. Khampheng Boupha, Phagna. Minister of Post, Telegraph, and
Telecommunications.
12. Kou Souvannemethl, Maha. Minister of Cults.
13. Khamphai Abhay, Phagna. Minister of Public Health.
14. Kham Duane Boupha. Secretary of State, Ministry of Defense.
15. Soukan Vllaysam, Phagna. Secretary of State, Ministry of Cults.
16. Deuane Souvannarath, Colonel. Secretary of State, Ministry of
Interior.
17. Guday Souvannavong, Phagraa. Secretary of State, Ministry of
Information and Tourist.
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18. Bousabong Souvannavong. Secretary of State, Ministry of Finance.
19. Houmphanh Xayasith, Phagna. Secretary of State, Ministry of
Public Works and Transportation.
20. Somvang Somsathit. Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice.
21. Touby Lyfoung, Phagna. Secretary of State, Ministry of Post,
Telegraph, and Telecommunications.
22. Ounneua Phimmasone. Secretary of State, Ministry of National
Education.
23. Tianethone Chantharasy. Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
24. Khamlieng Pholsena. Secretary of State, Ministry of Public
Health.
25. Somphou Oudomvilay, Dr. Secretary of State, Ministry of Economics
and Plans.
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II. Members of the Joint National Political Council (JNPC)
1. Souphanouvong, Prince.
2. Sisonmang Sileumsack, Tiao.
3. Kharasouk Keola, Phagna.
4. Sananh Southichak.
5. Khanphanh Vilaychack, Maha.





11. Phao Vanthanouvong, Phagna.
12. Souvanhdy.
13. Bouddy Souriyasack, Maha.




18. Duane Ratthikoune, Phagna.
19. Chao Singh.



































30. Sihalat Phasouk, Tiao.
31. Yangdao, Dr.
32. Viboun Abhay.








42. Tane Paphasalang, Dr.
M e m b e r
M e m b e r
M e m b e r
M e m b e r
M e m b e r
M e m b e r
M e m b e r
M e m b e r
M e m b e r
M e m b e r
M e m b e r
M e m b e r
M e m b e r
M e m b e r
M e m b e r
M e m b e r
M e m b e r
M e m b e r
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III. Members of the National Assembly (As Elected of January 4, 1974).
1. Chant Pathummayo
2 . "kKhamphaeng Boupha, Phagna




6 . Phone Phakonekham
Houa Rhone Province




10. Oune Rattikoune, Phagna
11. Khamla Kingsada*
12. Souk Boavong, Chao
13. Meekham Pilavan, Yanang
14. Souk Oupparavan, Phagna
15. Khamphang Yanouvong, Phia
16. Ampornsavad S. Vongkodrattana
17. Phon Morind
18. Phan Vongpid, Tid














26. Somphou Oudomvilay, Dr.*
27. Phouy Sananikone, Phagna Hoau
28. Houmphanh Xayasith, Phagna
Borikhane :Province
29. Xay Ounarome, Phagna










36. Leum Insixiengmay, Phagna*
37. Bounteng Insixiengmay*
38. Phanh Simoukda
39. Khod Vanvongsod, Phagna
40. Khamphanh Nuensavanh, Phagna
41. Khamsing Rajaboud
42. Sing Pettone





48. May Vilaysan, Phia
Attapeu Province
49. Khamtay S. Phabmixay





54. Loay Oubmalay, Phia
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Champassak Province
55. Sithad Sidthiboune, Phagna
56. Bonn Oum Na Champassak, Sadet Chao
Slthandone Province
57. Khamphai Abhay, Phagna, Dr.*




CALCULATION OF SAMPLE SIZE FOR LAO POLITICAL ELITE
X =
Strata Number of Members
1. PGNU 24
2. JNPC 42
3. National Assembly 42
3 108
/n
108 = % S a / Z  ( 4
3 "  Hi - 1
= 3 216 = 10.392
N = 108 
K = 2
D = + .10
10.392V _ S _______
X 36 
= .289
Where; n = Sample Size 
N = Universe 
X - Sample Mean
n _
2^X 108 X .289^




s = Standard Deviation of Sample 
V = Coefficient of Variation 
D = Level of Accuracy Required
K = Number of Standard Deviations associated with a 






QUANAL or Q Analysis program used in this study was developed by 
N. Van Tubergen, Mass Communication Research Bureau, School of Journalism, 
University of Iowa. The program is written in FORTRAN IV for Version 9 
of the IBM 7044 or IBM 360/65 Operating Systems. The program assumes 
these maximums; number of variables or number of test items, 109; number 
of observations or respondents, 130; and number of factors, 10.
QUANAL is a multiphrase program which allows data manipulation, 
correlation, principal components factoring, orthogonal or oblique rota­
tion to simple structure, and a summary procedure called WRAP (Weighted 
Rotational Analytic Procedure) which in Q analysis indicates the 
response patterns of the different types of people to the test items.
The program consists of eight different sub-programs arranged in 
four different phrases and a main (controlling) phrase. One of the 
features of the program permits the user to enter the execution cycle 
at nearly any phrase and terminate at any subsequent phrase. The program 
also contains a wide variety of error checking procedure and exists when 
an error is taken, a diagnostic message is written on the output unit 
and execution of the remainder of the problem is terminated.
A typical QUANAL error occurs when the user begins with
some sort of factor matrix as input. If a value greater than absolute 
5.0 is found in a C matrix input, or a value greater than absolute 1.0 is 
found in a simple structures matrix input, the program assumes that an 
erroneous read format was supplied. A message of that effect is listed 
and an error exist is taken. Such unreasonably large value could be
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accounted by incorrect card counts, and so forth.
The structure of the program is as follows:
1. Main Phrase
QUANAL — establishing routine among phrases, maintains 
blank common.
2. Phrase 1
INVMTX — a matric inversion subroutine used in phrases 
2 and 3.
PREPRS — evaluates user requests, echoes control summary 
and first rows of data, reads data by one of two procedures, 
alters data in any of three ways requested, including 
normalization.
3. Phrase 2
PRNCOM — computes Pearson correlations or intersection matrix 
and performs principal components factoring.
4. Phrase 3
ROTATE — varimax (orthogonal) or oblimax (oblique) rotation; 
or reference structure computed from user supplied trans­
formation (C) matrix.
5. Phrase 4
WRAP — provides standardized arrays for each item as seen by 
card type (factor), prepares a series of summary tables.
DSCND — routine used by WRAP to form descending arrays of z- 
scores for tabular presentation.
Examining these sub-programs in details, the pre-processor stage 
(PREPRS) allows the investigator to submit his data matrix either in R 
or Q form. The pre-processor then makes appropriate adjustments in the 
data arrangement according to the user’s request. This stage also pro­
vides means to normalize data and to reverse or add a constant to all 
scales used in the study. Optionally, the addition of a constant and 
the reversing-of-scales function may be carried out on a set of scales 
selected by the user, rather than on all scales.
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In the second phrase of the program (PRNCOM), a Pearson product- 
moment correlation matrix is produced from the data and means and 
standard deviations for all variables are reported. If the user is 
dealing with binominal, or other nominal-type scales, he may elect to 
have this phrase of the program produce an intersection matrix for 
factoring, instead of the correlation matrix. The intersection coeffici­
ents which comprise this matrix are formed by examining every possible 
pairing of the variables and counting the number of observation which 
have the same value on both variables in the current pair.l The 
coefficient equals this sum divided by the total number of observations.
Next, the correlation matrix (or intersection matrix) is evalu­
ated for principal component factors, using a procedure outlined by 
Harman.2 Communality estimates are used in the diagonal for factoring.
The number of factors produced by this program is dependent 
upon one of three things: a fixed number of factors to be extracted as
requested by the user, a maximum limit fixed by the user, or the 
program's test of eigenvalues. In the case of the latter two, the pro­
gram makes its tests and continues to factor until either the user's 
maximum is reached or the program's test is satisfied. In this test, 
the user specifies the smallest eigenvalue to be accepted for a factor.
The third phrase of the program (ROTATE) provides rotation of the 
factors to a varimax (orthogonal) or an oblimax (oblique reference 
structure) solution. The solution aimed at here should be characterized
Isee James Deese, The Structure of Association in Language and 
Thought (Baltimore: John Hopkins tress, 1965).
nHarry H. Harman, Modern Factor Analysis, 2nd ed. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1967).
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by the elements of simple structure described by Thurstone^ and summarized 
variously by Kerlinger^ arid Harman. In the event the user is not satis­
fied with one of these rotations, he may elect to determine subjectively 
his own normalized transformation (or, as Harris^ terms it, C) matrix 
from an examination of the extended vector matrix, which QUANAL always 
lists. The user wishing to employ these intuitive-graphical methods 
would plot the extended vector matrix and choose pivotal points for the 
rotation from these plots. The Harris articles contain details, as do 
several standard factor analysis texts . 6 Since QUANAL may be begun at 
any phrase and terminated at any subsequent phrase, the user can prepare 
his own normalized transformation matrix and begin the program at 
rotation, continuing from there through WRAP if desired.
The two mathematical rotation procedures used will be described 
briefly. Varimax rotation, used in this study, is performed in the 
traditional manner. The factor matrix is normalized and a maximum is 
sought for the criterion by the formula following:
V = n?m n 4 m1=1 ~jP 1^1 A
where a^^ is the normalized factor value for the jthvariable on the p*:̂
L. Thurstone, Multiple Factor Analysis (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1947).
4pred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research, 2nd ed. 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973).
^Chester W. Harris, "Direct Rotation to Primary Structure," 
Journal of Educational Psychology 39 (1948) , 449-468; and Chester W.
Harris, "Projections of Three Types of Factor Patterns," Journal of 
Educational Psychology 17 (1949), 385-403.
&For example, Benjamin Fruchter, Introduction to Factor Analysis 
(Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1954).
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factor. The computation of rotation angle follows the method described 
by Harman; all rotations greater than two degrees will be performed for 
a pair of factors. Transformation, of course, is determined iteratively. 
The criterion must not increase more than .00001 in four successive 
iterations to determine a stable maximum. The initial and final values 
for the criterion are reported, and the rotated factor matrix is 
denormalized and listed.
The oblimax rotational method used in the program also follows 
the one outlined by Harman. Under this method, a relative maximum is 
achieved for the criterion
-Î 2a  „ 2 
jpLi=i
for each factor during an iteration (where v^^ is the factor value of 
the variable on the p^^ factor). At the end of each iteration the 
overall criterion,
pi " / / [li p#i ]'
is evaluated. When K reaches a relative maximum, or stabilizes at a 
maximum (i.e., does not increase more than .00001 in four successive 
Iterations), iteration is stopped.
Transformation in the oblimax procedure is computed from roots 
of a fourth degree polynominal. QUANAL determines the roots through a 
combination of Graeffe’s root-squaring method and Newton-Raphson method.?
Refers to Isaac Newton, Universal Arithmetrik, trans. by 
Joseph Raphson (London: J. Senex, 1720); see Chester W. Harris and
Dorothy Knoell, "The Oblique Solution in Factor Analysis," Journal of 
Educational Psychology (1948), 385-403.
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The program notes the presence (but not the explicit value) of complex 
roots. Since a complex root cannot be used in the transformation, an 
orthogonal transformation (as suggested by Harman) is substituted when 
such roots occur. If such action must be taken excessively, it would 
appear that oblimax is an inappropriate rotation for the matrix in 
question; therefore, when a large number of complex roots are found 
during oblimax solution, the program automatically reverts to a varimax 
rotation.
If an oblimax solution is reached, the result is a reference 
structure matrix. The iterative process has implicitly defined a 
transformation matrix A such that
(1) V = AA
where V is the reference structure and
A is the original orthogonal factor matrix.
Since V and A are known at the end of iteration, the complete
transformation matrix A can be determined explicitly:
(2) A“^V = A 
But A is non-symetrical, so
A"^ = ((AA')~^A)'
is computed and A found from (2). The matrix A is then corrected for 
error that may accrue during iteration and the final reference struc­
ture, V, is then computed directly from (1). The matrix of correlations 
between the reference factors is determined from 
4» = A'A
The arc cosines of these correlations indicate the angles between vectors.
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The matrix V represents the correlations of the variables with 
each of the reference vectors (factors) and is of simple structure form. 
For interpreting value, however, the primary pattern matrix, P, is most 
helpful. (Harman discusses this, notably in Chapter 13.) This matrix 
P gives the coordinates of each variable with respect to the primary 
factors. The relationship between P and V may be found by normalizing 
A ^ by rows and postmultiplying the result by A, yielding the diagonal 
matrix, D. Then,
P = v d "^
The output from oblimax rotation, then, includes the initial 
and final values of the overall criterion, a record of any factors 
which have been reflected after rotation (so that each factor is at 
least 50 percent positive), the pattern matrix P, correlations and 
angles between primary factors, the reference structure matrix V, and 
the correlation matrix (with angle equivalents). Angles are expressed 
in degrees and decimal fractions of degrees.
WRAP is the fourth and final phrase of QUANAL and provides a 
summary of the Q results in terms of the semantic values of the study 
underway. WRAP first evaluates the rotated factor matrix to determine 
the presence of any bi-polar factors. A bi-polar factor is defined 
as one in which the absolute sum of the negative factor loadings is 
greater than 25 percent of the sum of the absolute values of this 
factor's loadings. (The user may adjust this criterion to another 
value if he wishes.) When a bi-polar factor is encountered, the 
negative loadings are taken from that factor and replaced with zeros. 
These negatives are then made positive and formed into an added factor. 
At this point in the processing, all factors may be seen as types—
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usually in Q studies, types of people. The factor matrix is then 
weighted, according to one of two procedures. The weighted factor 
values for the types are used to form standardized typal arrays of z- 
scores which indicate the behavior of each type of subject toward each 
item.
The arrays are computed easily. Each row of the weighted 
factor matrix is examined and the highest positive loading for that 
variable is located; all other loadings for the variable are set to zero.
Where N is the number of variables (in Q, people),
n is the number of observations (in Q, items),
p is the number of types (after the bi-polar analysis
of the rotated factor matrix),
F., is the weighted factor value of the j variable on 
the k type, and 
D , . is the response of the j variable to the 1 
observation:
NA., = V  D . . F., , where 1 = 1, n and k - 1,ik ±3 jk'
Since F., = 0 or F., = the highest positive loading for the j^^ variable, 
it is possible for a particular k that all F^^ are zero. The resulting 
array would then also be zero. If such a condition occurs, the 
zero array is eliminated at this point.
After the check for zero arrays is made and any necessary 
eliminations completed, the arrays A^^ are standardized in the usual 
manner to yield the arrays These present a standard (z) score
is for an item on a type, the stronger the response to that item by 
the people falling into that type.
From this point, WRAP is simply a program which compares com­
parative tables. First, it presents all items in the original order 
with their z's on all types. Next, it finds the Pearson correlation
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between the typal arrays. It then prepares a table of the items in 
descending order according to z-scores for each of the types.
Next, each type may be compared with each other type. Here, a 
difference between an item's z-score on one type and its z-score on 
the other type is computed and a table is formed in descending order 
of these differences (from highest positive z to highest negative z).
First Type 1 is compared with each of the others, beginning with
Type 3; etc. The user may choose to have none of these comparisons made,
or to have only selected comparisons made.
In the next section of WRAP, the program determines which items 
have their highest z-score on Type 1; these are listed as "Type 1 items 
greater than all others." Those items with their lowest z-score on 
Type 1 are next located and listed as "Type 1 items less than all others." 
This process is repeated for each type. Each of the sections of these 
tables is listed in descending order, according to the difference 
between the z-score in question and the average of all other z-scores 
for that item.
Finally, the WRAP phrase locates "consensus items" and lists 
them in descending order of their average z-score. A consensus item 
is defined as an item having a z-score difference among types no 
greater than some arbitrary value. The program assumes 1.0 as a 
criterion value, but this is adjustable at user discretion. At this 
value, one could say that a consensus item is one which, from one 
type to another, never varies in array position more than z - 1.0, or 
one standard deviation.
